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Dual Diagnosis (co-occurring mental health and substance use issues) is a pressing 
issue in health services. Despite its prevalence, research has demonstrated 
problematic practitioner-client relations; including stigmatisation and service-
exclusion of clients, and confusion and fear among practitioners about working with 
this client group. There is also a referential ambiguity about the term dual diagnosis, 
and an absence of consensus among services about its definition. Dual diagnosis may 
therefore be considered a problematic discursive phenomenon, which is constructed 
in diverse and discontinuous ways. Practitioners’ experiences of working with dual 
diagnosis clients is an under-researched area, to date. Moreover, there is a dearth of 
research on dual diagnosis in general within the discipline of counselling psychology. 
To address these shortcomings this research aimed to investigate practitioners’ 
accounts of working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients, to make visible these 
constructions and their power effects. Ten psychological practitioners (counsellors, 
psychologists and psychotherapists) were individually interviewed, and a 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis was performed. The analysis identified several 
contradictory circulating contemporary dual diagnosis discourses, which 
circumscribed dual diagnosis practice.  These discourses were deployed to resource 
five power-laden therapeutic subject positions. Four subject positions perpetuated 
asymmetric practitioner-client power relations, while one seemed to afford a more 
egalitarian practice. Overall, these findings are argued to contribute to the dual 
diagnosis literature by raising practitioners’ awareness of the power relations in their 
talk about working with clients. They may therefore offer practitioners a resource to 
develop a critical reflexivity in their practice, which may mitigate its harmful power 
effects. This is argued to be of particular relevance to counselling psychology, given 
its commitment to reflexivity and engagement with issues of power. 
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Problematising Dual Diagnosis in the Context of Psychological Practice 
 
1.1 Introduction to Chapter One 
 Dual diagnosis refers to co-occurring substance use and mental health 
problems. It is recognised as a highly problematic phenomenon in contemporary 
mental health and broader health settings (e.g., Department of Health; DoH; 2002; 
McKeown, 2010). Issues include vexed practitioner-client relations that may involve 
stigmatisation and service exclusion, practitioners’ uncertainty and negativity about 
effective practice with this client group, and an overarching confusion and lack of 
consensus about the definition of dual diagnosis itself. Problems for psychological 
practitioners—including counselling psychologists (CoPs)—thus arise from issues of 
language, in this area. 
 Although such problems with the language of dual diagnosis are evident, there 
is a dearth of research to date. In this study, I therefore used a qualitative approach to 
investigate psychological practitioners’ accounts of working therapeutically with dual 
diagnosis clients. In doing so, I employed a poststructuralist epistemology to answer 
the research question: “What are the discursive power relations in practitioners’ 
accounts of working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients?”. Ten psychological 
practitioners were interviewed about their experiences of therapeutic work with dual 
diagnosis clients. A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) was applied to the 
transcripts of these accounts to illustrate their diverse discursive practices and 
contingent power relations. 
In this chapter I will develop a rationale for undertaking this poststructuralist 
research. To do this I will first explore the problems of dual diagnosis, introduced 
above. I will then address its relevance to counselling psychology. Finally, I will 
outline the chosen poststructuralist epistemology and FDA method, and its relevance 
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for CoPs. This will provide a justification and context for the following chapters of 
this thesis. 
 
1.2  The Problem of Dual Diagnosis 
 Dual diagnosis as a psychiatric term is rooted in the theoretical segregation 
of substance use and mental health disorders in diagnostic classification systems 
(McKeown, 2010). It was first used in the US in the 1980s to identify people 
within mental health or substance misuse services who also has a diagnosis that 
was treated by the other system, and initially appeared in inverted commas. Over 
time these were gradually dropped, and it is now an established client group 
(McKeown, Derricott, Stowell-Smith & Mercer, 1997).  
 Within the literature, dual diagnosis has increasingly emerged as a 
significant problem in mental health, general health and forensic settings. It is 
estimated to affect half of substance use service users, a third of mental health 
service users, and more than 70% of the prison population in Britain (e.g., DoH, 
2002; McKeown, 2010; Mental Health Network, 2009, 2011; Prison Reform Trust, 
2011). However, the epidemiological picture is unclear, and prevalence estimates 
vary widely (Hill, Penson & Charura, 2016; Schulte & Holland, 2008). 
Furthermore, while some have argued that its prevalence has been overestimated 
(Roberts & Jones, 2012), others have argued that these estimates significantly 
under-represent the scale of the problem (Rosenthal, 2015). This confusion may be 
unsurprising, given that there is currently no agreed operational definition of dual 
diagnosis (Hryb, Kirkhart & Talbert, 2007).  “Classic” dual diagnosis refers to co-
occurring severe mental health diagnoses and substance misuse (UK Drug Policy 
Commission, 2012). The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE; 
2016) uses this definition, and specifies these diagnoses as “schizophrenia, 
schizotypal and delusional disorders, or bipolar affective disorder, or severe 
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depressive episodes with or without psychotic episodes” (p. 20). Substance use 
services, by contrast, tend to define dual diagnosis less strictly (Roberts & Jones, 
2012). And clinicians have argued that a strict definition provides an arbitrary 
barrier to care that serves to exclude those who do not reach the required threshold 
(Guest & Holland, 2011; Velleman & Baker, 2008). Yet others have argued that 
looser definitions render the term meaningless (McKeown, Stowell-Smith 
Derricott & Mercer, 1998).  
These disagreements about prevalence and definition are argued to 
illustrate the issues and ambiguities of language in contemporary dual diagnosis 
practice. At present, dual diagnosis may potentially be applied to a variety of 
combinations of mental health and substance use problems. It has consequently 
been criticised as an umbrella term that lacks clinical clarity (Cosci & Fava, 2011; 
Velleman & Baker, 2008). Indeed, clinicians have argued that dual diagnosis is not 
a diagnosis itself, but a descriptor of co-existing mental health and substance use 
disorders (Banerjee, Clancy & Crome, 2002). The term has also been criticised for 
its stigmatising capacity (Guest & Holland, 2011; Webb, 2010) and for 
representing the medical colonisation of the substance use care sector, with 
attendant issues of power and control (McKeown et al., 1998; Velleman & Baker, 
2008). Dual diagnosis is therefore recognised both as a pressing problem—
although how pressing seems unclear—and a confusing term that is critiqued and 
questioned yet widely used, including in the title of several peer-reviewed journals. 
Questions of language in clinical practice are to the fore, and worthy of research. 
 Further evidence of the ambiguities of language use are found in the 
literature regarding service provision. The Dual Diagnosis Good Practice Guide 
(DoH, 2002) stipulated that mental health services should be responsible for 
anyone with a severe mental health and substance use problem, with integrated 
care as the norm. Yet this guide provided no index for this severity, asserting 
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instead that local services needed to create their own, for the purposes of their 
inclusion criteria. From a linguistic perspective, this guidance may therefore have 
created more problems than it solved. Indeed, integrated care for dual diagnosis 
clients remains the exception to the rule (All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Complex Needs and Dual Diagnosis, 2014; Schulte, Meier, Stirling & Berry, 
2008), and the separation of mental health and substance use services persists. 
There is now a recognised ping-pong effect (Lawrence-Jones, 2010) with dual 
diagnosis clients, who are often shuttled between mental health and substance use 
services, with negative consequences for their care. Moreover, this lack of 
integration may lead to clients being excluded from substance use services because 
of their mental health problems, and vice versa. Service exclusion is a significant 
problem for dual diagnosis clients (Home Office, 2017; NICE, 2016).  
 Interestingly, within these ambiguities and confusions, service users who 
receive a dual diagnosis are also described as problematic. For example, within the 
psychiatric literature dual diagnosis clients are variously described as “notoriously 
difficult to help” (Gerevich, Bacskai & Meggyes, 2005, p. 299), “an extremely 
challenging client group to engage” (Donald, Dower & Kavanagh, 2005, p. 1371), 
being quick to drop out of treatment (Horsfall, Cleary, Hunt & Walter, 2009), and 
making slow progress (Schulte, Meier, Sterling & Berry, 2010). There additionally 
seems to be much confusion about what may work therapeutically with this client 
group. While several psychological treatment protocols have been identified, 
including motivational interviewing, CBT and group counselling (Drake, O’Neal 
& Wallach, 2008; Horsfall et al., 2009), a recent Cochrane Review found “no 
compelling evidence” (Hunt, Siegfried, Morley, Sitharthan & Cleary, 2013, p. 2) 
for one protocol over another to engage clients in treatment, reduce their substance 
use or improve mental health.  
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 The negative assumptions about dual diagnosis clients and uncertainty 
about effective therapeutic approaches seem to contribute to research findings that 
mental health professionals have experienced working with dual diagnosis clients 
as a seemingly impossible challenge (Coombes & Wratten, 2009), dual diagnosis 
workers can feel deskilled and helpless in dealing with their clients (Adams, 
2008), and dual diagnosis training can erase practitioners’ confidence (Roberts & 
Jones, 2012). Researchers have also found that mental health professionals can 
respond moralistically to clients’ substance use, leading to questions about their 
deservingness of care (Chorlton, Smith & Jones, 2015). Prejudice and stigma by 
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals towards clients can be common 
(e.g., Avery et al., 2013; Ralley, Allott, Hare & Wittkowski, 2009). Research with 
dual diagnosis clients has echoed these findings. Clients have reported 
inadequacies in service provision and professionals’ competencies and skills, 
while also experiencing stigmatisation (Lawrence-Jones, 2010). They have 
additionally reported misgivings about forming relationships with professionals, 
due to fears of being ridiculed or judged (Chorlton et al., 2015). 
 From these examples, the current picture of dual diagnosis clinical practice 
and service provision seems confusing and pessimistic. As the literature 
emphasises the enormity and intractability of the problem, it is also marked by 
disagreement about the term’s definition, its prevalence, and the effectiveness of 
therapeutic approaches with the client group. Both practitioners and clients may 
approach interactions with trepidation and low expectations, and moralising 
judgements and service exclusion are ongoing problems.  
Overall, it seems that problems of language predominate with dual 
diagnosis. In the context of the contemporary separation of substance use and 
mental health care provision, these have considerable implications. Disagreements 
over definition can lead to poor care, or no care at all (Velleman & Baker, 2008). 
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Moreover, the dual diagnosis label “itself can lead negative staff attitudes, poorer 
care and subsequently worse outcomes” (Ralley et al., 2009, p. 149). The literature 
thus demonstrates that the field’s linguistic ambiguities and issues can have 
pronounced power effects, which may impact practitioner-client interactions. 
While dual diagnosis is an increasingly fertile research area, there is a paucity of 
studies of practitioners’ experiences of therapeutic work with dual diagnosis 
clients. The problematic practitioner-client power relations identified in the above 
studies indicate that such research is warranted. Moreover, I argue, a 
poststructuralist study that attends to the power effects of practitioners’ talk is 
appropriate, in this context. 
 My interest in dual diagnosis stems in part from my work in a substance 
use service, where I witnessed the effects of the separation of mental health and 
substance use support on dual diagnosis clients: I will return to this in Chapter 3. It 
is also rooted in my training as a counselling psychologist. In the next section I 
will discuss counselling psychology and the relevance of this research to the field 
in more detail.  
 
1.3 Dual Diagnosis and Counselling Psychology 
 The discipline of counselling psychology is a comparatively recent 
development in the field of applied psychology. It emerged in the UK in the early 
1980s as a response to increasing interest among graduates of psychology in its 
psychotherapeutic application. The British Psychological Society (BPS) set up a 
section of counselling psychology in 1982, and in 1994 it achieved full divisional 
status. Its origins were influenced by mainstream psychology, European 
psychotherapy and humanistic philosophy (Hanley & Amos, 2018; James, 2018; 
Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). This humanistic value base leads to a 
conceptualisation of humans as relational beings, and a similarly relational 
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perspective on psychological distress. It also marks out the discipline as distinct 
from other branches of applied psychology (Diamond, 2010; Hanley & Amos, 
2018). 
 Reflecting its origins both within and outside psychology, counselling 
psychology is also rooted in a postmodern philosophical pluralism (James, 2018; 
McAteer, 2010; Rizq, 2010). It is therefore inclusive of multiple epistemological 
paradigms and therapeutic approaches. Indeed, counselling psychology training 
requires clinical competency in more than one therapeutic modality. This positions 
CoPs as flexible practitioners who can work with an array of problems in a range 
of settings (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). CoPs therefore must negotiate diverse 
and sometimes contradictory theoretical models and ideologies in practice. This 
entails holding tensions, rather than resolving them (Orlans & Van Scoyoc, 2010).  
 One such tension is between CoPs’ stance as both scientist practitioners 
and reflective-practitioners. The scientist-practitioner model is incorporated from 
clinical psychology and demonstrates counselling psychology’s commitment to 
research and practice. The latter model demonstrates a commitment to self-
reflection and an ongoing consideration of the impact of one’s assumptions, 
feelings and actions on the therapeutic relationship (Hanley & Amos, 2018; Wolfe, 
2016). These two perspectives may lead to competing visions of the nature of 
psychological research: scientific research is often within a positivist, quantitative 
paradigm predicated on statistical significance, which may be less relevant to 
counselling psychology’s holistic view of the person. Consequently, counselling 
psychology adopts a methodological pluralism towards research. A range of 
methods are considered valid and useful (Hanley & Amos, 2018). 
 The tensions within counselling psychology are also prevalent in relation to 
medical knowledge systems of distress and psychiatric diagnosis. These are central 
to the scientist-practitioner model, and locate the practitioner as an active expert 
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applying knowledge to a more passive client, who is assumed to be suffering from 
identifiable symptoms (Woolfe, 2016). Yet from counselling psychology’s 
humanistic perspective, the medical model may ignore context and the view of the 
whole person, and rely on normative assumptions. Larsson, Brooks and 
Loewenthal (2012) argue that counselling psychology is thus located between two 
competing epistemological positions regarding diagnosis. On the one hand, it 
should engage with the medical model while retaining a critical stance, and on the 
other it should uphold its nonpathologising and relational values (Woolfe, 2016). 
A commitment to egalitarian practice and an engagement with issues of power is 
thus required (Cooper, 2009; Steffen & Hanley, 2013). 
 Given its engagement with the medical model and interest in the 
therapeutic relationship, research on practitioners’ experiences of working 
therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients is argued to be a relevant area of study 
within counselling psychology. There is also a paucity of counselling psychology 
research on dual diagnosis at present, which may be an omission given its apparent 
prevalence. Furthermore, counselling psychology attends to the use of language in 
practice, and its impact on client work. It recognises that “all theories about 
therapeutic practice situate clients and the conception of their problems in 
normative discourses” (Woolfe, 2016, p. 10). Therefore, a poststructuralist 
approach that investigates the power effects of practitioners’ talk while 
maintaining a critical and non-essentialist stance towards knowledge is also 
suitable: although this may lead to further tensions with counselling psychology 
that I will discuss below. In the next sections I will describe this poststructuralist 
epistemology, with reference to the work of the French historian, critical theorist 




1.4  Language and Poststructuralism 
 Poststructuralism refers to a heterogeneous group of ideas that arose in 
continental European philosophy during the political ferment of the 1960s and 1970s 
(Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008; Gergen & Gergen, 2008). These build upon 
structuralism’s critique of the modernist notion of an objective and independent truth 
with discoverable essential principles, and a reality that is “both prior to and 
independent of representation” (Edley, 2001, p. 435). Structuralism posits that rather 
than reflecting reality, language constructs and organises it. Moreover, humans are 
the products, or subjects, of these necessarily social and relational processes. The 
“self” is therefore radically decentred. It is revealed not as an unchanging core 
essence, but as discontinuous and constantly in flux in the social situation (Burr, 
2003; Gergen, 2015; Gergen & Gergen, 2008; Sarup, 1993). 
 Structuralism posits that while the relationship between signifier and signified 
is arbitrary, it is also stable, identifiable, and independent of individual use. It is 
therefore primarily concerned with investigating these structures. Poststructuralism, 
by contrast, holds that language is not a predictable system. Meaning is fluid, 
contestable and changing over time, and language has effects—not least in terms of 
power—beyond its structure and content. Consequently, poststructuralists focus on 
processes and representation in language as discourse. They investigate the causes 
and effects of discourses, and how they have been historically and culturally 
produced (Burr, 2003; Carter, 2013). From this perspective, social processes are 
inextricable from the production and nature of knowledge (Gergen, 2015; Hook, 
2007; Randol, 2014). Poststructuralism is perhaps most strongly associated with 





1.5  Foucault and Discourse 
 Although Foucault’s earlier archaeological studies are structuralist, he came to 
focus on the power effects of discourse in the social construction of reality in his 
poststructuralist genealogical work (Carter, 2013; Weinberg, 2008). Here, his 
objective was to “create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, 
human beings are made subjects” (Foucault, 1983/2002, p. 326). Scholars have 
described Foucault’s conceptualisation of discourse as referring to, or ways of 
constituting, bodies or systems of knowledge and encompassing the rules and 
divisions therein. Discourses invariably have a historical underpinning (e.g., Arney & 
Bergen, 1984; Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008; Carter, 2013; Miller, 2008). The 
delineation of discourses-as-knowledge (Hook, 2007) emphasises that these practices 
are inextricably linked to, and bound up in a circular and productive relationship with, 
the exercise of power. Discourses are self-legitimating versions of the world that 
societies “accept and make function as true” (Foucault, 1980/1991, p. 73). As regimes 
of truth, they disqualify competing versions (Miller, 2008) such that they may be 
considered “weapons of attack and defence in relations of power and knowledge” 
(Sarup, 1993, p. 66). In determining “what can and must be thought” (Foucault, 
1984/1992, p. 6), discourses constitute humans as subjects. Thus, discourses are 
simultaneously productive and constraining. They are opaque, strategic and power-
laden (O’Callaghan, in press): this conceptualisation of discourse is argued to be 
suited to research investigating dual diagnosis practitioners’ talk, given the linguistic 
confusion and asymmetric power relations that may characterise dual diagnosis 
practice. 
 Foucault was particularly concerned with the role of the sciences in the 
production and propagation of discourse. He argued that in the late 18th century, the 
incipient medical sciences deployed new discourses that functioned as dividing 
practices (Foucault, 1983/2002). These discourses facilitated the establishment of 
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norms that served to categorise, individualise, and produce new types of humans with 
highly efficient and subtle power effects (e.g., Foucault, 1975/1991, 1976/1998, 
2001). Of relevance to this study, Foucault (1964/2001) contended that an emerging 
eighteenth century discourse of madness-as-disease served as a dividing practice to 
constitute and separate the sane from the insane: these figures came into being as this 
discourse’s product and effect. This discourse both made modern psychiatry possible 
and imbued it with a legitimacy and authority that facilitated its development as an 
expert position (Joranger, 2016; Loewenthal & Snell, 2003; Zhao, 2012): I will return 
to this in Chapter Two.  
 Foucault (1983/2002) additionally argued that through discourses humans 
constitute themselves as subjects. In this submission of subjectivity, these discourses 
function as a “law of truth” (p. 331) that humans recognise in themselves and others. 
Thus, they unwittingly recruit themselves into these relations of power/knowledge 
(Bailey, 2005; Rose, 1998). The problematisation of dual diagnosis clients in the 
literature discussed above, alongside practitioners’ reported difficulties with these 
clients, suggests that such processes may be at work in contemporary dual diagnosis 
practice. The analysis below intends to address this. 
Scholars have divided Foucault’s oeuvre into sections, which broadly relate 
to his differing conceptualisations of power (e.g., Miller, 2008; Thompson, 2003). 
In his earlier and middle work, power is conceptualised as a strategic force 
permeating all levels of society. In this top-down model the subject is entirely 
constructed, or subjected, by discourse, and ensnared within its power relations 
(Miller, 2008; Vintges, 2012). Foucault’s conception of disciplinary power 
(1975/1991), which produces docile bodies and behaviour through individualising 
practices of hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and examination, is 
emblematic of this strategic model. 
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However, Foucault (1976/1998) also argued that resistance is a necessary 
precondition for the existence and exercise of power, and vice versa. Within the 
strategic model’s totalising power relations, it is unclear to what extent resistance 
is possible (Miller, 2008). Moreover, this resistance is conceptualised as a direct 
confrontation of a dominant power that is bound to be futile because it is “always 
determined by its engagement with an ascending force; its only options are to 
comply with or refuse the challenge” (Thompson, 2003, p. 120). This model failed 
to account historically or conceptually for the workings of power, resistance and 
subjectivity.  
Therefore, in his late work Foucault reconceptualised power as 
governmental. In this model, it indirectly acts on actions by determining their 
“field of possibilities” (Foucault, 1983/2002, p. 341). Here, freedom is intrinsic to 
the operation of power (Thompson, 2003). This freedom may take the form of a 
technology of the self, in which people perform various operations on their own 
thoughts and conduct (Foucault, 2000d). However, this may also render them 
subject to their own identities such that they may “act out of a tendency to conform 
to the regulations and ongoing practices of the various social agencies that define 
and shape these identities” (Thompson, 2003, p. 130). The truth-telling practices of 
psychotherapy are particularly implicated here, within which the confessional self 
is formed (Besley, 2005; Burr & Butt, 2000; Rose, 1998).  The governmental 
model thus provides a more robust account of how humans construct themselves 
through the available discursive resources, and how they become self-regulating 
subjects. 
In his final works, Foucault (1984/1990, 1984/1992) returned to these 
technologies of the self as potentially offering a degree of emancipation from these 
power relations. Key here is the practice of critique, through which “we pose the 
limits of our most sure ways of knowing” (Butler, 2001, p. 3). Critique thus 
 23 
involves refusing the individuality that has been imposed, particularly through 
scientific discourses. Bringing it to bear on technologies of the self facilitates an 
relatively autonomous and ethical self-formation leading to more egalitarian 
relationships with others, rather than a self-regulation that perpetuates these 
relations of power (Thompson, 2003; Vintges, 2012). This research will consider 
the strategic and governmental models of power, and the relatively emancipatory 
potential of critique, to highlight the power relations in participants’ accounts of 
working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients. 
 
1.6  Foucault, the Poststructuralist Epistemology and Counselling Psychology 
 In asserting the primacy of discourse in constructing reality, a poststructuralist 
epistemology takes an anti-essentialist and relativist position that unsettles the 
aforesaid modernist notions of truth, reality, and objectivity.  Foucault, who once 
trained as a psychologist, argued that psychology played a prominent truth- and 
reality-producing role in contemporary society, and thus had a central place in 
modern governmental economies of power (Hook, 2007).  
 This epistemology was introduced into psychology in the 1980s, in the form 
of FDA (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008; Willig, 2013). In keeping with 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of his work as an ‘antiscience' through which traditional 
narratives of subjectivity and truth are reread (Carter, 2013; Hook, 2007), its 
introduction was intended to challenge the assumptions of mainstream psychology, as 
well as highlighting how it constructs the objects that it studies and purports to 
explain. Consequently, FDA is strongly linked with critical psychology (Willig, 
2013; Parker, 2013).  
 This research method may be considered part of a critical-ideological 
research paradigm (Ponteretto, 2005) that views lived experience as constructed in 
language and “mediated by power relations within social and historical contexts” (p. 
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130). Research thus aims to reveal the constructed nature of experience and our 
taken-for-granted assumptions, and the strategic and ideological power relations 
therein, so that we might liberated from their grasp (Gergen & Gergen, 2008; 
Ponteretto, 2005; Parker, 2013; Hook, 2007). As I will discuss in Chapter Three, the 
present research is located within this critical-ideological paradigm.  
 While this seems in keeping with counselling psychology’s commitment to 
engage with power issues in practice, this research method may also be in tension 
with counselling psychology itself, as a professionalized discipline of applied 
psychology. I think that this tension is further enhanced by counselling psychology’s 
humanistic roots. Foucault was profoundly critical of humanism which, he argued, 
underpinned the Enlightenment and its human sciences that constituted the modern 
subject and entrapped this subject within totalising relations of power (Alessandrini, 
2009; Olssen, 2003). I will consider this tension in Chapter Five. 
 
1.7 Overview of Aims and Potential Contribution of this Research 
 This chapter has argued that dual diagnosis is a problematic clinical 
phenomenon. Terminological confusion and debate are at the fore with this 
phenomenon. Research has also demonstrated that asymmetric power relations can be 
prevalent between dual diagnosis practitioners and clients. It may be unsurprising, 
therefore, that dual diagnosis has been described as a “vexed discourse” (Roberts & 
Jones, 2012, p. 666). 
 However, there is currently a paucity of research on the experience of 
therapeutic practice with this client group, not least within counselling psychology. 
This research intends to address this shortcoming by investigating ten psychological 
practitioners’ accounts of working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients. In 
doing so, a FDA is applied to attend to the discursive power games within these 
accounts. This method is argued to be appropriate, given the aforesaid problematic 
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discourse and practitioner-client power relations. The application of a critical 
poststructuralist epistemology to this research aims to alert practitioners—not least 
counselling psychologists—to the discursive resources they may draw on in their 
practice with this client group, and the discursive rules that may shape their 
understandings. It also aims to raise practitioners’ awareness of the power relations 
they may unknowingly be situated within, and the regimes of truth they may both be 
subject to and perpetuate.  
 To address these aims, in Chapter Two I apply this poststructuralist 
perspective by offering a genealogical analysis of dual diagnosis. In Chapter Three I 
detail the methodology and method adopted in this research. Chapter Four presents 
the findings of this research’s FDA of ten practitioners accounts of working 
therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients. In Chapter Five I offer a conclusion for 
this research by discussing and evaluating its findings and possible contributions to 
the field of psychological practice with dual diagnosis clients, and counselling 














A Genealogical Approach to Dual Diagnosis 
“However, if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if 
he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ 
behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they 
have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in piecemeal fashion 
from alien forms” (Foucault, 1971/1991, p. 78)  
 
2.1 Introduction to Chapter Two 
In this chapter I will review relevant literatures by providing a genealogical 
study of dual diagnosis.  As a critical history, Foucault used a genealogical lens to 
trace the emergence and historical course of discourses in their wider social, political 
and cultural context, to provide a history of their present uses. In exposing the 
contingency, complexity and fragility of these historical foundations, genealogy 
defamiliarises the present and unmasks the institutional and embodied power effects 
of discourses, so that they can be contested (Hook, 2007).  
 Dual diagnosis is a contemporary psychiatric term, informed in its present 
uses by diverse historically inherited discursive resources. I will detail its discursive 
production in the context of Foucault’s (1964/2001, 2000c) critical histories of 
psychiatry and mental illness and more recent examples thereof (e.g., Porter, 2013; 
Scull, 2015), and genealogical studies of addiction (e.g., Fox, 2015; Levine, 1978, 
2015; Reinarman 2005; Reith, 2004; Room, 2015; Valverde, 1997). I will note the 
discursive turns in constitutions of mental illness and addiction, the convergences and 
divergences of these discourses and their subjects¾the mental patient and the 
addict¾and how they are combined in dual diagnosis with specific power effects. In 
keeping with this study’s poststructuralist epistemology, in this chapter I assume that 
these discursive phenomena do not pre-exist language but are constituted through 
circularly productive social processes. From this perspective, medical and 
psychological discourses produce the phenomena they claim to describe and explain. 
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2.2 Foucault, the Genealogy of Madness, Psychiatry, and the Psy-Complex 
 In Madness and Civilization (1964/2001), Foucault traced the birth of 
psychiatry and its modern constructions of madness as mental illness. He argued that 
these emerged in the context of the Great Confinements of the poor, sick and 
unemployed in seventeenth century Europe. These were both a political decision 
designed to prevent civil unrest, and a moral one, rooted in an emerging bourgeois 
ethic of the virtue of work. Confinement thus represented a synthesis of morality and 
law. Prior to these confinements madness was broadly considered a natural, if 
extreme state: Porter (2013) claims that religious constructions of madness as divine 
or demonic possession predominated. The mad were beyond reason, but not sick, and 
were initially undifferentiated from the other internees in the confinement houses. 
However, within these houses the mad came to be distinguished through this new 
bourgeois ethic, by their apparent willingness to exclude themselves from work. Thus 
madness began to be constituted in moral terms, and “the solidarity between sick and 
healthy, unreason and reason, disappeared” (Joranger, 2016, p. 314). 
Throughout the eighteenth century a new medicalised construction of 
madness emerged, within this bourgeois moral frame of intelligibility. It was 
theorised to result from nervous irritation due to overstimulation, which excessive 
passions of all types could trigger. This incorporated guilt into the concept: one’s own 
feelings were the cause of insanity. Thus, madness was constituted as “the 
psychological effect of a moral fault” (Foucault, 1964/2001, p. 148). This made a 
distinction between physical and mental treatment possible, providing a space for 
psychiatry to emerge. Porter (2013) asserts that these secular discourses were partly 
deployed by the ruling classes because they held greater potential for social control 
than religious discourses, which had proved ineffective in this regard. 
During the eighteenth century, a great fear of confinement houses as the 
source of a contagious madness gradually spread throughout society, which was 
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rapidly changing. Liberty, knowledge and civilisation itself were considered potential 
causes of madness, by arousing the passions excessively. This discourse was 
formalised in several new disease constructs. In England, George Cheyne (1671-
1743) conceptualised the English malady, a nervous disease caused by—and a mark 
of—civilisation. In America, Dr Benjamin Rush (see below) similarly conceptualised 
anarchia, an insanity resulting from excessive passion for liberty (Scull, 2015).  
These newly constituted mental disorders seemed to serve as a repository for broader 
concerns about modernity and social change.  
A vigorous critique of confinement then arose, centred on the mad. However, 
the injustice was that others were confined with them: confinement itself was now 
considered another source of madness. The rationale for general confinement 
collapsed. Yet the insane were considered too socially disruptive and economically 
unproductive to release, and so were imprisoned. 
 According to the legend of psychiatry’s birth, the enlightened pioneers 
Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) in France and William Tuke (1732-1822) in England 
entered the prisons and delivered the mad from their brutal internment, establishing in 
the process the new science of psychiatry and its humane asylums. However, 
Foucault (1964/2001) argued that this myth obscures a more complex arrangement. 
Tuke and Pinel instigated treatment regimes that were predicated on constructions of 
madness as a breakdown of morality and rationality, and organised around the 
principles of judgement and surveillance. Through the latter, the former was 
perpetual, and punishment immediate. The mad were to recognise their own madness, 
take responsibility for their actions that led to it, and feel remorse. They were to enact 
their own self-restraint, through which they would be liberated from their illness. This 
introduced notions of the will and willpower into madness, which were—and 
remain—central to medical constructions of addiction; see below. Through 
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surveillance madness increasingly came to understood and recognised through norms 
of behaviour. This made psychology as a distinct discipline possible. 
The asylum thus embodied the bourgeois moral code. The mad were expected 
to learn work’s virtues.  Self-control and familial devotion were emphasised. In this 
moral order, the doctor assumed the form of the parent and judge, confronting the 
childlike madness and weak will of the insane. Indeed, the physician’s superior 
character, expertise and moral example established a psychological and moral 
ascendancy over his charges that was considered optimally efficacious (Porter, 2013). 
Those who transgressed this moral code by failing to show remorse, refusing to work 
or stealing, were systematically excluded from this family. This seems to prefigure 
the current widespread exclusion of dual diagnosis clients from mental health 
services, justified by their failure to maintain abstinence (see section 1.2).   
Therefore, Foucault (2000a) argued, the asylum enacted dominating power 
relations whereby the insane became “citizens without rights, delivered over to the 
arbitrariness of the doctors and orderlies, whose own power increased symmetrically 
with the diminishment of their charges” (p. 48). The pioneers of psychiatry freed the 
mad from their iron manacles, only to enchain them more comprehensively in this 
regime of moral and psychological constraint. 
  Psychiatrists’ authority derived from this double role of parent and judge. In 
the ensuing decades, this was obscured as psychiatry increasingly deployed 
discourses of positivism, such that today this authority is thought to stem from their 
medical status. Yet for Foucault (1964/2001, 2000c) psychiatry remains an indelibly 
moral practice. This assertion seems to be supported by the above descriptions of dual 
diagnosis clients as “lacking motivation” and being “notoriously difficult to help”, 
within the literature (see section 1.2). Foucault (2000c) later noted that the positivistic 
discourse of psychiatry was—and remains— inevitably circular. Psychiatry 
constructed a morality-based and behaviourally normative “truth” of madness as a 
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disease. It then developed the tests to confirm and manifest this truth, based on these 
norms. And through this new knowledge psychiatry justified its medical power, and 
madness was confirmed as such a disease. In short, psychiatry produced the 
symptoms it described, and on this basis administered its treatments. This had 
dramatic power effects. Madness was: 
constituted as an object of possible knowledge for a medical science, that 
constituted it as an illness, at the very moment when the “subject”, 
stricken with the illness, found himself disqualified as insane—which is 
to say, stripped of any power and any knowledge concerning his illness 
(Foucault, 2000a, p. 49) 
 
Psychiatry thus became a dividing practice par excellence. It produced and 
individualised the mentally ill, and delineated them from the rest of society. Indeed, 
the asylum was a “marvelous harmony” (Foucault, 2000c, p. 49) between a state 
wanting social control, and a medical profession wanting the isolation of patients to 
establish and enhance its status: in England a medical presence was required by law 
in all asylums after the 1820s, and a letter from a physician was required for 
confinement (Porter, 2013). Moreover the state took an increasing role in confining 
the mad, through licensing asylums and standardising care. This coincided with the 
century’s exponential growth in the asylum population, which Scull (2015) argues 
was the true Great Confinement. These numbers were predominantly drawn from the 
industrial working classes, and women were disproportionately the recipients of 
mental treatments both within and beyond asylums (Porter, 2013).  
 Although Foucault did not articulate his strategic power model until some two 
decades after Madness and Civilization was published, the power relations therein 
exemplify it. Normalising judgement and surveillance were key instruments by which 
he theorised that disciplinary power functions (Foucault, 1975/1991). Perhaps these 
power relations also prefigure those of governmentality, since treatment involved 
patients regulating their own behaviour to rejoin society. 
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 Others have expanded upon Foucault’s argument and its governmental 
implications in articulating the psy-complex (e.g., Danziger, 1990; Parker, 2018; 
Rose, 1985, 1998); the disciplines of psychiatry, psychology, psychotherapy and 
psychoanalysis that, through their inexorably expanding bodies of knowledge, have 
been responsible for the “production and complexification” (Guilfoyle, 2001, p. 151) 
of the individual in the West. The psy-complex’s diverse systems of knowledge 
enjoin people “to govern themselves as subjects simultaneously of liberty and of 
responsibility” (Rose, 1998, p. 12). It continues to spread throughout life, 
problematising new domains.  
 
2.3 A Genealogical Approach to Addiction 
In this section I will summarise scholars’ contributions to a genealogy of 
addiction, to highlight the discursive turns that have influenced its present medical 
problematisation of behaviour. In doing so I will focus initially on alcohol 
consumption, in relation to which addiction was first articulated before being applied 
to consumption of other substances. I will detail the various constructions of 
addiction of the past two centuries, their subjects, and their power relations.  
 
 2.3.1 Drinking in the pre-Modern and early Modern era. 
 References to alcohol consumption and drunkenness date back to the earliest 
recorded human history. Winemaking reached ancient Greece around 2000 BCE, and 
the Romans subsequently spread it throughout their empire: the term addiction is 
Roman in origin, signifying a legal designation of enslavement as punishment for 
unpaid debts (Smith, 2010). The ancient bacchanalian drinking traditions held sway 
in the West until the Middle Ages. Drinking was part of everyday life for millennia, 
and drunkenness considered its common and harmless consequence. The medieval 
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figure of the drunkard was presumed to drink because he or she enjoyed it. No 
internal flaw was inferred (Levine, 2015; Nathan, Conrad & Skinstad, 2016). 
In the early modern era, concurrent with the Great Confinement, protestantism 
and capitalism combined to create capitalist market economies, which rapidly 
transformed society. Traditional support networks weakened, and families became 
highly reliant on people’s capacity to regulate their own behaviour to succeed. This 
led to the constitution of the modern Western liberal self as free-born and possessing 
a free will. This discourse objectified the liberal subject as rational, autonomous, self-
directed and sober (Levine, 2015; Reinarman & Granfield, 2015, Room 2015; Rose 
1998; Weinberg, 2008). It underpinned the aforesaid bourgeois moral code. 
At the same time, there was a massive upsurge in consumption of grain-based 
spirits. Low taxation and large harvests meant they rapidly replaced wine and beer 
due to their cheapness. This caused a sharp rise in drunkenness, and serious health 
consequences including a spike in infant mortality. It reached its peak in the British 
Gin Crazes of the 1730s and 1740s, which led to history’s first drug scare (Brennan, 
2004). New constructions of alcohol and drunkenness as a threat to society emerged, 
and Parliament raised taxes and passed new laws to limit its consumption (Duff 
Gordon, 2017; McCandless, 1984). This moral panic, like the great fear of 
confinement, may have functioned as a repository for concerns about societal change.  
Throughout the eighteenth century religious discourse began to problematise 
drunkenness for its deleterious effects on piety and productivity. Protestant 
clergymen sermonised on its ills. They noted drunkards’ apparent difficulty in giving 
up their habit and their suffering in this world and the next, which their routine 
avoidance of social and familial responsibilities would ensure (Levine, 1978, 2015). 




2.3.2 The discursive production of addiction as a disease. 
 These historical circumstances provided the context for the emergence of the 
modern medical construction of addiction, in the late eighteenth century. According 
to Levine (1978, 2015), the key figure in this process was the American physician, 
social reformer and politician—and proponent of anarchia—Dr Benjamin Rush 
(1746-1813). He proposed that drunkards were addicted to alcohol, and this addiction 
took hold progressively. He conceptualised this addiction behaviourally, as a loss of 
control over drinking. This, he argued, was a disease of the will, named alcoholism. 
And he proposed a cure of total abstinence. In Britain, the Naval doctor Thomas 
Trotter (1760-1832) independently and concurrently came to a similar conclusion 
(Edwards, 2012; McCandless, 1984). Rush (1812) and Trotter (1804) thus 
reconstituted the harmless drunkard as the diseased alcoholic. They also constructed 
this new disease of alcoholism, which was recognisable through behavioural norms. 
They claimed this figure and disease for medicine and laid the foundation for its 
psychiatric and psychological treatment. As the will was the disease site, alcoholism 
was a necessarily modern and liberal affliction (Valverde, 1997). It seemed to share a 
moral root with medical constructions of madness (see section 2.2). The resilience of 
this construction is evident by its continuing centrality to the ideology of Alcoholics 
Anonymous; see below.  
Rush (1835) additionally proposed that these alcoholics should be treated in 
Sober Houses, where they might be confined against their will. He justified this on 
the grounds of maintaining order, as their compulsiveness was a threat to society 
(Duff Gordon, 2017). This objectified alcoholics not merely as diseased, but 
dangerous: the interests of medicine and the state seemed to align here, too. 
Moreover, I argue, the alcoholic was rendered childlike through this 
incapacity to exercise self-restraint, and inferior to the patriarchal doctor whose 
willpower remained exemplary. As unruly children, their enforced treatment was 
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justified. The alcoholic seemed to have been located within similarly asymmetric 
power relations as the mental patient, and the product of the same social and political 
forces. 
  Scholars have argued that the concept of alcoholism predates Rush and Trotter 
by decades (e.g., Berridge, Walke & Mold, 2014; Porter, 1985). However, it was in 
their work that the disease concept, its product the alcoholic, and the medical 
profession’s central role in its diagnosis and treatment was first fully articulated. This 
marked a significant discursive shift, which engendered new power relations around 
alcohol. These ideas were initially slow to spread in the nineteenth century.  Heavy 
drinking remained commonplace, and alcohol’s effects were not considered 
inevitably deleterious throughout society (Levine, 1978, 2015; Porter, 1985). The 
popularisation of this discourse was primarily due to two interrelated processes 
against the backdrop of the era’s immense changes: the evangelical temperance 
movement and the drive to professionalise medicine. 
 
2.3.3 Addiction in the nineteenth century: the temperance movement. 
 The temperance movement, which grew to become the largest mass-
movement of the century in the US and a similarly potent force in Britain, took Dr 
Rush as its founder. His constructions of the alcoholic and social consequences of 
alcohol, and recommendation of a curative total abstinence, formed its ideological 
core. However, the movement also constituted alcohol as the inherently addictive 
demon drink, which accounted for the alcoholic’s incapacity to resist it (Levine, 
2015; Reinarman & Granfield, 2015; Room, 2015). This discourse objectified the 
alcoholic as out of control, but now due to forces outside of him or herself. It 
therefore seemed to repeat earlier Christian constructions of madness as demonic 
possession. Moreover, the movement promulgated the notion that alcoholism caused 
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insanity. Madness and addiction were linked again, as consequences of similar causal 
processes.  
Room (2015) argues that the temperance movement was also propelled by, 
and served as a vehicle for, society’s burgeoning concern with self-control in the 
rapidly industrialising western world: this was accompanied by dramatically 
increasing levels of consumption that were feared to be a threat to social and moral 
order (Reith, 2004). These conditions proved ripe for the construction of alcohol as an 
addictive substance that made people behave in ways they otherwise would not. 
Demon drink discourses thus took on a powerful explanatory function regarding 
people’s loss of this prized self-control. They also explained why some people 
continued to drink in the face of the temperance movement’s concerted attempts to 
build a sober society (Room, 2015). These ideas persist in contemporary medical 
constructions of addiction. A key criterion for positive diagnosis is continued use 
despite knowledge of harmful consequences; see below.  
Temperance discourse, then, problematised alcohol as a mortal threat, both to 
the individual and society. In so doing, it promoted notions of the ideal, self-
controlled liberal self.  In Britain, the temperance movement shifted official Church 
of England policy toward abstinence by the end of the century, with varying power 
effects. The Church advocated complete abstinence for the proletariat, but moderate 
consumption for the upper and middle classes (Olsen, 1994). These class distinctions 
were also inbuilt in medical constructions of addiction during this period. 
 
2.3.4 Addiction in the nineteenth century: The medical profession.  
The disease construction of alcoholism also appealed to the nascent medical 
profession. Before the medical registration measures of 1858, there were no strict 
parameters for qualified medical professionals in Britain. Professional status, 
however, was essential for the establishment of its authority as a modern scientific 
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discipline. This required new knowledge systems and medical techniques to designate 
and categorise disease, and so legitimise this status. By valorising alcoholism 
discourses, the alcoholic could be brought under its control (Berridge, 1997; Foxcroft, 
2007). 
There was a strong relationship between the temperance movement and the 
medical profession. However, the question of alcohol’s harmfulness was as divisive 
in the medical community as in society. While many doctors advocated abstinence 
and signed public declarations about alcohol’s perils, others advocated its use in 
treatment (McCandless, 1984; Olsen, 1994). The medical profession was similarly 
divided about opium, with some doctors arguing it caused insanity while others 
extolled its medicinal virtues (Foxcroft, 2007). And while temperance and medical 
perspectives on alcohol sometimes overlapped, the former conceptualised the 
problem lying more with the substance while the latter problematised the individual 
(Smith, 2010; Weinberg, 2013).  
The view that addiction caused insanity was popular in the medical 
community, particularly among those affiliated with the temperance perspective 
(Porter, 1985). The medical profession developed numerous disease constructs to link 
addiction and insanity, which Valverde (1997) argues were designed to bring those 
who did not fit diagnoses of insanity under its gaze. Degeneracy was based on 
Lamarckian theories of heredity. Parental drunkenness was theorised to be passed 
down to the children along with its accompanying criminality, idiocy and insanity. 
The drunkenness of one generation would lead to a progressive degeneration in the 
next, and the eventual extinction of the family line through infertility within four 
generations (McCandless, 1984). This discourse also underpinned later nineteenth 
century medico-legal discourses of abnormality. Abnormals included both addicts 
and the mad (Foucault, 2000a, 2016). 
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Degeneracy discourse was a potent dividing practice. The psychiatric 
profession, which by the latter third of the century was in crisis, seized upon it. Its 
moral treatments had proved far less successful in curing madness than it had initially 
claimed. But by objectifying patients as pathologically deficient in willpower and 
having a “morbid constitutional defect” (Scull, 2015, p. 303), psychiatry could 
present itself as performing a crucial function by protecting society from these 
degenerates’ malignancy (Scull, 2015). This discourse’s power effects were 
formidable. They would eventually lead to eugenicist sterilisation policies in the US 
and UK (Smith, 2010).  
Later in the century the disease construct inebriety emerged, which 
incorporated alcohol and opiates. Its chief proponent was the temperance movement 
campaigner and physician Dr Norman Kerr (1834-1899), who founded the Society 
for the Study of Inebriety (known today as the Society for the Study of Addiction and 
publisher of the journals Addiction and Addiction Biology). This society advanced the 
disease concept of addiction, and promoted medical treatment rather than 
incarceration. It advocated a partnership between the state and the medical profession 
to meet these ends (Berridge, Walke & Mold, 2014). Inebriety became a legal 
definition, referring to the loss of will to make moral decisions due to intoxication 
(Berridge, 1997). A network of public inebriate asylums was set up around the UK, 
and compulsory commitment instituted (Valverde, 1997). 
Kerr proposed that inebriety led to functional brain changes, but these changes 
could only happen because of an underlying lack of willpower that was passed down 
from earlier generations (Berridge et al., 2014). Inebriety thus seemed to share 
degeneracy’s deterministic hereditarian basis (Berridge, 1988). Despite its scientific 
assertions, the will continued to be the disease site and the focus of treatment. 
Valverde (1997) has noted a paradox here: inebriates were characterised by a 
 38 
diseased will, but their recovery wholly relied on them engaging this diseased part of 
themselves.  
Like degeneracy, inebriety discourse produced a figure who lacked willpower 
profoundly. This inebriate was also ensnared in dominating power relations, in which 
the interests of medicine and the state intertwined.  Those committed to state-run 
inebriety asylums could be held for three years. This group consisted predominantly 
of mothers accused of neglecting their children, and prostitutes. Gentlemen, 
meanwhile, were believed to have sufficient willpower but an excess of desire, and 
were voluntarily confined to private retreats where treatment focused on moral 
matters (Valverde, 1997). These disorders also functioned as containers for fears 
about social change: greater susceptibility among the industrial working classes was 
assumed (McCandless, 1984; Weinberg, 2013). 
 
2.3.5 Conclusion to addiction in the nineteenth century. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, alcohol and its consumption had been 
dramatically reframed, discursively. Temperance and medical addiction discourses 
had proliferated.  The subjects that these discourses produced—the alcoholic, the 
degenerate, the inebriate—were the antithesis of the liberal subject. They seemed to 
take on a powerful pedagogical function as constant reminders of the need to 
maintain self-control, and the perils that befell such failure. Thus, they were potent 
governmental tools. As Reith (2004) writes,  
The addict was a ‘made up’ person whose parents were a convergence of 
interests between the industrial state and the medical profession, and who 
linked the individual with the social body. Addicts served as repositories 
for widespread fears of unrest - a group who had a deviant identity 
stamped upon them, so they could be just as forcibly ‘cured’ (p. 290). 
 
The moral underpinning of these constructions and their cures linked them to 
psychiatric discourses of mental illness. However, it also accounted for their 
discursive instability. Ultimately, they could not explain how to rebuild their 
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proposed disease site, the will, except in moral terms. This contravened the medical 
profession’s self-assertions of its scientific status (Valverde, 1997). 
 
2.3.6 Addiction in the twentieth century. 
 Perhaps due to their instability, medical addiction discourses lost favour in the 
early twentieth century. The state reclassified inebriety as a “constitutive peculiarity, 
or even more modestly, a habit” (Valverde, 1997, p. 268), repealed its compulsory 
treatment legislation, and defunded the inebriety asylums (Valverde, 1997). The 
temperance movement also shifted its focus toward encouraging prohibitionist 
legislation (Levine, 2015). Alcohol and the alcoholic were constituted exclusively as 
social problems, and fell under the state’s control.  
New discourses of addiction, referring only to drugs, emerged and superseded 
inebriety in medical knowledge systems. These prioritised craving symptoms 
(Berridge et al., 2014). They may partly have been expedient, in affording medicine 
continued control over substances that the state had not yet reclaimed: the 
government classified this new disorder as a disease needing treatment in 1926 
(Berridge, 1997). While Berridge and colleagues (2014) have argued that this 
addiction construct had less moral baggage than inebriety, its emphasis on craving 
seemed to problematise the addict’s desire. Indeed, addiction was still objectified as a 
vice that eventually became a genuine disease with an identifiable pathology 
(Berridge et al., 2014). The addict’s moral fibre was still the source of his or her 
predicament.  
The post-World War I peace settlement also saw the establishment of an 
international drug control system, and the onset of national drug-regulation policies. 
This prohibitionism was partly motivated by concerns about social breakdown, once 
more. Young women and the working classes were considered especially susceptible 
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to drugs, and their accompanying moral degradation (Mountian, 2013): this seemed 
to mobilise possession discourses. 
 
2.3.6.1 Alcoholics’ Anonymous and psychoanalytic models of addiction. 
 Addiction discourses shifted again in the 1930s, following the end of 
prohibition. Alcoholism was reconstituted as a medical condition through the 
discourse of the Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) movement. AA deployed medical 
discourse by constructing addiction as a progressive and irreversible disease, although 
this was spiritual and rooted in drinkers’ selfishness: this model continued to 
problematise the will. Alcohol was cast as a socially acceptable drug that was 
addicting only for some people, who were born alcoholic and would become 
powerless when they eventually consumed it: traces of degeneracy discourses also 
seem present in this construction. AA could help such people abstain and recover, 
although never be cured, by applying its 12 Steps (Duff Gordon, 2017; Fox, 2015). 
These focused on facilitating a spiritual and behavioural transformation, in a seeming 
repetition of the paradox of inebriety treatment: the alcoholic’s will was the source of 
his or her illness, and recovery involved accepting this powerlessness. But the 
alcoholic had to want to recover, which necessarily required engaging the will to 
remain abstinent.  
This normative and governmental discourse thus privileged the liberal self by 
constituting recovery as the reinstitution of self-control. It produced a new subject, 
the recovering alcoholic, who again seemed to be rendered childlike through his or 
her lack of willpower (Duff Gordon, 2017). Interestingly, though, this subject was not 
inferior to medical authority, at least ostensibly. Addiction was self-diagnosed in the 
first Step. And treatment was exclusively predicated on the alcoholic’s active 
participation in recovery. This left no space for the application of medical knowledge. 
AA’s structures also required neither a professional presence, nor a medical space 
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(Elam, 2015; Levine 2015). However, AA discourse also exhorted its subjects to 
govern themselves, and seemed to exemplify the mechanisms of the psy-complex 
(see section 2.2). It was subsumed by the medical profession, and became the 
dominant psychiatric treatment approach for alcohol addiction in the US (Duff 
Gordon, 2017).  
 Concurrent with the emergence of AA discourse, new psychological theories 
of addiction emerged in the form of psychoanalytic models (e.g., Glover, 1932; Radó, 
1933). These emphasised the addict’s regression to an early life developmental 
trauma, to which the he or she responded with substance use. This discourse also 
produced a childlike addict, unable to regulate or cope with his or her own experience 
and thereby deficient in willpower. However, here this addict was reliant on a 
paternal and strong-willed psychoanalyst, for treatment. This discourse, I argue, 
repeated the power relations of psychiatric mental illness discourse, and Rush’s 
model of addiction. 
 
 2.3.6.2 Withdrawal and tolerance. 
As the twentieth century progressed, new addiction discourses emerged based 
around physiological symptoms of tolerance and withdrawal. As addiction markers, 
these held promise of a path to scientific respectability for the field, because they 
were specific, identifiable and unreliant on theories of underlying characterological 
deficit. Within the withdrawal paradigm, substances that produced these symptoms 
were considered addictive, and those that did not were denied this status (Weinberg, 
2013). Treatment was aimed at rapidly treating physical withdrawal symptoms and 
then promoting abstinence through “a system of moral enlightenment…to inculcate 
self-control and restore values more in line with conventional society” (Hill et al., 
2016, p. 31). Despite these discourses’ ostensible value-freedom, addiction treatment 
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was still constituted in moral and normative terms. They produced a weak-willed 
addict, who could only regain self-control under medical supervision. 
 
2.3.6.3 Drug addiction and the war on drugs. 
 Medical addiction discourses continued to be unstable throughout the 1950s. 
The World Health Organization repeatedly redefined drug addiction. A 1950 
definition emphasised the compulsion to increase drug use, along with physical and 
psychic dependence and detrimental effects on the user and society. But because 
some drug users did not follow this pattern, it was soon redefined as drug habituation 
and the allusions to compulsion and social consequences were dropped. In the next 
decade, drug habituation was replaced with a looser definition of drug dependence, 
characterised simply by psychic and / or physical dependence (Reinarman & 
Granfield, 2015).  
Despite this confusion, in the early 1960s the British government reconfirmed 
the medical treatment of drug addiction, which was defined as “an expression of 
mental disorder” (Mars, 2012, p.7) rather than a criminal behaviour. It also issued the 
first guidelines for specialist psychiatric inpatient alcohol treatment. This treatment 
was based on the AA model (Thom & Berridge, 1995).  Addiction was constituted as 
a psychiatric problem, and the psychiatric profession had now regained control over 
both alcohol and drugs. The interests of the state and medicine had realigned.  
However, the ensuing decade’s profound social changes and massive increase 
in recreational drug use within Western societies (Hendrickson, Schmal & Ekleberry, 
2004), engendered a significant discursive turn. In a repetition of the Gin Crazes (see 
section 2.3.1), the British government responded to this apparent threat to society by 
tightening control over drug prescriptions and, in the early 1970s, introducing new 
prohibitionist and criminal legislation (Mars, 2012). In the US, the Nixon 
administration initiated the war on drugs.  
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Against this backdrop, in 1972 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
introduced the concept of drug abuse, defined as non-medical use of consciousness-
altering drugs in ways that “are considered by social norms and defined by statute 
inappropriate, undesirable, harmful…or culture-alien” (Zinberg, 1984, p. 39): this 
medical definition was reliant on social and legal norms. It produced the drug abuser, 
as much a criminal as a patient, who seemed to threaten the very fabric of society. 
Indeed, the US government constituted this drug abuse as America’s public enemy 
number one, enacted broad legislation to criminalise drugs, and in 1974 founded the 
National Institute of Drug Abuse (Sacco, 2014). This established separate funding 
and research streams for addiction and mental health, leading to the development of 
separate treatment programmes (Hendrickson et al., 2004). Reinarman and Granfield 
(2015) have noted a striking circular productivity between medicine and the state, 
here: lawmakers justified new drug laws on the basis of medical expertise, but this 
medical expertise was contingent on legal terminology. Addiction, I argue, continued 
to be a locus for fears about societal change. Moreover, these fears initiated a 
discursive differentiation of mental illness and addiction, which would make dual 
diagnosis possible.  
War on drugs discourse has become hegemonic, and shapes policy and public 
opinion about drug use and addiction (Orsini, 2017; Rosino & Hughely, 2017). 
Mountian (2013) has applied a Foucauldian disciplinary lens to this discourse, which 
has become increasingly prevalent in Britain. In constituting drugs as “the engine of 
crime” (p. 57) it produces drug using subjects as deviants, in an apparent echo of 
degeneracy discourse (see section 2.3.4). It also objectifies drugs and drug users as a 
poorly defined enemy. This is strategically useful, because this enemy can cause fear 
precisely because of its polyvalent qualities, and this objectification can be deployed 
towards substances or social groups according to need. The enemy is also imbued 
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with extraordinary power, and positioned as coming from beyond society’s borders 
(Mountian, 2013).  
War on drugs discourse is therefore a potent dividing practice that constitutes 
drug use in binaries of health and deviance and even life and death, as the slogan say 
no to drugs, yes to life illustrates (Mountian, 2013). In working drugs up as 
incontrovertibly bad and worthy of opprobrium, it gives rise to vigorous disciplinary 
projects of confinement and exclusion. Activities against drugs and drug users are 
sanctioned that would otherwise be socially resisted. Its disciplinary gaze is 
strengthened because “anyone has the moral power to intervene in other people’s use 
of drugs” (Mountian, 2013, p. 81).  
This discourse thus constructs drugs and drug users as an existential threat, 
“the antagonistic drug Other” (Crick, 2012, p. 408). Its narrative of virulent harm 
creates a sense of panic and emphasises the need for action, thereby facilitating 
dominating top-down power relations (Alexandrescu, 2014; Van Dijk, 2008). This 
may be evident in McKeown’s (2010) description of dual diagnosis as “arguably one 
of the most significant problems facing health services” (p. 3). 
 
2.3.6.4 Methadone treatment and psychological models of addiction. 
 The war on drugs’ impact was evident in the development of methadone 
treatment. This was introduced in America in the early 1970s, in response to rising 
heroin use and its perceived connection with a crime increase, and the return of 
heroin-using conscripts from the Vietnam War (Berridge, 2012; Fox, 2015). Heroin 
users’ withdrawal symptoms were problematised as the cause of this criminality. It 
was theorised that substituting heroin for the legal methadone would eliminate these 
symptoms and crimes (Fox, 2015).  
 Methadone treatment established distinct treatment regimes for heroin and 
alcohol addiction, which made strikingly divergent assumptions about their patients, 
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with concomitant power effects (Fox, 2015). As noted above (see section 2.3.6.1), 
alcohol treatment assumed people could deploy their willpower to resist the 
temptation to drink, and renew this every day. Methadone treatment, by contrast, 
assumed its patients had no such resources: it involved substituting one addictive 
substance for another, to stop them committing crime. This produced a markedly 
different subject, the feckless heroin addict. Most of those in this treatment were from 
the working classes (Fox, 2015). While the alcoholic and heroin addict were both 
medicalised subjects, this medicalisation inscribed them in strikingly different ways. 
These treatment regimes, and their underlying assumptions, seemed to emulate the 
two-tier inebriety treatment (see section 2.3.4).  
Furthermore, methadone treatment necessarily involved professional medical 
involvement to dispense the drug. Clients rarely participated in dosage decisions, and 
had to submit to drug screening on pain of treatment termination. Heroin addiction 
was thus treated in a “quasi-medical, quasi-criminal arrangement” (Fox, 2015, p. 
161).  In Britain, compulsory methadone treatment was instated, and continues today. 
It could be argued that it was a disciplinary regime, while alcohol treatment was an 
example of governmental power.  
Throughout the next decade new psychological models of addiction 
developed, based on social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), which privileged 
expectancies of the capacity to control drug use. These developed through past social 
experiences. Positive past experiences of controlling behaviour would engender 
strong coping expectancies, and afford the capacity to keep substance use within 
socially acceptable levels.  Addicts, by contrast, had “poor coping skills in general for 
dealing with life’s problems” (Jung, 2010, p. 31), and turned to substances to manage 
these problems. These models constituted addicts as incapable of managing 
themselves adequately, once again, and reliant on psychologists for help. Within this 
paradigm, Akers (1985) constituted addiction as a deviant behaviour, learned through 
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socialisation with deviant role models (Ford & Ong, 2014). This normative model, I 
argue, resourced war on drugs discourse and produced a similarly quasi-criminal drug 
addict. It seemed an effective dividing practice. 
 
2.3.7 Addiction and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental      
Disorders. 
In the 1970s the APA attempted to address the persisting problem of 
diagnostic unreliability in psychiatry, which was a serious threat to its status as a 
medical science (Davies, 2013). In 1980, it published the third edition of Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; APA, 1980). This was 
designed to be a standardised diagnostic system based on specific categories of 
mental disorder, identified by observable and reportable symptom clusters. The 
diagnostic categories specified inclusion and exclusion criteria, to promote inter-rater 
reliability (Fraser, Moore & Keane, 2014; Nathan et al., 2016; Scull, 2015).  
Discursively, this was highly productive. Diagnostic categories created clinical 
cutoffs that produced new subjects of psychiatric knowledge in dichotomies of health 
and illness. DSM-III was a formidable tool of psychiatric power, as a dividing 
practice. Davies (2013) has detailed the use of political consensus in the development 
of DSM-III’s diagnostic categories. Its claims to value-free scientific status were 
seriously overstated.  
DSM-III had a separate chapter for substance use disorders. This formalised 
the discursive segregation of mental illness and addiction, which the state had begun 
a decade earlier (see section 2.3.6.3). It made a dual diagnosis of addiction and 
mental illness possible, for the first time. These disorders were applicable to a range 
of substances including alcohol, opiates, amphetamines, cocaine and cannabis.  
The chapter distinguished substance abuse and dependence. These disease 
constructs continued to rely on moral judgements. Substance abuse was classified by 
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the normative criteria of pathological use and a resultant social or occupational 
impairment. A minimum one month time course was specified. Substance 
dependence was diagnosed by the presence of withdrawal symptoms, except with 
alcohol and cannabis where evidence of social or occupational impairment was also 
required.  (Fraser et al., 2014; Nathan et al., 2016). In DSM-III-R (APA, 1987), loss 
of control, the core component of Rush and Trotter’s original disease construction of 
addiction (see section 2.3.2), was included as a criterion for substance dependence 
(O’Brien, 2011).  
 In DSM-IV (APA, 1994), the chapter was renamed substance-related 
disorders. This reflected what Nathan and colleagues (2016) have described as “a 
broader purview” (p. 43), through which more substances were classified as 
addictive, including caffeine, sedatives and hypnotics. Substance dependence was 
also redefined. It no longer required tolerance or withdrawal for positive diagnosis. 
This reflected evidence that some drug users used compulsively without developing 
withdrawal symptoms, and others developed withdrawal symptoms without 
compulsive use (Nathan et al., 2016; Weinberg, 2013). Withdrawal, which had 
previously held the promise of scientific respectability (section 2.3.6.2), began to 
destabilise addiction. New discourses were needed to reaffirm its credibility. These 
emerged in constructions of addiction as a chronic and relapsing brain disease.  
 
2.3.7.1 The brain disease paradigm and DSM-5. 
 Brain disease discourses are based on developments in imaging technology 
that show the brain responds to psychoactive substances in similar ways to other 
pleasurable activities. This has led to the hypothesis that such substances hijack the 
brain’s natural reward pathway (e.g., Kalivas & Volkow, 2005; Koob & Volkow, 
2010), leading to structural changes that explain their addictive nature. These 
neurobiological processes are constructed as causal mechanisms, and assumed to 
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underpin all the addictive disorders in DSM-5 (APA, 2013). This has stabilised the 
disease construct of addiction “as (an) observable neurobiological condition” (Fraser 
et al., 2014, p. 30). Such discourses are now preeminent in psychiatry, and facilitate 
novel biological constructions of mental illness (Scull, 2015). Vrecko (2010) has 
linked the emergence of these new discourses to the Nixon administration’s war on 
drugs, through which research that conceptualised addiction as a biochemical disorder 
was funded: these discourses represent an ongoing harmony of the interests of 
medicine and the state. 
DSM-5 (APA, 2013) contains a chapter entitled Substance-Related and 
Addictive Disorders. This title effectively untethers addiction from substances and 
opens space for behavioural addictions. The brain disease paradigm provides support 
for this discursive decoupling: brain scans reveal that a wide range of human 
behaviours can produce the responses identified in relation to psychoactive 
substances (Reinarman & Granfield, 2015).  
 DSM-5 conceptualises a new core syndrome of substance use disorder, which 
subsumes the previous categories of substance abuse and dependence. It additionally 
affords a dimensional diagnosis. From the disorder’s eleven diagnostic criteria, the 
presence of two or three indicate a mild case, four to five a moderate one, and six a 
severe presentation. Moreover, these symptoms can have appeared at any time in the 
past year (Fraser et al., 2014). Thus this new syndrome’s diagnostic criteria are less 
specific, relevant over a longer period of time and require a lower threshold for 
positive diagnosis. It produces more addicts than previous iterations. Loss of control 
remains a core criterion, and craving is also reintroduced. Both are identified by self-
report. These self-report measures seem to demonstrate the workings of the psy-
complex, again (see section 2.2): as with AA discourses, to be an addict one must 
first declare oneself an addict.  
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DSM-5 has been heavily criticised for systematically over-diagnosing 
behaviour, aided by the undue influence of drug companies (Nathan et al., 2016). 
Brain disease discourse has also been critiqued. In claiming that drugs corrupt the 
brain’s natural reward pathway, addicts are recast as hostages to this brain hijack. 
This effectively problematises these drugs, in a continuation of earlier demon drink 
and possession discourses (Room, 2015). Vrecko (2016) has also noted how 
constituting addiction as a chronic disease leads to relapse becoming its main feature. 
In this discourse, relapse is the consequence of craving. And craving is constituted as 
the result of a combination of factors including genetic susceptibility—calling to 
mind earlier degeneracy and inebriety discourses—and prolonged exposure to the 
drug of choice (Elam, 2015). Thus, I argue, the current chronic relapsing brain 
disease discourse synthesises historical medical and temperance constructions of 
addiction, and problematises both the substance and the person. Perhaps this accounts 
for its stability. Furthermore, constituting addiction as a chronic disease means that 
recovery remains a matter of personal responsibility, and continues to involve the 
rigorous application of self-control. Thus, this neurobiological addiction discourse 
provides “new technoscientific grounds for a remoralisation of disease” (Elam, 2015, 
p. 49).  It is perhaps unsurprising that the proponents of this discourse who argued it 
would destigmatise drug use and challenge prohibitionist policies, have been proved 
wrong (Fraser et al., 2017). 
This paradigm again embodies the circular productivity of psychiatric 
discourse (Foucault, 2000c; see section 2.2). Discourses of addiction as a disease 
affecting the brain—either functionally or structurally—have existed for at least a 
century (see section 2.3.4). Technological advances have led to the development of 
brain scans, deployed as tests that confirm this truth claim, through which 
psychiatry’s scientific status is affirmed and enhanced. 
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In conclusion, DSM constructions of addiction have proved highly unstable 
over the past 40 years; as have its constructions of mental disorders generally (Scull, 
2015). Criteria such as self-control and withdrawal have been introduced and 
dropped. Yet at the same time, addiction has proved resilient. Unlike other disease 
constructs, it has become more flexible and less specific over time (Reinarman & 
Granfield, 2015). This has facilitated its application to ever increasing areas of 
experience, bringing them under medical purview. Contemporary neurobiological 
discourses also seem to problematise substance and person simultaneously. 
Consequently, they constitute addiction as a more nefarious disease, demanding 
constant vigilance and self-control to defend against it. These discourses are potent 
governmental tools.  
Over the past twenty years increasingly complex psychological models of 
addiction have proliferated, which mobilise these DSM discourses. For example, 
West and Brown’s (2013) synthetic theory constructs addiction as resulting from 
abnormalities in a neurological motivational system. These abnormalities may result 
from changes induced by a behaviour or substance—thereby mobilising possession 
discourses—or from a pre-existing internal brain abnormality such as depression or 
chronic anxiety: this problematies the addict. Orford (2001) has constituted addiction 
as an underlying problem of excessive appetite, which may affect a swathe of 
activities including substance use, gambling, eating and sex. These appetites develop 
gradually, through social learning (see section 2.3.6.4). An appetite is considered 
excessive when it erodes freedom of choice: addiction thus remains a liberal disease. 
Moreover, this discourse strikingly resembles the original constructions of mental 





2.3.8 The recovery movement. 
In response to the dominating power dynamics of the above medical 
discourses, an alternative—or competing—recovery discourse emerged in the 1980s. 
This developed independently in the mental health and addiction fields (Roberts & 
Bell, 2013). In the former, it was an outgrowth of the psychiatric survivor movement 
(Crossley & Crossley, 2001; Resnick & Rosenheck, 2006). In the latter, recovery 
discourse arose as a legacy of treatment approaches such as AA, which emphasise 
lived experience and peer support (Roberts & Bell, 2013)—although Berridge (2012) 
has argued the term is also “redolent of 19th-century temperance” (p. 22).   
 In both contexts, recovery discourse’s emergence was also propelled by a 
growing recognition of the need to combat stigma in practice (Roberts & Bell, 2013). 
Indeed, recovery-focused treatment is partly constituted as a recovery from 
stigmatisation. This model has become a core concept in British mental health and 
substance use policy and practice. It enjoins practitioners to be aware stigma’s 
impact, and commit themselves to non-stigmatising practice (e.g., Leamy, Bird, Le 
Boutillier, Williams & Slade, 2009; NICE 2011, 2016).  
 This discourse posits recovery as an individualised process, which engenders 
a reorganisation of power arrangements between practitioners and clients (Slade, 
Adams & O’Hagan, 2012). Fardella (2008) has argued that it affords “a critical 
retrieval by the subject of herself as self-determining agent of change” (p. 111). 
However, scholars have noted contradictions, here (e.g., Fomiatti, Moore & Fraser, 
2017; Lancaster, Duke & Ritter, 2015). While recovery is constituted as living with 
disorder as fully as possible in mental health contexts, in the substance use field it 
entails moving beyond addiction.  For example, the UK Drug Policy Commission 
(2008) defines recovery as “characterised by voluntarily sustained control over 
substance use which maximises health and wellbeing and participation in the rights, 
roles and responsibilities of society” (p. 6). This highly governmental definition 
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evokes an ideal liberal subjectivity, in contrast to a life on drugs (Lancaster et al., 
2015). More recently, recovery has been explicitly associated with abstinence (Home 
Office, 2017). Recovery may therefore simultaneously signify an individualised and a 
prescribed process.  
Moreover, Rose (2014) argues that it is “shot through with...normalisation” 
(p. 217). Indeed, the expert addiction literature constructs recovery as a process of 
identity change, made possible by ceasing aberrant drug use and participating in 
normal activities (Fomiatti et al., 2017); as the UK Drug Policy Commission’s above 
definition seems to illustrate. Reith (2004) has contested the claim that recovery can 
facilitate the development of this new liberal identity, because a recovering addict 
identity is as adhesive as that of the addict. Both mark out the subject as not free to 
choose, thereby denying him or her genuine liberal subjectivity. 
 
2.3.9 Conclusion to a genealogical approach to addiction. 
The history of addiction over the past 200 years is not one of progress but of a 
repetition and reaffirmation of its initial construction by Rush and Trotter, and its 
attendant moral judgements and power relations. While addiction has at times been 
contested by the medical profession and the state, the past 50 years has seen an 
increasingly cooperation and interconnection in this area. This is evident in the 
discursive production of the heroin addict, and this figure’s subjection within a 
totalising network of medical and legal judgements and power relations. There seem 
echoes in this process of the production of the female inebriate a century earlier. And 
as with inebriety discourse, contemporary medical discourses of addiction are applied 
today in different ways to different groups, with different power effects.  
Contemporary addiction disease models presuppose a proper non-addicted 
person who successfully regulates behaviour through making rational decisions 
(Fraser et al., 2017). This is the same liberal citizen who made addiction possible in 
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the first place, some 200 years previously. In contemporary Western economies, the 
state has increasingly withdrawn from the regulation of everyday life while mass 
consumption through immediate gratification is increasingly encouraged (Reinarman 
& Granfield, 2015; Reith, 2004). These contradictory expectations have enhanced the 
importance of self-regulation: “the burden of liberty” (Reith, 2004, p. 296) has only 
increased. 
In this context, the figure of the addict as consumed by consumption assumes 
an even greater cautionary relevance. The addict has failed to manage this liberty 
effectively, and as a result has forfeited his or her autonomy and choice. Unlike the 
self-regulating citizen who is free to assume other identities, the addict is stamped 
with this label, and is expected to carry it even in recovery: this seems to undermine 
recovery discourse’s liberatory potential. Indeed, this label is readily self-applied in 
this process.  The addict is the living example of a failure to self-regulate, and a 
constant reminder to maintain this self-control. This figure is a particularly effective 
example of governmental power, guiding the conduct of the populace’s conduct. 
 
2.4 A Genealogical Approach to Dual Diagnosis 
 In one sense, the history of dual diagnosis as a discursive phenomenon is 
brief. As noted above (see section 2.3.7), it was only with the publication of DSM-III 
that co-occurring psychiatric diagnoses became possible, and the term is rooted in this 
theoretical segregation of mental health and substance misuse disorders. It arose to 
identify people within mental health or substance misuse services who now also had a 
diagnosis that was treated by the other system (see section 1.2). According to 
Hendrickson and colleagues (2004) the term was “borrowed from the mental 
retardation field” (pp. 25-26): this itself is a medico-legal term arising from 
nineteenth century psychiatric discourses and dividing practices (Foucault, 2000a). 
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Perhaps this choice of term may also indicate implicit judgements about the 
capacities of the group it was intended to designate. 
As discussed (see section 2.3.6.3), while DSM-III formalised the clinical 
segregation of mental health and substance use problems, this process began a decade 
earlier in the US government’s response to the social changes and increase in 
recreational drug use during the 1960s. This response established separate research, 
funding and treatment streams for mental illness and addictions. It was followed 
during the 1970s and 1980s by frequent observations that psychiatric patients also 
admitted using drugs (McKeown et al., 1998), which in turn repeated nineteenth 
century psychiatrists’ observations that many asylum patients had used alcohol to 
excess (McCandless, 1984).  
Thus, after the state enacted the discursive bifurcation of mental illness from 
addiction, medicine soon rediscovered their frequent co-occurrence. This led the 
medical profession to produce a new discourse to explain this phenomenon. This new 
discourse also triggered a series of scientific papers through which dual diagnosis was 
legitimized (McKeown et al., 1998). The state’s response, as characterised by 
Nixon’s war on drugs, was also in part a moral undertaking. Dual diagnosis, then, is 
the product of political, legal, and moral processes that were themselves a response to 
fears raised by rapid social change. This is a repetition of the discursive production of 
addiction in the nineteenth century, and mental illness a century before that. Indeed, 
dual diagnosis discourses seem inflected with moral panic, as its description by the 
UK government as one of the largest problems facing mental health services (DoH, 
2002) may indicate. 
While mental illness and substance use had hitherto been considered 
interrelated—and had similar historical and moral roots—a division of their treatment 
had occurred previously with the establishment of the inebriety asylums. Smith 
(2010) cites the Superintendent of Gartnavel Royal Hospital in Glasgow, who in 
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giving evidence to parliament in 1895 in support of these asylums claimed that 
“respectable lunatics do not care to be associated with a man who is just a 
demoralised drunkard and I think in their interest he ought not to be there” (p. 355). 
Perhaps there are echoes here of the need to protect prisoners from defilement by the 
mad, which partly motivated the establishment of the first psychiatric asylums (see 
section 2.2). Moreover, the derogation of substance use problems in relation to those 
of mental health continues with dual diagnosis, which as discussed above can 
frequently lead to exclusion from mental health services due to ongoing substance use 
(see section 1.2). Indeed, Roberts and Jones (2012) argue that dual diagnosis 
“invokes the moral concept of the deserving or undeserving sufferer” (p.673). 
  Dual Diagnosis began to appear as a concept in Britain in the 1990s, by 
which time it had lost its inverted commas and had thereby “assumed an established 
concreteness” (McKeown et al., 1998, p. 67). This seemed to demonstrate its 
constitution as a medical discourse. By the middle of the decade the government had 
begun to commission research, which reported massive increases in dual diagnosis 
rates in primary care, mental health and substance use service settings (Hill et al., 
2016). Shortly after the emergence of dual diagnosis discourses in the UK, then, this 
new problem was found to be everywhere: McKeown and colleagues (1998) have 
argued that this construct is paradigmatic of the psy-complex. 
The UK government soon responded through the Task Force Review (DoH; 
1996) and the Dual Diagnosis Good Practice Guide (DoH, 2002; see section 1.2), 
which attempted to establish standards of practice and models of service. Specifically, 
they advocated integrated support for mental health and substance use within 
psychiatric services. The medical profession, in the form of NICE, has also produced 
guidelines for practice with dual diagnosis clients (e.g., NICE 2011, 2016). There 
seems to be a harmony between medicine and the state with dual diagnosis, through 
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which a new disease has been identified and confirmed, and those so affected brought 
under their control. 
 Dual Diagnosis discourses have been increasingly widely deployed in UK 
health settings. However, as noted above (see section 1.2) a feature of these 
discourses is the lack of consensus over its definition. It too is an unstable discursive 
phenomenon. It has been criticized both for being so over-inclusive it is rendered 
meaningless (McKeown et al., 1998), and for being too restrictive in establishing an 
arbitrary and exclusive threshold for treatment (Velleman & Baker, 2008). Indeed, 
the latest NICE (2016) guidelines seem to establish such a threshold through referring 
to dual diagnosis as “coexisting severe mental illness and substance misuse” (p. 5; 
emphasis added). This definition seems to illustrate the normative and moral 
assumptions within this construct. Substance use services, by contrast, have 
constructed dual diagnosis much less narrowly (Roberts and Jones, 2012). As 
discussed above (see section 1.2) this discursive instability may shed light on the 
current confusion about effective psychological treatments for dual diagnosis, and its 
prevalence.  
 Although current constructions of dual diagnosis and addiction both lack 
specificity, they seem to produce divergent power effects. Neurobiological discourses 
seem to facilitate the spread of addiction and the medical gaze over ever-wider areas 
of human experience.  But ascriptions of dual diagnosis can often lead to exclusion 
from mental health services. Moreover, this exclusion is justified in terms of the 
inability to achieve abstinence. The dual diagnosis client’s self-control is again 
problematised in this condition. It seems, indeed, that both narrower psychiatric 
constructions and broader substance use service constructions may justify exclusion. 
The former creates a high threshold for treatment, while the latter problematises a 
swathe of clients, whose needs then cannot be met by drug services. High rates of 
poverty, homelessness and marginalisation have also been reported among dual 
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diagnosis clients, who have been described as a “mental health underclass” 
(Hawkings & Gilburt, 2004, p. 57). Perhaps implicit class-based assumptions about 
willpower are also present in these exclusions. 
 
2.4.1 Conclusion to a genealogical approach to dual diagnosis 
Dual diagnosis is paradoxically a scientific discourse with no agreed scientific 
definition. Its lack of specificity and inconsistent construction in different health 
services seems to justify exclusion from care on a large scale. Indeed, dual diagnosis 
may presently be a discourse of exclusion. The confusion of dual diagnosis 
discourses produces a similarly confused dual diagnosis client. This figure 
transforms, depending on the health setting. Foucault (2000a) described the medieval 
juridico-moral figure of the monster that, he argued, lay behind nineteenth century 
psychiatric discourses of abnormality (see section 2.3.4). This monster was a “double 
violation” (p. 51) of the laws of society and nature, and combined what was thought 
impossible and forbidden in the same form (Hook, 2007).   
Perhaps the dual diagnosis client may represent a contemporary incarnation of 
this monstrous figure. This client, as a figure with both a mental health and substance 
misuse problem, embodies a double violation of self-control—and thus of morality— 
in a hyper-governmental age that demands its perpetual application.  The dual 
diagnosis client is thus forbidden, in these terms.   
 This figure may also combine what is discursively impossible. It transgresses 
the discursive bifurcation of mental health and substance use service provision in the 
UK, and fits within neither. Like the monster, the dual diagnosis client is thus “a 
breach of law that automatically stands outside the law” (Foucault, 2016, p. 56): by 
transgressing the discursive regimes of truth, he or she is excluded from them. Butler 
(1993) has argued that “the force of exclusion and abjection” (p. 3) is critical to the 
constitution and circumscription of the subject. Dual diagnosis clients’ exclusion may 
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therefore simultaneously a means of social production, through which the 
contemporary liberal subject—rational, autonomous, and sober—is formed (Fraser et 
al., 2017). By their transgression of the behavioural norms associated with this 
subjectivity, dual diagnosis clients are not merely excluded from services but denied 
the status of liberal subjects. Indeed, their paradoxical subjection as non-subjects 
seems to justify and render their exclusion intelligible. 
 Dual diagnosis clients’ monstrosity—or non-subjectivity—can further explain 
why these clients are the objects of stigmatisation by mental health professionals and 
may feel disempowered in their interactions with them (e.g., Avery et al., 2013; 
Chorlton et al., 2015; Ralley et al., 2009), why these professionals may also feel 
confused or deskilled with dual diagnosis clients (e.g., Adams, 2008; Coombes & 
Wratten, 2007), and why integrated dual diagnosis care remains the exception, rather 
than the rule (All Party Parliamentary Group on Complex Needs and Dual Diagnosis, 
2014; Schulte et al., 2008). It may also explain why the dually diagnosed are 
significantly over-represented in the prison population, along with the mad (Prison 
Reform Trust, 2011; Scull, 2015). Indeed Scull (2015) argues that we have come full 
circle here: the mad and the dually diagnosed are parts of an undifferentiated 
population existing at the very margins of society, and in its prisons. These are the 
very conditions which gave rise to psychiatry, some two hundred years ago. 
Ironically, I argue that these conditions could now be the result of the state and 
medical profession working in concert, united in their disapproval of the dually 
diagnosed. As noted above (section 1.2) the Dual Diagnosis Good Practice Guide 
(DoH, 2002), which was product of medicine and the state, eschewed defining dual 
diagnosis. This may then have facilitated the discursive confusion and culture of 





Methodology and Method 
“Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting”  
                            (Foucault, 1971/1991, p. 88) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will describe the poststructuralist research method that I used 
to investigate the research question; “What are the discursive power relations in 
practitioners’ accounts of working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients?”. 
First, I will locate the FDA adopted in this research within the broad field of 
psychology, and then specifically in the discipline of counselling psychology. Next, I 
will outline the methods I deployed to collect and analyse this study’s data, in 
accordance with ethical guidelines. Finally, I will discuss issues of reflexivity as a 
researcher, and the criteria of quality that are applicable to this qualitative research 
method. These criteria will be used to evaluate this research in Chapter Five.  
 
3.2 FDA and Poststructuralist Epistemology in Psychology 
As discussed in Chapter One, from a poststructuralist perspective reality and 
meaning are socially constructed and historically located, and discourse is the 
medium through which this is achieved (Gergen, 2015; Potter & Hepburn, 2008). As 
discourse is productive and power-laden, it is an object of study, itself. This research 
thus aims to illustrate the power relations in ten dual diagnosis practitioners’ accounts 
of working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients, to raise awareness for CoPs of 
the power effects that may be at play in working with this client group, and their 
implications for clinical practice. 
 In contrast to traditional psychology’s positivistic and realist claims of 
representativeness and objectivity, discourse analysis (DA) in psychology is informed 
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by a poststructuralist epistemology that posits the ubiquitous barrier of language as 
opaque and strategic. DA is a wide-ranging group of research methods, which focus 
on the study of context-bound, constructive and functional language in use (Avdi & 
Georgaca, 2007; Nikander, 2008). Currently, the two most popular DA approaches in 
contemporary psychology are discursive psychology (DP), and FDA (Willig, 2013). 
It is useful to compare these two approaches to clarify my chosen methodology of 
FDA: although it should be noted that while Parker (1992, 2013) and Willig (2013) 
have highlighted their differences, others have identified their shared assumptions, 
not least a methodological relativism that eschews a priori assumptions about the 
truth or relevance of one account over another (Potter & Hepburn, 2008; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1995). 
 Burr (2003) describes DP as a micro-constructionist approach that focuses on 
a detailed analysis of the function of talk in negotiating agency and accountability. 
From this bottom-up perspective, people are viewed as skilled and agentic users of 
language, through which they accomplish effects and manage their own interests. DP 
therefore focuses on the action orientation of participants’ talk. Moreover, DP only 
attends to features of discourse that participants themselves demonstrably orient to: 
power is discussed only insofar as participants may refer to it in their accounts 
(Nikander, 2008; Potter & Hepburn, 2008). For example, Askew (2016) used this 
method to illustrate how participants legitimised illicit drug use by rhetorically 
deploying three distinct discursive frameworks: a “drug cultures” framework that 
highlighted the accommodation of drug use within social networks; a “planned 
celebration” framework that legitimised use through infrequent consumption; and a 
“situational opportunity” framework that emphasised the wide availability of illicit 
drugs as a determinant of behaviour.   
 FDA, by contrast, is a macro-constructionist approach that investigates how 
broader cultural and institutional discourses determine and are called upon in the 
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construction and negotiation of accounts (Avdi & Georgaca, 2007; Burr, 2003). From 
this top-down viewpoint the constitutive power of language is prioritised, and the 
wider socio-political influences and apparatuses that produce and constrain people as 
subjects is examined: FDA presupposes a markedly weaker actor than DP (Jones, 
2017; Miller, 2008). As noted above (see section 1.6), FDA was introduced to 
psychology to challenge the assumptions of mainstream psychology. For example, 
Rose (1998) and Parker (1999) have used FDA-informed research to critique 
psychological knowledge and its institutions, and highlight psychology’s social 
regulative effects. FDA’s top-down perspective has also led to criticisms of its 
diminished clinical relevance (Avdi & Georgaca, 2007). However, Hodges (2002) has 
demonstrated its value to practice through his analysis of interactions between radio 
counsellors and the public, which illustrated both how clients were constructed in 
these interactions and how this legitimised and perpetuated psychotherapy’s 
institutional position of power. 
 I considered DP for this research. But in light of its aforesaid research 
question, which was informed by the apparent relations of power in the literature, 
FDA is argued to be the appropriate method. This is because of its explicit concern 
with these power relations, and its illustration of how participants' accounts draw on 
social, cultural and institutional discourses that bring ‘realities’ into being, constitute 
subjects and facilitate certain experiences while foreclosing others (Duff Gordon, 
2017; Willig, 2013). In short, FDA highlights how participants are talked by the 
language they use (O’Callaghan, in press). Therefore this research’s epistemological 
assumptions are guided by poststructuralism’s extreme relativist perspective, from 
which “the world is like a text: it all has to be represented and interpreted (Edwards, 
Ashmore & Potter, 1995, p. 33). The analysis I present below is therefore only one of 
many possible readings of the data. 
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While it is acknowledged that Foucault did not prescribe a method for 
conducting FDA, describing his works instead as “a kind of toolbox which others can 
rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own 
area” (Foucault, 1974, pp. 523-524), psychological researchers have proposed various 
guidelines for conducting this form of analysis (e.g., Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 
2008; Hook, 2007; Parker, 1992; Willig, 2013). Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 
(2008) have summarised three broad dimensions of FDA that are of interest to 
psychologists (Randol, 2014). First, since FDA is historical in its concern with how 
discourses come into being and are sustained (Hook, 2007), they assert the 
importance of conducting a historical inquiry of the specific topic. I have done this in 
the genealogy offered in Chapter Two. Second, the analysis should be focused on the 
mechanisms of power operating between discursive objects and subjects. I address 
this in my problematisation of dual diagnosis (Chapter One), genealogy (Chapter 
Two), and the analysis provided in Chapter Four. Finally, FDA should be concerned 
with how people are made subjects through discourses, and the practices through 
which they are so positioned. This is the principle focus of my analysis in Chapter 
Four. It is argued that this is relevant to counselling psychology because of its 
aforesaid interest in issues of power and language, in practice (see section 1.3). 
 
3.3 Methodological Design 
 This research elicited participants’ accounts of working therapeutically with 
dual diagnosis clients by means of semi-structured interviews with an opportunity 
sample of ten psychological practitioners. Such interviews are a common and 
pragmatic way of collecting relevant data for analysis (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 
2008; Willig, 2013). Numerous recent FDA studies have employed this data-
collection technique, which indicates its capacity to collect sufficiently rich data (e.g., 




 This research was approved by the University of Roehampton’s Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix A). It adhered to the BPS’s Code of Ethics and Conduct 
(BPS, 2018), and Generic Professional Practice Guidelines (BPS, 2008).  
 It additionally conformed fully to the Data Storage Protection Guidelines of 
the University of Roehampton’s Centre for Research in Social and Psychological 
Transformation (see Appendix B). All collected data were treated confidentially and 
anonymously. Participants were given a pseudonym and all identifying information 
was removed from the data during transcription. Transcripts and audio-recordings 
have been securely stored according to data protection law, and will be destroyed 
after ten years in accordance with BPS Ethics (BPS, 2018).  
 Participants were required to read and sign an informed consent form (see 
Appendix C), which was securely stored in a locked filing cabinet, separate from 
research data. The consent form notified participants of their rights, including 
confidentiality, and their freedom to withdraw from the research. On conclusion of 
their interview participants were also given a debrief form (see Appendix D) to 
ensure the interview had been conducted ethically. This form provided the 
researcher’s contact details, and those for organisations that could be approached for 
support if participants experienced post-interview distress. No participants reported 
concern or withdrew consent. 
 
3.3.2 Participants. 
 This research recruited ten participants via advertisement and snowballing. 
The research advertisements targeted third-sector organisations providing counselling 
services to dual diagnosis clients. These organisations were initially approached by 
sending a letter (see Appendix E), asking for permission to post an advertisement (see 
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Appendix F) to the relevant services. This research also directly approached 
practitioners working privately with a separate letter (see Appendix G).   
For the purposes of FDA, this sample was considered sufficient. FDA seeks to 
interrogate the discursive resources mobilised by participants, and the power relations 
within their accounts, without seeking to generalise beyond the sample (Willig, 
2013). Therefore, it requires a modest sample size to provide sufficiently rich data for 
the purposes of analysis. Randol (2014) and Jones (2017) have demonstrated how a 
sample of ten participants is sufficient for this approach.  
 This research’s inclusion criteria specified that participants should self-
identify as accredited psychological practitioners (e.g., BACP, BPS, UKCP, BABCP) 
with at least six months’ experience of working therapeutically with dual diagnosis 
clients. This was considered sufficient time to have developed ideas and opinions 
about working with this client group. There were no criteria relating to gender or 
work setting, as FDA values all contributions and contests essentialisms associated 
with such social constructs. Furthermore, there were no inclusion criteria relating to 
therapeutic approach: as discussed above (see section 1.2), research has identified no 
evidence of any approach’s superior efficacy with this client group (Hunt et al., 
2013). 
 
3.3.3 Procedures for data collection. 
 Following initial contact from potential participants, I issued the participant 
consent and debrief forms outlining this research’s premise and requirement of a one-
to-one audio-recorded interview expected to last no more than 90 minutes. I agreed a 
date and time to conduct the interview, at a convenient location. Participants were 
either interviewed at their workplace or the University of Roehampton. All interviews 
were conducted in a private room so participants could speak without interruption.  
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 On meeting, participants signed the consent form, and were encouraged to ask 
questions or raise concerns. I issued participants a unique identification number to 
preserve anonymity and confidentiality, and stored the code linking this number to 
participants’ pseudonyms in a locked cabinet, separate from any research data. I 
recorded interviews using an Olympus WS-831 digital voice recorder. 
 During interviews, I was guided by the following nine open questions: 
• Can you tell me how you came to work with dual diagnosis clients? 
• How did your training help to prepare you for work with this client 
group? 
• How do you understand dual diagnosis as presently defined in health 
settings? 
• How do you define dual diagnosis personally? 
• In your work with dual diagnosis clients, what have you found most 
satisfying? 
• In your work with dual diagnosis clients, what have you found most 
frustrating or difficult? 
• How do you think the wider public perceptions of dual diagnosis (or 
drugs / alcohol and mental health) are at play in your work with dual 
diagnosis clients? 
• Are there any other issues you have experienced that contribute to 
enhancing therapeutic work with dual diagnosis clients?   
• What do you think the future may hold for dual diagnosis in 
therapeutic work? 
 I used these questions to access and highlight participants’ constructions and 
truth claims about working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients. While they 
provided a guide, I used them flexibly to engage participants, facilitate other 
questions, and clarify responses (Willig, 2013). 
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 After the interview, I gave participants the debrief sheet and answered any 
questions or responded to any feedback about the interview. I then transcribed 
interviews using Malson’s (1998) transcription conventions. This was appropriate to 
the present research because FDA is concerned with the content and use of language 
in participants’ accounts, rather than the delivery of speech (Jones, 2017).  
 
3.3.4 Steps in the analysis. 
 As discussed above, this research’s central analytic interest was the contingent 
power relations in participants’ accounts of working therapeutically with dual 
diagnosis clients. Willig’s (2013) six-stage FDA model informed my analysis of 
participants’ accounts. I additionally drew on Parker (1992), Hook (2007) and 
Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine’s (2008) insights to further refine and develop this 
analysis. 
 The first step was immersion in the data. I read through and annotated each 
transcript several times to familiarise myself with content and themes that related to 
the research question. I initially focused on how the discursive objects of dual 
diagnosis and dual diagnosis clients were constructed in participants’ talk. As argued 
in Chapter Four, participants resourced wider normative discourses of mental illness, 
drug use and addiction in their accounts. I therefore additionally considered how 
these broader discursive regimes underpinned and facilitated these constructions. 
 I then attended to the subject positions in participants’ accounts. These 
provide “a location for persons within the structure of rights and duties” (Davies & 
Harré, 1999, p. 35) determined by the discourse that is resourced in talk. I analysed 
how practitioners, clients and other professionals were positioned by their accounts, 
and the power relations therein. Finally and most tentatively, I investigated how these 
subject positions seemed related to ways of experiencing and being in the world, and 
thus the consequences of participants’ subject positioning on their subjective 
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experiences (Willig, 2013). This entailed examining the range of thought, feeling and 
experience facilitated by these subject positions.  
 In conclusion, these analytic steps aimed to afford insight into both the 
broader power relations in the circulating discourses that resourced participants’ 
constructions of dual diagnosis and dual diagnosis clients, and the more local 
relations of power illustrated by subject positions and subjectivities. I considered this 
necessary to address the research question. Moreover, this research’s poststructuralist 
perspective acknowledges that the below analysis is a product of both researcher and 
participant being subject to—and acting within—established networks of social, 
cultural and institutional meaning (Willig, 2013): indeed, qualitative research in 
general conceptualises the researcher as thoroughly embedded within the research 
process. Hence it is essential to include a consideration researcher reflexivity, both to 
acknowledge the interpretative nature of the research, and interrogate the implications 
of the researcher’s involvement in the research process (e.g., Finlay & Gough, 2003; 
Morrow, 2005; Ponteretto, 2005). In the next section I explore such issues. 
 
3.4 Researcher’s Reflexivity 
 Reflexivity may be described as the process of “taking the researcher’s self as 
an object of scrutiny and examining how this self, with all its cognitive, emotional 
and social parts, affects the research process” (Josselson, 2017, p. 119). Since 
reflexivity is engaged with in ways consistent with the researcher’s epistemological 
and methodological position, it is important to consider both epistemological and 
personal reflexivity (Finlay, 2017; Finlay & Gough, 2003; Willig, 2013). I do so here, 
noting how the former impacts the latter.  
 As discussed above (section 1.4), a poststructuralist epistemology 
conceptualises a decentred and discontinuous self that is the product of power 
relations generated within and transmitted through discourse. This radically relativist 
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position additionally posits that reality is a discursive product: notions of truth and 
knowledge are disrupted and contested. From this stance, reflexivity does not—and 
cannot—reveal a researcher’s hidden agendas or underlying motivations (Finlay, 
2017). Reflexivity itself is a discursive and performative practice that contributes to 
shaping the researcher’s role in and experience of the research. The researcher is also 
subject to the prevailing discourses of the topic of interest, which is itself a linguistic 
phenomenon. Researcher transparency is therefore impossible (Finlay, 2017; 
McSkimming, 2017). 
 Gemignani (2017) advocates a critical constructionist reflexivity that attends 
to the constructive and located nature of knowledge and resulting patterns of 
difference rather than an illusory description of essences and fixed positions. 
Reflexivity is thus “concerned with both constructions of the researched-researcher 
relation and the genealogical processes that guide such constructions, with the results 
of producing an entanglement of subject and object” (p. 194). This demands an 
openness to revisions of what one knows and assumes, and a consideration of the 
power relations of this knowing. For Gemignani (2017), such a reflexivity is a matter 
of ethics: as noted above (see section 1.5) Foucault (1991b, 1984/1992) also linked 
reflexivity to ethical self-formation, through facilitating a critique of the self that 
offers alternative ways of being. I employ this critical, constructionist stance in 
considering my personal reflexivity, which is understood as a response to the 
discursive practices to which I have been subject, and to which I may unthinkingly 
have subjected participants, in undertaking this research.   
 My initial interest in dual diagnosis lies in my own experience of persistent 
psychological distress and periodic substance use in adolescence and early adulthood. 
While the latter may initially have been an attempt to mitigate the former, for me they 
ultimately seemed to become entwined. These experiences no doubt contributed to 
my decision to work in a statutory substance use service before enrolling on the 
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PsychD at Roehampton. As a key worker, I was responsible for working with a small 
caseload of clients, with the explicit aim of facilitating a reduction in substance use.  
 I became familiar with the phenomenon of dual diagnosis, at this time. Clients 
with mental health diagnoses were so described within the service. Staff had often 
received little or no specific training for these diagnoses, so could feel deskilled—or 
perhaps intimidated—by them. They would try to refer these clients to local mental 
health services. However, mental health services would refuse to accept them until 
they were abstinent. These clients would often feel that this demand for abstinence 
was unrealistic and unreasonable. Thus, they would either return to the drug service, 
where staff did not feel competent to meet their needs, or drop out. The drug service 
also attempted to establish closer links with local mental health services, but this 
proved difficult. My colleagues perceived that mental health services were resistant to 
this, and they frequently voiced frustration about it. 
 Through working with my caseload I came to perceive that many of these 
clients seemed to be stigmatised not just by mental health services, but NHS services 
more generally. Most clients reported adversarial relationships with their GPs. Local 
pharmacies would refuse to allow these clients to collect their methadone 
prescriptions inside: they would have to wait at the back door, so as not to “put off’ 
the other customers. Through my client work I developed a sense of injustice about 
the experience of dual diagnosis clients—and substance use clients more generally. 
 I enjoyed the environment of the substance use service. I found it 
disconfirmed some of my own assumptions about long term use of “hard” drugs. 
Several clients had also spent significant time in prison: in some cases, this was 
where they began to use substances. Again, my experiences with these clients raised 
my awareness about my assumptions about criminality, and discourses of substance 
users as dangers to society. These experiences also afforded me the chance to 
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challenge these assumptions, which in turn strengthened my sense of injustice about 
their place in society. 
 Many colleagues additionally self-identified as recovering addicts. This 
identity seemed extremely important to them. They would often take a cynical stance 
with clients, whom they perceived were unwilling to do the necessary work to 
overcome their substance use issues.  I became curious about the apparent rigidity of 
this recovering addict identity, and its imposition on clients: rather than affording 
empathy, it seemed to have the opposite effect. This alerted me to the power 
dynamics of these identities and descriptions, and made me want to investigate them 
further. 
 Applying the aforementioned critical reflexivity to these experiences, while 
they made me more aware of normative discourses of addiction and substance use 
and my own assumptions regarding them, I also became subject to discourses of dual 
diagnosis clients’ stigmatisation which were prevalent among my colleagues. The 
substance use service was itself located in a web of power relations arising from the 
discursive segregation of mental health and substance misuse problems. 
Consequently, the service itself seemed to function as a discursive practice. 
 These experiences therefore led to my constitution as an avowedly political 
and ideological researcher in the context of this inquiry. I located myself in a resistant 
position towards medical constructions thereof, and so within specific power relations 
that I have additionally transmitted to my participants by bringing this activist-
researcher subjectivity to bear on our interviews. This was particularly true in my 
earlier interviews, before some of the discursive themes discussed in Chapter Four 
began to emerge. My ideological stance has shifted during this research. I will offer a 
further critique of my reflexivity in the context of my research findings in Chapter 
Five. 
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 A critique of reflexivity itself is also warranted at this point. Counselling 
psychology prizes reflexivity, which is understood to help CoPs negotiate the 
multiple therapeutic and epistemological perspectives of its practice (Strawbridge & 
Woolfe, 2010). It has been incorporated as a professional competency (BPS, 2001). 
This could be argued to be a surveillance practice, through which CoPs regulate and 
form themselves according to the institutional norms embodied in counselling 
psychology training. The practice of reflexivity, then, may perform the very function 
it is intended to critique and counteract. As a discursive practice located within a web 
of power relations it must not be beyond contestation itself (Jones, 2017).  
 
3.5 Criteria for Quality in Qualitative Research 
 The traditional quality criteria in quantitative research of validity and 
reliability are not appropriate or applicable to poststructuralist investigation. Indeed, 
from this perspective such terms are critiqued as rhetorical devices that may serve to 
legitimate scientific truth claims (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000; Willig, 2013). By 
contrast, qualitative research’s standards of quality focus on transparency and clarity 
of evidence from localised accounts that provide the reader with a rhetoric to consider 
the phenomenon under investigation in new and unexpected ways. In the context of 
counselling psychology, Morrow (2005) notes these as criteria of trustworthiness. 
She specifies three such criteria that span research paradigms and epistemological 
stances. The first criterion is social validity, which she relates to issues of researchers’ 
subjectivity and reflexivity. I have addressed these above, and do so again in Chapter 
Five. The next criterion of adequacy of data was addressed through undertaking ten 
semi-structured interviews with psychological practitioners, through which saturation 
was argued to have been achieved: no new constructions or subject positions were 
revealed in the final interviews. I also attempted to ground the study in the culture 
and context of the participants through my own experience in substance use services 
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and my literature review and genealogy, which familiarised me with the setting and 
current state of dual diagnosis care in Britain.   
 This research addressed adequacy of interpretation through the analytic steps 
discussed above, which specifies the analytic framework that was deployed. Morrow 
(2005) avers the importance of balancing researcher interpretation with supporting 
quotations in presenting research findings. The analysis in Chapter Four is intended 
to accomplish this.  
 Researchers have also specified trustworthiness criteria for poststructuralist 
research (e.g., Madill et al., 2000; Morrow, 2005; Willig, 2013). Again, Morrow 
(2005) highlights praxis—the integration of theory and practice—and authenticity, 
which includes honouring participants’ different constructions and elaborating them. 
This research’s genealogy (Chapter Two), methodology and analysis (Chapter Four) 
are offered as evidence of its commitment to praxis. The below analysis also 
addresses authenticity through describing participants’ various constructions of and 
subject positions toward dual diagnosis and dual diagnosis clients.  
 As discussed above, the interpretative nature of poststructuralist research 
means that any analysis is merely one reading of the data. Consequently, such 
inquiries are ultimately assessed on their own merits and the plausibility of their 
findings. These findings should cohere around assertions of the historical location of 
the research topic at hand, and enhance consciousness of issues of power therein 
(Madill et al., 2000; Ponteretto, 2005; Walker, 2015). I will appraise the 
trustworthiness of my own analysis in Chapter Five.  
 Finally, Morrow (2005), proposes a criterion of transgressive validity for 
poststructuralist research. Here, trustworthiness relates to the research’s capacity to 
raise awareness of implicit power, incite discourse and contribute to a critical social 
science. Although this research’s ambitions were modest in this regard, since I 
approached it from an explicitly ideological stance—and it is conceptualised within 
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the critical psychology tradition—this validity is applicable here. I will also critique 




























4.1 Introduction to Chapter Four 
 In this chapter I will present the findings of my analysis of interviews with ten 
participants about their experiences of working therapeutically with dual diagnosis 
clients. It is structured in the context of this project’s research question: “What are 
the power relations in practitioners’ accounts of working therapeutically with dual 
diagnosis clients?”. As discussed above (see section 3.3.4), this analysis was 
informed by Willig’s (2013) FDA model. Parker (1992, 2013), Hook (2007) and 
Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2008) have also developed broad FDA strategies, 
which I considered and found useful.  
 In addressing my research question, I will first detail the circulating 
contemporary discourses—or discursive regimes (Foucault, 1980/1991)—identified 
in this analysis. These provided the context for the investigation of participants’ 
therapeutic subject positions, of which I identified five. It should be noted, however, 
that I make no claims to this analysis’ authoritativeness. As with any FDA, it 
represents one of many possible readings of the data. Moreover, I make no claim to 
material reality in analysing these discourses and their contingent power relations.   
 Table 1 shows the circulating expert discursive regimes, the subject positions 
that variously resourced these truth claims, and the illustrative discourses that 








Summary of the circulating contemporary discourses, subject positions and their 
linked illustrative discourses  
4.2     Circulating Contemporary Discourses of Dual Diagnosis 
 
 
4.2.1     A medical-moral discourse 
 
4.2.2     A recovery discourse 
 
4.2.3     A war on drugs discourse 
 
 
Therapeutic Subject Positions 
 
Illustrative Discourses  
4.3.1   The Adversarial Practitioner 4.3.1.1     “Need for boundaries”  
 
4.3.1.2     “Danger of burnout”  
4.3.2   The Deskilled Practitioner   4.3.2.1     “Where do I start?” 
 
4.3.2.2     “Insufficient training”  
 




4.3.3.1     “Unwinding stigma”  
4.3.3.2     “Critiquing medicine”  
4.3.3.3     “Representing the client” 
4.3.4   The Expert 4.3.4.1    “Wounded children” 
4.3.4.2    “Abject beings” 
4.3.4.3    “Learning on the job” 
4.3.5   The Critical Practitioner 4.3.5.1   “Limited understanding” 







4.2 Introduction to the Circulating Contemporary Discourses 
 In talking about their therapeutic practice, these ten participants resourced 
three circulating contemporary discourses: a medical-moral discourse; a recovery 
discourse; and a war on drugs discourse. These competing regimes of truth seemed to 
objectify dual diagnosis clients in diverse and sometimes contradictory ways. 
 
4.2.1 A medical-moral discourse. 
 Medical constructions of dual diagnosis are, I have argued in Chapter Two, 
infused with moral judgements. Here, clients’ issues are constituted as “a maladaptive 
personal choice” (Broadus & Evans, 2015, p. 116) resulting from a deficit of self-
control or will power.  
Excerpt 1 
So yeah there’s more of this flying off and disappearing. Which is frustrating for a 
therapist, although it’s what we work with and we have to understand it happens, 
and in addiction it does happen. But it seems to happen more with dual diagnosis, 
they are less reliable. (Eli, 719-723) 
 
Excerpt 2 
INTERVIEWER: What in your work with dual diagnosis clients have you found 
most difficult or frustrating? 
FAY: Their unwillingness to change. (Fay, 459-461) 
 
Excerpt 3 
…as a clinician you’re going to fix me. And if you don’t fix me, I’m not gonna 
engage with you. And if I don’t engage with you, I’m gonna try to make you feel 
that you’re responsible for me. (Lawrence, 482-485) 
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In these excerpts, Eli and Fay objectify their clients as “less reliable” and 
“unwilling to change”. Lawrence asserts that they will attempt to make him feel 
“responsible”, which, by inference, seems to produce clients as unwilling to take 
responsibility for themselves. These accounts appear to mimic dual diagnosis clients’ 
constitution in the psychiatric literature as lacking motivation and being difficult to 
treat or engage (see section 1.2). Within this discursive regime, then, dual diagnosis 
clients are constructed as irresponsible, perhaps even feckless. Their ascribed 
shortcomings of character may also complicate clinical practice. This seems to repeat 
early medical discourses of madness and addiction (see sections 2.2, 2.3.2). It could 
therefore be argued that contemporary medical-moral discourse is a similar example 
of objectification by dividing practices (Foucault, 1983/2002).  
 
4.2.2 A recovery discourse. 
This discourse seems to contrast markedly with medical-moral truth claims: as 
discussed above (see section 2.3.8), the recovery movement developed in opposition 
to medical practice. A key feature of recovery-focused treatment is a commitment to 
addressing the impact of stigma on clients. 
Excerpt 4  
The majority of the clients who would come to us, essentially were perceived as the 
lowest of the low (Dora, 786-787) 
 
Excerpt 5 
So it’s, err, very very very easy for dual diagnosis clients to slip through the cracks. 
Because they are seen as difficult to work with and, a lot of clinicians don’t want to 





I think that comes in as, “there’s something wrong with that person”. And I think 
that’s introjected by the client. And, if we’re not careful, by, by agencies as well. I 
think we have to be very clear about that. (Tony, 503-507) 
 
These participants note the impact of stigma on dual diagnosis clients, here. For Dora, 
they are “perceived as the lowest of the low”, while Lawrence claims they are 
considered “difficult to work with” by clinicians. Tony talks of judgements that 
“there’s something wrong” with clients. These judgements can be “introjected by the 
client” and “agencies as well”, and can also “make it easy for clients slip through the 
cracks”. Recovery discourse therefore objectifies clients as subject to—and perhaps 
victimised by—stigma, including by medical or psychological practitioners. It thus 
seems not merely a counterpoint to medical-moral discourse, but antagonistic towards 
its dividing practices. 
 
4.2.3 A war on drugs discourse. 
As noted above (see section 2.3.6.3), war on drugs discourse objectifies drugs 
and drug users as an existential yet nebulous threat. It categorises them in reductive 
binaries of health and illness and life and death, and can induce panic and a need for 
action.  Perlman and Jordan (2017) have noted its impact on drug services in the 
deployment of militaristic metaphors, such as targeting, capturing, tracking and 
surveillance in relation to clients and treatment.  
Excerpt 7 






…I guess it is a bit of a battlefield, and you’re kind of - my experience, especially 
as a trainee, was that you were being shot at by all sides. (Dora, 1029-1031) 
 
Excerpt 9 
…it depends really on what they’re using, the consistency of it, umm, and sadly if 
it is substances there’s only one place you’re going, and that’s six foot under. 
(Susan 590-593) 
 
These excerpts seem to encapsulate this panic and need for action. In casting dual 
diagnosis as a “timebomb”, Jane conveys its potential gravity and deadliness. Dora 
locates her practice on a “battlefield”, where her safety is at stake. And Susan 
objectifies “substances” as inevitably lethal, irrespective of type; thereby 
demonstrating this discourse’s reductiveness. War on drugs discourse therefore seems 
to construct dual diagnosis practice as a perilous undertaking, both for practitioners 
who may be “shot at”, and clients who may end up “six foot under”. It appears to 
objectify clients as dangerous, or alternatively in danger, because of their drug use. 
Clients are inconsistently defined, within this discursive regime. 
  
4.3 Introduction to the Therapeutic Subject Positions 
 For the purposes of this analysis, the above circulating contemporary 
discourses provided different frames of intelligibility for participants’ accounts of 
dual diagnosis work. I identified five therapeutic subject positions, which were 
resourced by these discourses: the Adversarial Practitioner; the Deskilled Practitioner; 
the Advocate; the Expert; and the Critical Practitioner. These located practitioners 
within distinct sets of power relations. 
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4.3.1 The Adversarial Practitioner. 
Two participants, Lawrence and Dora—a CoP—mobilised this subject 
position most prominently in their accounts. They resourced both medical-moral and 
war on drugs truth claims in doing so. 
 
4.3.1.1 “Need for boundaries”.  
Excerpt 10 
No I would, I would, err, be of the opinion that boundaries are absolutely primary 
in dual diagnosis patients. (Lawrence, 109-110) 
 
Excerpt 11 
Umm, and pushing back with your own boundaries. “No, you can’t arrive 50 
minutes late and expect to be seen, I’ll see you next week”. And that’s constant, 
that to and fro. (Dora, 1021-1023) 
 
As argued above, in medical-moral discourse dual diagnosis clients are seemingly 
objectified as feckless or irresponsible. Mobilising a subjectivity resourced by this 
discursive regime—and its attendant dividing practices—seems to engender an 
adversarial relationship between therapist and client, in which “boundaries are 
absolutely primary”. Through their assertion of the fundamental importance of 
maintaining these boundaries in their practice, Lawrence and Dora implicitly 
construct clients as constantly trying to test these boundaries. This seems to position 
these clients as disobedient and in need of discipline. Indeed, Dora asserts the 
importance of resisting this pressure by “pushing back”. Thus practice seems to be 
objectified as a constant battle for control in which practitioners must actively assert 
their authority, which effectuates dominating top-down power relations. This subject 
position seems to locate practitioners and clients within a rigid moral order, with 
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practitioners assuming an authoritarian parental position in relation to their childlike 
clients. It seems to repeat doctor-patient power relations in early psychiatric 
treatments of mental illness and addiction (see sections 2.2, 2.3.2). 
 
 4.3.1.2 “Danger of burnout”. 
Within the Adversarial Practitioner subject position, then, therapy seems to be 
constituted as a power game in which practitioners must defend their own position.  
Excerpt 12 
I think it’s very easy to burn out working with dual diagnosis clients. I could think 
that people could maybe have a four to five-year frontline life in that kind of work 
because I think it is hugely challenging, and hugely exhausting work as well, 
psychologically. And with very few rewards. You get the golden nuggets, but 
they’re very few and far between. (Lawrence, 689-695) 
 
Excerpt 13 
And it is - it’s one of those services where I feel like burnout could be a real thing 
after ten years working there. I think it’s a field where, without supervision and 
without support from a colleague you would have to walk away. Because it’s 
lonely. (Dora, 1040-1044) 
 
Excerpt 14 
… I think if you don’t have [support] in place, then you leave yourself very 
exposed to the kind of chaos that is gonna exist there. (Lawrence, 170-176) 
 
Within this subject position, the threat of burnout in practice clearly looms and the 
rewards—or “golden nuggets”—are rare indeed. Lawrence also deploys militaristic 
metaphors to construct his experiences of dual diagnosis work, which occurs on the 
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“frontline”, much as Dora locates her practice on a “battlefield” (Excerpt 8). In 
conjunction with their depiction of their work as “hugely exhausting”, “lonely” and 
with the potential to “leave yourself very exposed”, this military language renders this 
practice not merely grim, but dangerous.  
By resourcing war on drugs discourse, these participants seem to objectify 
clients as antagonistic drug Others (see section 2.3.6.3), who may cause burnout or 
“chaos”. In this context, then, the Adversarial Practitioner subject position objectifies 
clients not merely as difficult or disobedient but as the malignant source of 
formidable problems in the work. Participants who mobilise this subject position are 
seemingly preoccupied with protecting themselves from their clients: there appears to 
be scant concern for clients’ welfare, here. Thus, I argue, the subject position could 
be seen to abrogate any responsibility towards dual diagnosis clients. 
The Adversarial Practitioner subject position is therefore inauspicious for the 
prospect of therapy. By constructing clients as difficult or even dangerous, this 
subject position seems to foster a need for action. But this action is defensive, and 
centred on preserving practitioners’ authority or safety. The Adversarial subjectivity 
therefore seems to enact or perpetuate dominant power relations over clients, which 
may further legitimise their stigmatisation or exclusion from services. Participants 
who mobilise this subject position seem to uncritically adhere to medical-moral or 
war on drugs discourse. It seems to represent a “submission of subjectivity” 
(Foucault, 1983/2002, p. 322) to these regimes of truth. 
 
4.3.2 The Deskilled practitioner.  
 Several participants, including Dora most notably, mobilised a Deskilled 




4.3.2.1 “Where do I start?”. 
 As discussed above (see section 2.4) there has been a discursive bifurcation of 
mental illness and addiction within medical expert knowledge over the past forty 
years. This delineation may therefore be considered a feature of medical-moral 
discourse, which resources this knowledge system. 
Excerpt 15 
I think most things, when you have more than one diagnosis, there [sic] always 
that kind of chaos of what you do first, and who deals with it, and always a 
differing of opinion. Umm and that’s gonna rise in chaos. (Dora, 206-209) 
 
Excerpt 16 
You’ve got so many of these, err, just significant mental health diagnosises [sic]. 
Yes, you can go with the addiction approach because that’s all quite, been you 
know, kind of researched. But then where are you going to aim your mental health 
approach? (Lawrence, 750-754) 
 
Excerpt 17 
…with dual diagnosis it’s what am I dealing with here, am I working with this, or 
am I working with that? And I’ve worked with that and I’m getting an 
improvement. But the more I improve and dig them out of that, the more they often 
go down on the other side. So it’s almost like scales. (Fay, 461-466) 
 
In these excerpts, participants appear to draw on this medical-moral truth claim, with 
Dora’s talk of “more than one diagnosis”, Lawrence’s contrasting of an “addiction 
approach” with a “mental approach”, and Fay’s questioning whether she is “working 
with this, or…working with that”. This seems to lead these participants to objectify 
their clients as highly complex, and clinical practice as confusing or perhaps even 
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frustrating: the more Fay “digs [clients] out of” one area, “the more they often go 
down the other side”. For Dora, this confusion seemingly takes on a more pernicious 
quality, leading “always [to] a differing of opinion” and a “rise in chaos”. In 
resourcing medical-moral discourse, these participants therefore seem to mobilise a 
Deskilled Practitioner subject position. The confusion and uncertainty that 
accompanies this position appears to leave them unsure what to focus on or where to 
begin, in their practice.  Lawrence and Dora also seem to accept diagnostic categories 
unquestioningly in these accounts. This apparent reification may enhance their 
Deskilled subjectivity, by reinforcing the construction of dual diagnosis clients as 
having “so many of these…significant mental health diagnosises”.  
  
4.3.2.2 “Insufficient training”. 
 Several participants spoke about their training in a manner that also mobilised 
the Deskilled Practitioner subject position.  
Excerpt 18 
INTERVIEWER: Umm, so how did your training […] help to prepare you for 
work with this client group, would you say? 
TONY: Hmm (.) well, I don’t think it does. I don’t think it does. I think it maybe 
highlights what my limitations are, or with the training, with regards to working 
with a particular client group.  And at best maybe to make an assessment as to 
whether that was inside my capacity, or whether I need to refer, you know, a 
person to, err, yeah to another, some other psychological services. (Tony, 24-34) 
 
Excerpt 19 
DORA: And especially then when you add in potential like gender confusion, or 
maybe bullying and stigma from different gender identities into then anxiety, 
depression and drug and alcohol… 
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INTERVIEWER: Yeah  
DORA: It’s like a minefield of what you’re touching. And I feel there isn’t the 
preparation for that. (Dora, 318-322) 
 
In the above excerpts, Tony positions his training as effective only insofar as it 
“highlights” his “limitations…with regards to working with a particular client group”. 
Dora similarly depicts hers as not providing “the preparation” for dual diagnosis 
practice, which she locates in a “minefield”. This seems to amplify the potential 
consequences of this lack of training, for her. In their accounts, then, these 
participants seemingly construct training as inadequate in preparing them for the 
challenges of working with dual diagnosis practice. This, I argue, locates them in the 
Deskilled Practitioner subject position, within which they seem to question their own 
capacity to work with this client group. Moreover, this subject position may abrogate 
the responsibility to undertake this work: in objectifying his training as failing to 
provide the necessary resources to work with dual diagnosis clients, Tony may justify 
referring dual diagnosis clients to “some other psychological services”. This subject 
position may therefore effectively perpetuate problematic practitioner-client power 
relations.  
The Deskilled Practitioner subject position also seems to offer little promise 
for the prospects of clinical practice. In objectifying clients as highly—or 
threateningly—complicated, and training as failing to prepare them for this 
complexity, these participants again seem to experience a negative subjectivity about 
their work. Unlike the Adversarial subject position, however, here this negativity 
seems to leave participants with limited agency. Moreover, the Deskilled Practitioner 





…what I would say is I’m being much more careful now and it is the dual 
diagnosis that has brought that about. Because the dual diagnosis – they simply – 
we are, we’re here in a way, we’re not goal-driven but if I had – we see about 130 
clients a year I suppose for long term therapy. You know some of them stay for six 
months, some of them only for you know 12 weeks, some of them for two years. 
But about 120 people over a year come through these doors. And if we’re taking 40 
people with personality disorder and only five of those are showing any great 
improvement, then I’m afraid statistically it doesn’t work. We don’t work as a 
service. (Eli, 775-786) 
 
Here Eli, who runs a substance misuse service, seems to resource medical-moral 
discourse in two ways. First, in an apparent reification of the diagnostic category of 
“personality disorder”, and second in his connection of this category with a lack of 
“any great improvement in therapy”, which echoes the construction of dual diagnosis 
clients as making especially slow progress in the psychiatric literature (see section 
1.2). In unquestioningly resourcing these truth claims, he mobilises the Deskilled 
Practitioner Subject Position: practice with dual diagnosis clients has “made him 
much more careful now” and may ultimately mean “we don’t work as a service”. In 
short, he seems to constitute these clients as too complicated or unwell to treat. In this 
excerpt, then, the Deskilled subject position seems to engender or perpetuate 
dominating power relations. Moreover, these power effects appear especially 
troubling in this instance because they are unthinkingly activated in the context of an 
uncertain and non-agentic subjectivity.  
 The Deskilled Practitioner subject position, and its contingent power relations, 
seems to illustrate the difficulties that can accompany a sense of lack of competence 
in practice. This may be particularly relevant, perhaps as a cautionary example, to 
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CoPs who are expected to negotiate multiple expert knowledges in their own practice, 
in areas in which they may not be experienced (Jones, 2017). 
 
 4.3.3 The Advocate  
 This subject position was primarily resourced by recovery discourse, and its 
emphasis on destigmatisation. While most participants mobilised this subjectivity 
periodically in their accounts, Jane, Susan and Kathy did so most prominently. 
 
 4.3.3.1 “Unwinding stigma”. 
Excerpt 21 
You know I’ll say things like, “look let’s just kick this stigma out the window, 




How we all are with people, we’re very (coughs) sorry - very supportive, very non-
judgmental and we can talk about anything. And actually that, that, it really settles 
people really quickly (Susan, 1080-1082) 
 
Excerpt 23 
…I think part of the therapy at the start of the therapy, when you’re building a 
relationship, is making sure that you are not a - stigmatising the person, you are 
not labelling or judging the person. Therefore it’s almost making them 
understand why their unhappiness, uh, using, and anybody might have gone 
through the same situation, might have end up in the same (.) going through the 




…part of recovery is about umm (.) forgiving oneself and actually understanding 
oneself. So you’re not actually full of shame and full of guilt, and actually living up 
to those kind of like, stigmas. (Susan, 1102-1105) 
 
In these accounts, participants construct their practice in terms of destigmatisation. 
Jane “kicks this stigma out the window”, and Susan is “very non-judgmental”. Kathy 
cites the importance of “not labelling or judging the person” at the start of therapy. 
This seems to position them as empathic practitioners who are attuned to their clients. 
They can have an “open conversation” and “talk about anything”, which “settles 
people really quickly”.  
As I have argued above (see section 4.2.2), recovery discourse seems to 
objectify dual diagnosis clients as victims of stigmatisation. Susan appears to do so 
here in describing recovery as no longer “living up to…stigmas”. Working up clients 
as victims may lead to practice becoming directive or didactic. For Kathy, therapy 
involves “making [clients] understand…that anybody might end up in the same 
position as them”, and Susan constitutes recovery as “actually understanding 
oneself”, which implies that prior to recovering these clients lacked this self-
understanding. These participants thus seem to construct their clients as passive and 
unsophisticated in comparison to their capable and understanding selves, here. This 
engenders unequal practitioner-client power relations. 
 
4.3.3.2 “Critiquing medicine”. 
 Participants are also sharply critical of medical practitioners and services, in 





…a lot of the medicalised model doesn’t get near to, you know, what’s happened to 
you? (Jane, 518-519) 
 
Excerpt 26 
Umm a lot of the, a lot of the difficulties with dual diagnosis work is GPs don’t 
have a, a good - so you might get a GP that’s good with an understanding of mental 
health, but absolutely no idea about substance misuse. (Jane, 925-928) 
 
Excerpt 27 
I think when I worked in drugs and alcohol, the main issue was around getting 
people into mental health services, trying to get them to take the client seriously. 
That they had, umm, you know that they had issues worth referring them for… 
(Adele, 286-289) 
 
In these excerpts, Jane constructs the “medicalised model” of dual diagnosis as 
inadequate. Additionally, or perhaps because of this shortcoming, she constitutes GPs 
as failing to understand it. This lack of understanding is then the source of “a lot of 
the difficulties with dual diagnosis work”. Adele similarly appears to assert that 
mental health services are inclined not to “take the client seriously”.  This subjectivity 
seems to locate practitioners firmly in opposition to medical perspectives of dual 
diagnosis.  Indeed, Jane seems to demonstrate that they may even be rejected 
outright. This dismissal is especially problematic from a counselling psychology 
perspective, which entails traversing multiple knowledges reflectively in practice. It 
also highlights how these participants appear to rigidly adhere to recovery truth 
claims in working up their practice. 
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4.3.3.3 “Representing the client”. 
This oppositional positioning leads participants to advocate on clients’ behalf 
in interactions with medical or mental health services. 
Excerpt 28 
Umm, so you know, with what’s frustrating and difficult is when, like for example 
with my client that I took to the early intervention team, and they said, “he’s not 
got a primary psychotic illness”. It’s like well, umm, well maybe not but he is 
having these symptoms and he is having trouble with his mental health. And I 
really really pushed for that. And like, I actually got quite frustrated in one of the 




So then part of the job as a, I think as a therapist in a, in a, in a substance misuse 
service is to deal with mental health services. And try to see if you can, err, make a 
referral, or create a link or with, with substance, with mental health services and 
see if we can do some joint working together. (Kathy, 264-269) 
 
Excerpt 30 
You have to be prepared as well I think, to advocate on behalf of this client group 
(Adele, 259-260) 
 
Jane, Kathy and Adele seem to fashion this advocacy as a matter of course in their 
practice, here. And, for Jane, this may necessitate conflict with medical services and 
staff. Therefore, in contrast with the Deskilled subjectivity, participants here 
seemingly position themselves as competent and capable practitioners and 
representatives for their clients. Indeed, they fashion themselves as caring for their 
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clients both within and beyond the consulting room. They seem to take on a hyper-
responsible position towards their victimised clients, who are simultaneously 
rendered impotent and enfeebled, and requiring this advocacy. 
 In this way, this subject position also represents a near-diametric inversion of 
the Adversarial subjectivity: here participants represent clients in the face of other 
practitioners’ oppression, rather than defending themselves from clients who are a 
threat. I argue, then, that the Advocate is a resistant subjectivity. Yet this resistance is 
worked up in terms of the dominant medical approach it intends to repel: as Jane 
exemplifies (Excerpt 25, 26), it involves a negation of this medical perspective. This 
seems an example of tactical reversal (Foucault, 1976/1998; see section 1.5), where 
resistance confronts a dominant force—here the medical approach—directly. 
However, this resistance will be futile because it is limited to either complying with 
or refusing the dominant force’s challenge. Therefore, the resistance in this subject 
position is bound to be ineffective. 
 Moreover, by constituting clients as victims, this subject position appears to 
disempower these clients in relation to practitioners. The forces of abjection by which 
subjects are formed and circumscribed (see section 2.4.1) are present in this subject 
position, as Excerpt 24 may illustrate: Susan objectifies her clients as “full of shame 
and…guilt”, and “living up to…stigmas”. Consequently, the Advocate subject 
position may merely substitute clients’ subjugation through a medical dominance for 
their oppression through the discursive regime of recovery. This is antithetical to the 
recovery movement itself, which, as noted above (see section 2.3.8), aims to 
reorganise power arrangements between practioners and clients. At minimum, 
participants deploying this subject position seem to mobilise a language of 
empowerment without changing service users’ experiences within this practice 
(Masterson & Owen, 2006). Similarly, in rendering clients abject this subject 
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position, which ostensibly affirms these clients’ legitimate place in society, may 
paradoxically locate them as non-subjects.  
The Advocate subject position, then, seems inadvertently to perpetuate the 
power relations that it aims to combat. It highlights the dangers of practitioners being 
unaware of the discursive power games within which they—and their practice—are 
located (O’Callaghan, in press). This subjectivity calls to mind Room’s (2005) 
observation that “the literature on stigmatisation seems generally to be less alive to 
the possibility that efforts to reduce stigma may also have unintended effects” (p. 
150). 
 
4.3.4 The Expert.   
Participants also widely used this subject position, in their accounts. Unlike 
the Advocate subjectivity it was resourced by several different discursive regimes, 
which participants drew on in different ways. 
 
 4.3.4.1 “Wounded children”. 
Excerpt 31 
Because for me, addiction comes from a very early narcissistic wound. Yup, very 
early. (Fay, 170-171) 
 
Excerpt 32 
…and then there are all the drives that are kind of behind the addiction. Or, you 







In these excerpts, participants seem to construct clients’ problems in terms of 
developmental wounding. These traumatic early life experiences may give rise to 
“addiction” for Fay and Tony, or “mental health issues” for Jane. This construction 
seems to resource psychoanalytic and psychological addiction discourse (see sections 
2.3.6.1, 2.3.6.4, 2.3.7.1). Through their apparent valorisation of this discourse, these 
participants seem to affirm their own comprehension about the roots of dual 
diagnosis, and so position themselves as Experts in the field. Fay, for example, 
confidently states where “addiction comes from”, and Tony lists “all the 
drives…behind the addiction”. 
 I have argued above (see sections 2.3.6.1, 2.3.6.4, 2.3.7.1) that these 
psychoanalytic and psychological truth claims objectify clients as childlike in their 
incapacity to manage their own experiences, and so repeat the power dynamics of 
psychiatric discourse. It seems that these participants’ accounts similarly produce 
childlike clients, here. Although they may be constructed here as more vulnerable, 
rather than impulsive and disobedient as in the Adversarial Practitioner subject 
position, this Expert subjectivity seems to engender similarly unequal power 
relations. In locating themselves as Experts, these participants position themselves as 
benevolent and perceptive adults in relation to their clients. 
 In mobilising an Expert subjectivity, these participants also seem to resource 
medical-moral truth claims by differentiating addiction and mental health problems. 




…I-I guess it became, the drug and alcohol became a function. So we’d see the 
other part of the dual diagnosis, as in the mental health condition, as the primary 
diagnosis, regardless of whether the addiction was more apparent. (Dora, 298-302) 
 
Excerpt 35 
…I enjoyed it because you then, as a psychologist, you have a luxury in a way to 
work with a, with a mental health problem with having - and you can almost at 
times ignore the alcohol or the drug abuse, and concentrate on the person. (Kathy, 
88-92) 
 
Here, these participants—both psychologists—seem to draw on this differentiation to 
discount clients’ substance use in their practice. Dora asserts that mental health 
problems are “the primary diagnosis”, much as Jane (Excerpt 33) seems to claim that 
you “throw substances on top” of mental health problems in dual diagnosis. Kathy’s 
comment that ignoring substance use allows her to “concentrate on the person” seems 
to reinforce this construction of substance use as extraneous. The discursive 
bifurcation of addiction and mental illness, therefore, seems to afford them an Expert 
subjectivity, in their practice. They position themselves as knowing what to address, 
and what to ignore. This seemingly renders their clients less complex, which may 
entrench this Expert subject position.  
These accounts therefore seem to illustrate the power of the psy-complex (see 
section 2.2), which allows practitioners to gain authority over their clients by bringing 
order to disorder through the application of regimes of truth (Foucault, 2000a). While 
this may make dual diagnosis practice more intelligible, it does so here at the cost of 
disregarding a significant component of these clients’ experiences. Therefore I argue 




4.3.4.2 “Abject beings”. 
Several participants mobilised an Expert subjectivity by emphasising dual 
diagnosis clients’ abjection.   
Excerpt 36 
…somebody with dual diagnosis is much more likely to be either drinking on their 
own, or with a very dysfunctional group of drinkers, like hanging around outside a 
YMCA or whatever in […] than, than in the pub with some high achievers who 
like drinking (Eli, 640-644) 
 
Excerpt 37 
My experience of dual diagnosis was, that tangible link was only their drug dealer. 
Or the l-off licence that was selling them alcohol. They had no other social circles, 
especially not prosocial. They didn't have any at all. (Dora, 844-848) 
 
 Here, these participants seem to objectify clients as socially inadequate: Eli 
contrasts their “dysfunctional” drinking with that of “high achievers”, and Dora 
works them up as having no “prosocial” circles. This seems to epitomise the forces of 
exclusion and abjection that form and delimit the liberal subject (Butler, 1993; see 
section 2.4.1). In constructing dual diagnosis clients as abject, these participants seem 
to marginalise clients and perhaps locate them exterior to this liberal subjectivity. 
Interestingly, Dora then appears to offer clients a pathway back to the domain of the 
liberal subject through her status as a CoP.  
Excerpt 38 
And that’s where I think, the holistic nature I guess of counselling psychologists, 
the way they look at individuals, comes into it because you’d be more better 
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prepared necessarily for the bigger picture to prepare them for social life and 
society. (Dora, 864-868) 
 
Dora, I argue, resources recovery discourse here by valorising the normative 
construction of this recovery as a return to the rights, roles and responsibilities of 
society (see section 2.3.8). Doing so seems to locate her as an Expert who can 
facilitate this process. Moreover, she seemingly claims this power specifically for 
CoPs, thereby perhaps privileging them as first among Experts. This also seems to fix 
clients within a dominating moral order, once more: as abject beings they are inferior 
to and perhaps reliant upon sober and responsible Expert practitioners. Dora’s 
assertion also seems to exemplify Rose’s (1998) argument that the source of 
psychology’s position of power is its capacity to offer a “promise of personhood” (p. 
88), through its governmental practices. 
 The construction of clients as wounded children or abject beings in 
participants’ accounts has further implications for practice. 
Excerpt 39 
Oh there’s always a sense that, you know, progress will be slow. And also, do I 
open up a wound that they can’t sufficiently close in the session to go out in the 
real world. Cause this is a false world. So I have to judge how they are, and if I’m 
gonna go there will I give them enough time to recover so they can go back there. 






Umm, and we’re able to kind of use either directive or non-directive skills, or you 
know they don’t always know that we’re doing that, you know, when we encourage 
someone to speak up in group. Or, you know, they’re not, it’s not like we make 
them aware of what’s happening. Sometimes it’s just unconscious stuff that you 
know, we know what we’re doing but the th - we don’t, we don’t like let them 
know exactly what’s going on. ‘Cause they wouldn’t get it anyway. They’d be like, 
“what?” (laughs). (Susan, 727-735) 
 
Excerpt 41 
…I don’t think there’s enough counsellors and psychotherapists working in 
substance misuse, to really fully understand dual diagnosis and what, what’s really 
going on with the client. (Susan, 1307-1310) 
 
Here, Fay seemingly draws on psychoanalytic or psychological truth claims to 
objectify dual diagnosis practice as inevitably drawn-out, in part because of the need 
to “open up” or “sufficiently close” her clients’ wounds. She then appears to construct 
therapy as a process of disassembling these damaged clients into their constituent parts, 
by likening it to “stripping them bare of their defences”. In so doing she may implicitly 
affirm her own Expert position, by endowing herself with the power to reassemble or 
leave clients broken.  
Susan constructs clients who “don’t always know” what she is doing in practice, 
thereby seeming to render  them unsophisticated or obtuse. She simultaneously appears 
to position herself as an Expert, who can use “directive or no-directive skills”. This 
contrast may then justify not letting clients know “exactly what’s going on. ‘Cause they 
wouldn’t get it anyway”. She may buttress her Expert subjectivity through her claim 
that only “counsellors and psychotherapists” can “really fully understand dual 
diagnosis”: this seems a self-legitimating assertion. 
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Again, in these excerpts the Expert subject position seems to generate a 
dominant power relationship over dual diagnosis clients. Within this subject position 
dual diagnosis practice is objectified as a prescriptive and normative process, which 
entails leading clients towards a preordained solution. Therapeutic work seems to 
function as a regime of governmental practice (Thompson, 2003), in these accounts. 
From a counselling psychology perspective, this is highly problematic because it is 
directive and may engender dominating power relations.  
 
 4.3.4.3 “Learning on the job”. 
 Most participants mobilised discourses of experiential learning in relation to 
dual diagnosis practice.  
Excerpt 42 
…part of it was great ‘cause it’s learning on the job and I think that’s almost what 
teaches you to be a psychologist, because it doesn’t matter what you’re taught in a 
classroom… (Dora, 264-267) 
 
Excerpt 43 
…although I was doing [counselling psychology] training, none of the training that 
I was doing was had anything to do with alcohol. I just had a very good…I started 
out working in a voluntary sector organisation for alcohol. They had an 
exceptionally good training programme with it. Very good supervision. It was very 






Umm I don’t think there was dual diagnosis training. I think the mental health 
training I run now is very focused on dual diagnosis. It really goes into it and 
explains it and - but when I came in, I wasn’t, I wasn’t really trained as such. I was 
lucky I was working with [_] and she gave me a lot of insight and kind of… 
INTERVIEWER: So that was sort of your training, when you were sort of… 
JANE: I think so, it was on the ground. (Jane, 242-246) 
 
In these excerpts, participants seem to objectify their formal training as failing to 
prepare them for dual diagnosis practice, as did participants who mobilised the 
Deskilled Practitioner subject position (see Excerpts 18, 19). For example, Maria—a 
CoP—claims that her training did not have “anything to do with alcohol”, and Jane 
says she “wasn’t really trained as such”. Unlike in the Deskilled subjectivity, 
however, they contrast this paucity with their experiential learning. This, for Dora, is 
“what almost teaches you to be a psychologist”: she also appears to dismiss her 
formal training with her comment that “it doesn’t really matter what you’re taught in 
a classroom”. By inference, these participants seem to constitute this experiential 
learning as enabling them to work with dual diagnosis clients. In Jane’s case, it may 
even have helped her develop a training that is “very focused on dual diagnosis”.  
These participants therefore seem to privilege this “on the job” experience. In 
so doing, it could be argued that they effectively exclude those without this 
experience from the arena of dual diagnosis practice. These apparently self-
legitimating accounts, then, position these participants as Experts in the field. But in 
laying claim to dual diagnosis practice as their exclusive preserve, they also beg the 
question whether this is in their clients’ best interest (Jones, 2017).  
 
  
4.3.5 The Critical Practitioner. 
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The Critical Practitioner subject position was the least frequently used subject 
position in participants’ accounts. It was identified by a self-questioning reflexivity in 
the working up of dual diagnosis practice. 
  
4.3.5.1 “Limited understanding”. 
Excerpt 45 
MARIA: I think some of that still needs to emerge, actually. My feeling is that 
we’re still in the early days of understanding what dual diagnosis might mean. 
INTERVIEWER: Ok 
MARIA: Right so there’s probably a lot of work that needs to be done in order that 
things do emerge that we begin to understand in a better way. (Maria, 241-247) 
 
Excerpt 46 
…but I think what’s taken to mean dual diagnosis generally, are people who, umm 
(.) what can I say that it’s a different, because I’m not so certain of my own 
perceptions about this are […] present in a way that’s a little outside of what maybe 
culturally is identified as the norms of behaviour and interaction. (Tony, 86-91) 
 
Maria and Tony seemingly explore the current limits of dual diagnosis expert 
knowledges, in these excerpts. Maria appears to critique these knowledges through 
her claim that “a lot of work…needs to be done” to allow practitioners to “understand 
[it] in a better way”. Tony seems to highlight the normative function of dual 
diagnosis, and perhaps objectify it as a social construct with his reference to cultural 
“norms of behaviour and interaction”. By inference, he may therefore call into 
question its reality as a diagnostic category and demonstrate awareness of its   
contingent power effects.  
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Thus, it could be argued, these participants position themselves as agnostic 
towards dual diagnosis discourses. In an apparent contrast with the above subject 
positions, within this Critical subjectivity these systems of knowledge are not reified 
but produced as mutable and open to question, without needing to be dismissed. 
Tony additionally deploys the Critical Practitioner subject position in 
discussing dual diagnosis clients.  
Excerpt 47 
You know, sort of completely different presentation, a different aspect of that 
person becomes more dominant. And it’s like we’re working with some, someone 
completely different. Yeah. Umm, but so I, I guess that’s what I would find - I find 
myself trying to defend against, against the kind of labelling. And, yet - yet I’m 
kind of lost in terms of language (laughs). (Tony, 132-137)  
 
Here, Tony’s attempt to avoid “labelling”—or maybe drawing on contemporary 
discourses— seemingly leaves him “lost in terms of language”. Butler (2001) has 
argued that the practice of critique “emerges, with the awareness that no discourse is 
adequate here, or that our reigning discourses have produced an impasse” (p. 3). It 
could be argued that Tony has arrived at this point: he seemingly lacks the discursive 
resources to adequately describe his work, and finds himself at this impasse. His talk, 
therefore, may illustrate the apparent paucity of contemporary dual diagnosis 
discourses.  
In mobilising this Critical subjectivity, he may objectify dual diagnosis clients 
as unknowable others here: he can only describe them as “completely different”. This 
may serve to distance him from his clients. However, the power effects of this 
positioning seem somewhat limited, compared with the above subjectivities. 
Describing clients as “different” does not appear to produce them as inferior, 
antagonistic or impossibly complex. 
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Maria also seems to mobilise the Critical Practitioner subject position while 
discussing her clients. 
Excerpt 48 
...if people were becoming a bit wobbly and they might not be taking their 
medication, and they then start using drugs that they of, that they’re buying, then 
umm I think we just need to understand that sometimes those drugs that they’re 
buying might be doing them better than the drugs that they were taking. So people 
that have a dual diagnosis sometimes might know a bit more about stuff that 
they’re taking sometimes, than the people that are prescribing stuff to them do. 
(Maria, 249-256) 
 
In questioning the limits of medical knowledge about drugs—and the expertise of 
those prescribing them—Maria appears to objectify clients, who “sometimes might 
know a bit more about stuff that they’re taking”, as complex and self-directed, and 
capable of making their own decisions regarding their care: she does not produce 
passive clients who need practitioners to represent them, in contrast with the 
Advocate subject position. This simultaneously seems to locate her as a self-
questioning practitioner who is open to other perspectives.  
 I argue that Maria appears to draw on recovery discourse, here. She may 
demonstrate its requisite shift of expertise from practitioner to client (see section 
2.3.8). Moreover, both she and Tony seem to interrogate constructions of addiction, 
drug use and mental illness, which recovery-focused treatment requires (Lancaster et 
al., 2015). Interestingly, these participants appear to avoid the normative 
constructions of recovery that may accompany this discourse (e.g., Excerpt 38). It 




4.3.5.2 “Working differently”. 
Within this subjectivity participants seem to display a non-defensive 
awareness of the limits of their knowledge. This in turn engenders a distinct approach 
to clinical practice. 
Excerpt 49 
…for me in my experience of working with someone that has a dual diagnosis is 
that I can’t, how can I say I can’t umm, fall back on what I imagine to be norm, 
normal or the norms in communicating with people. So I’ve got to be in this place 
of kind of real openness. Now, that might be (laughs) what a person working 
towards a good therapist wants to be. But I’m, I’m talking about something, err, 
more, more specific I think to that presentation, yeah. (Tony, 320-328)  
 
Excerpt 50 
I think there’s a bit of room to sort of give a bit more say to [clients], really. 
(Maria, 749-753)  
 
In stressing his non-reliance on the “norms in communicating with people” in his 
practice, it could be argued that Tony again critiques contemporary circulating dual 
diagnosis discourses. Instead, he asserts the importance of bringing an “openness” to 
his practice. While this may inferentially locate dual diagnosis clients beyond these 
“norms”, thereby producing them as others once again, this does not seem to enact a 
dominating power relation over these clients. Maria’s assertion that there is space in 
clinical practice to “give a bit more say” to clients also seems to construct them as 
able to speak for themselves. It thus positions them less as inferiors than her equals.  
Interestingly these participants’ apparent awareness of the limits of their 
knowledge does not seem to undermine their status as practitioners, in contrast with 
the Deskilled subject position, wherein uncertainty may be an impediment to practice 
(see Excerpt 16, 17). The Critical subjectivity is therefore argued to afford these 
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participants a sense of professional agency within limits: they neither locate 
themselves as omniscient, as may be true of the Expert subject position, nor as non-
knowing. Moreover, they position their clients as complex and differently motivated, 
and capable of making their own decisions about their care. They seem to objectify 
practice not as a didactic, top-down process but a more egalitarian encounter, in 
which clients are as knowledgeable as practitioners. Therefore, I argue, this subject 
position appears to facilitate a more flexible approach to clinical practice and more 
balanced practitioner-client power relations. 
The Critical Practitioner subject position, then, seems to engender a capacity 
for self-questioning and reflection on the limits and power effects of contemporary 
dual diagnosis discourses and practice. Within it, participants appear to avoid the 
submission of subjectivity that may characterise the above therapeutic subject 
positions. There, participants draw uncritically on discourses that become laws of 
truth (Foucault, 1983/2002) through which they rigidly constitute themselves, their 
clients and their practice. Perhaps, then, the Critical Practitioner subjectivity could be 
argued to be a technology of the self (see section 1.5). These participants’ critique of 
dual diagnosis discourses seems to allow them to resist an imposed individuality, 
which affords some freedom in constituting practice, thereby facilitating more 
balanced power relations. This is more in keeping with counselling psychology’s 
stance.  
 
4.4 Summary of the Analysis 
 The analysis of these ten participants’ accounts, I argue, demonstrates that 
dual diagnosis is a problematic discursive phenomenon, for counselling psychology. 
The application of a poststructuralist FDA showed that participants resourced several 
contemporary dual diagnosis discourses in their talk. These objectified dual diagnosis 
clients in ways that could be problematic for therapeutic practice, and sometimes 
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contradicted each other. Participants also deployed five therapeutic subject positions 
in their talk that engendered distinct sets of power relations. Four of these located 
participants in relations that lent themselves to the stigmatising and exclusionary 
practices that are prevalent with dual diagnosis. These again seemed inimical to 
clinical work. Only one subject position appeared to afford participants a critical 
reflexivity towards dual diagnosis, which arguably mitigated these power effects. 
This analysis therefore supports the argument that CoPs and practitioners more 
generally could benefit from attending to their talk about practice with dual diagnosis 
clients, to raise awareness of the truth and power games within which they may 
unknowingly be located. It may further provide a resource for practitioners to develop 




















“My problem is to construct myself, and to invite others to share an 
experience of what we are, not only our past but also our present, an 
experience of our modernity in such a way that we might come out of it 
transformed. Which means that at the end of a book we would establish 
new relationships with the subject at issue” (Foucault, 1980/2000 p. 242) 
 
 
5.1  Introduction to Chapter Five 
 In this chapter I will discuss and evaluate the present research’s findings that 
were produced to answer the research question: “What are the power relations in 
practitioners’ accounts of working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients?”. I 
propose that this research contributes to the dual diagnosis literature and counselling 
psychology by raising awareness of the contingent power relations in psychological 
practitioners’ talk about dual diagnosis, and how they may unknowingly be 
positioned—and locate their clients—within complex and dominating power relations 
in their accounts of therapeutic practice. As the analysis in Chapter Four highlights, 
dual diagnosis may be resourced by diverse and sometimes contradictory circulating 
discourses. This study therefore additionally illustrates how a poststructuralist, 
discursive perspective can shed new light on the acknowledged problems of dual 
diagnosis in contemporary UK health settings.  
 I will first evaluate the contribution of this research’s findings to the broader 
diagnosis literature, and to counselling psychology. I will then evaluate the 
poststructuralist stance employed, and its application of a Foucauldian Analytic. 
Thirdly, I will offer a further reflexive commentary as a CoP researcher and 
practitioner interested in working with dual diagnosis clients. Finally, I will offer 
recommendations for future research. In discussing these findings, however, it is 
important to emphasise that they are one set of many possible from these ten 
participants’ accounts. In keeping with this research’s epistemology, I neither make 
essentialist claims to their material effects, nor any objective “truths” derived from 
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making visible some of the power games in practitioners’ talk about working with 
dual diagnosis clients (Jones, 2017; Randol, 2014). I only comment on the truth 
claims within participants’ talk, and seek to raise awareness through the rhetorical 
power of my arguments supported by the illustrative excerpts offered in Chapter Four 
(Willig, 2013). 
 
5.2  The Research Findings and their Possible Contribution to the Dual 
Diagnosis Literature 
 In Chapter One of this thesis, I argued that a poststructuralist perspective is 
appropriate to investigate the asymmetric power relations between healthcare 
professionals and dual diagnosis clients identified in the literature (see section 1.2). I 
theorised that dual diagnosis seems a problematic discursive phenomenon, with 
concomitantly troubling power effects. In Chapter Two I presented a genealogy that 
argued that medicalised constructions of mental illness and addiction may share a 
discursive root as “the psychological effect of a moral flaw” (Foucault, 1964/2001, p. 
148), in which discourses of willpower and agency feature prominently. This 
genealogy also problematised the bifurcation of medical discourses of mental illness 
and addiction that made a dual diagnosis possible. It suggested that this division has 
contributed to the problematic power relations between dual diagnosis practitioners 
and clients, and may have led to dual diagnosis becoming a discourse of exclusion in 
contemporary British health settings. Indeed, according to Foucault’s extended 
version of discourse, which includes institutions and their practices (Potter & 
Hepburn, 2008), the structural segregation of mental health and substance use 
services and trainings may be considered less a discursive effect than a discourse 
itself. I proposed that dual diagnosis’ referential ambiguity also contributes to the 
present difficulties of clinical practice, and may even engender the confusion and 
uncertainty that practioners can experience. A poststructuralist research method that 
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attends to the historically located constructive power of language may thus illuminate 
how dual diagnosis practice has assumed its present forms, in ways that a more realist 
epistemology conceptualising dual diagnosis as an objective, pre-existing 
phenomenon cannot. 
The FDA in Chapter Four produced two aspects of interest, from a critical-
ideological perspective (see section 1.6). First, it illustrated some of the various 
contemporary dual diagnosis discourses that this research’s participants resourced in 
their practice. These were sometimes competing and contradictory, which seemed to 
contribute to rendering dual diagnosis practice complex and confusing. This research 
identified a recovery discourse (see section 4.2.2) that functioned as an explicit 
counterpoint to the medical-moral (see section 4.2.1) regime. However, the resistant 
power of the recovery discourse seemed limited by its repudiation of the medical-
moral perspective. It seemed more to negate this medical expertise than offer an 
alternative construction of dual diagnosis. Therefore it seemed to exemplify the 
limited forms of resistance that Foucault’s strategic power model allows (see section 
1.5), wherein one can only affirm or reject the dominant discourse.  
 Another feature of these circulating expert discourses was their apparent 
paucity (see Excerpt 47). None seemed to encapsulate the experience of dual 
diagnosis practice such that participants could resource it exclusively, during an 
interview. Rather, participants resourced different discourses at different times, 
rendering their talk contradictory. This too may partly explain the confusion and 
uncertainty that marks dual diagnosis practice, at present. These circulating 
discourses also seemed to embody Butler’s (2001) assertion that “the categories by 
which social life are ordered produce a certain incoherence or entire realms of 
unspeakability” (p. 3). 
 The FDA also identified five distinct power-related subject positions, which 
were resourced by the circulating expert discourses: this was its second main finding. 
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Each had implications for therapeutic practice with dual diagnosis clients. For 
example, the Adversarial (see section 4.3.1) and Deskilled Practitioner subjectivities 
(see section 4.3.2) seemed to entrench asymmetric power relations and perhaps 
stigmatisation and service-exclusion in practice. The Advocate subject position (see 
section 4.3.3) did so as well, although by separate means. Its perpetuation of 
dominating power relations within an ostensibly resistant subjectivity is especially 
interesting to this research: see below. The Expert subject position (see section 4.3.4) 
may have demonstrated the impact of the bifurcation of mental health and addiction 
discourses on dual diagnosis practitioners. It may have facilitated the reductive 
construction of dual diagnosis practice that several participants demonstrated (see 
Excerpt 34, 35), by privileging an expert mental health knowledge over that of 
addiction in their efforts make practice intelligible and manageable.  
 This research’s participants deployed the Critical Practitioner subject position 
(see section 4.3.5) most rarely in their accounts. Participants’ apparent difficulty in 
sustaining a critical and reflexive subjectivity regarding dual diagnosis and practice 
was thus notable. Perhaps it suggests that maintaining such a critical perspective with 
dual diagnosis clients is particularly difficult, or that dual diagnosis expert discourses 
may discourage such a subjectivity. However, this research’s poststructuralist 
epistemology posits that these subject positions may be deployed by any practitioner, 
and each offers its own opportunities and constraints (Jones, 2017).  
 Several participants mobilised discourses of training deficiencies in their 
accounts, which resourced the Deskilled and Expert subjectivities (see sections 
4.3.2.2, 4.3.4.3). These participants constructed their training as failing to prepare 
them for the demands of dual diagnosis practice. 
While such discourses may be commonplace among psychological practitioners, in 
the context of clinical dual diagnosis practice I argue that they have notable 
implications. This apparent deficiency of training may be a function of the discursive 
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segregation of mental health and addiction: in Britain, separate trainings are offered 
for mental health and addiction psychological practitioners. Thus the current structure 
of practitioner training seems to militate against facilitating effective practice with 
dual diagnosis clients. This research therefore suggests that the organisation of 
training provision should be addressed, to meet the demands that the apparently 
growing dual diagnosis client group may represent. 
  
5.3 The Research Findings and their Possible Contribution to Counselling 
Psychology 
 This research also offers a contribution to counselling psychology 
specifically. First, it addresses the dearth of counselling psychology research on dual 
diagnosis. This is relevant, in light of dual diagnosis’ apparent prevalence and the 
expectation that CoPs should work in a variety of healthcare settings.  
 Second, this research offers a critical perspective on how psychological 
practitioners construct their work with dual diagnosis that may facilitate the 
development of a critical reflexivity in practice.  Moreover, through the Critical 
Practitioner subject position this research may demonstrate how practitioners have 
brought such a reflexivity to their work. It therefore shows that attending to the power 
relations in language affords a critical lens through which one may investigate one’s 
own talk and consider what the truth claims therein may enable or constrain. Perhaps 
the poststructuralist perspective that subjectivity is constantly positioned and 
repositioned through talk (Randol, 2014) may also facilitate the holding of multiple, 
sometimes contradictory truth claims that counselling psychology practice demands. 
This research may thus additionally illustrate the practical potential and relevance of 
FDA to counselling psychology. 
 As discussed above (section 1.3), counselling psychology is committed 
engaging with issues of power, and fostering anti-oppressive practice. These are 
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matters of ethics (Shillito-Clarke, 2010). For Foucault (1991a, 1984/1992, 2000b, 
2000d) critique is central to self-formation as an ethical subject. Ethics entails coming 
to a new self-relationship—or rapport á soi (Foucault, 1991a)—with the discourses 
and truth games that shape ourselves and our worlds. I argue that this research’s 
facilitation of a critical gaze towards dual diagnosis may in turn afford an opportunity 
to develop a more ethical practice with dual diagnosis clients. For example, the 
findings discussed above suggest that in the ostensibly resistant and destigmatising 
Advocate subject position, dominating power relationships were perpetuated rather 
than challenged. Perhaps this was because dual diagnosis clients were defined in 
terms of their victimisation by others, within this subject position. Benhabib (1992) 
has argued that this reduces “subjectivity to the terms of the dominant discourse and 
does not allow for the ways in which it may challenge that discourse” (p. 83).  The 
disruption of dominant power relationships and the marginalisation of clients, by 
contrast, requires the interrogation of expert discourses and constructs such as 
addiction and drug abuse (Lancaster et al., 2015; Seear & Fraser, 2014). One can 
never be exterior to power relations. Yet through a critical attitude one may “play the 
games of power with as little domination as possible” (Foucault, 2000b, p. 289). 
 Therefore, I propose that this research may provide a resource for CoPs to 
develop their own critical attitudes towards dual diagnosis, and so establish 
therapeutic relationships that are less riven with damaging power relations.  This 
critical attitude may offer CoPs opportunities to “work on the limits of (our) culture, 
inventing new subjectivities and self-techniques by critically reworking the present 
ones” (Vintges, 2012, p. 289). These new subjectivities are, I argue, needed in dual 
diagnosis practice, to address its current issues: as presently constituted, dual 




5.4 An Evaluation of this Research 
 In this section I will evaluate the FDA research method deployed in this 
thesis, to answer its research question. As with any method, choosing to use FDA 
necessarily offers benefits and limitations, due to the constraints of its underlying 
epistemological framework. These shape the parameters of what can be made visible 
and what knowledge claims may be produced (Willig, 2013).  I also critique this 
research’s data collection methods, and its relevance to counselling psychology. 
Finally, I revisit researcher reflexivity, from the position of having produced one of 
many possible readings of these data.  
 
5.4.1 A critique of Foucauldian discourse analysis. 
 FDA seeks to investigate the constructive and constraining power of talk in 
constituting social and psychological realities. This affords a critical investigation of 
the links between therapeutic practice and broader cultural and institutional 
knowledge systems and power relations (Avdi & Georgaca, 2007). Its role within 
psychology research has been debated and criticised, in four main ways. 
 First, Avdi and Georgaca (2007) note that FDA’s relevance to clinical practice 
has been questioned, due to its macro-level focus. However, they assert that FDA 
research can demonstrate the connection between therapeutic interactions, 
subjectivity and wider social processes by highlighting both the normative 
assumptions reflecting wider sociocultural discourses that therapists bring to their 
work, and the constructive role of discourses in clients’ articulations of their 
problems within therapy. It can thus illuminate both macro- and micro-levels of 
clinical practice, and enhance its usefulness while retaining its critical perspective. 
While this study sheds no light on therapeutic interactions between practitioners and 
dual diagnosis clients, it has investigated wider power relations through its genealogy 
and local ones in its analysis of participants’ accounts of therapeutic work. It may 
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therefore offer a legitimate resource for practitioners to develop reflexivity in their 
clinical practice. 
 Second, debates within psychology continue about the relationship between 
discourse, materiality, and subjectivity (Willig, 2000, 2013). Hook (2007), for 
example, has argued that FDA in psychology has failed to attend to the materiality of 
discourses and the physicality of their power effects, which gives Foucault’s analyses 
their potency. This in turn has led to an excessive focus on textuality that locates 
discourse as an effect rather than an instrument of power. However, I argue that this 
notion of materiality implies an extra-discursive reality that is ontologically 
discrepant with poststructuralism’s extreme relativism: as discussed above (see 
section 3.2), this research has adopted such a relativist position. Moreover, this 
relativism posits that the body itself is an overdetermined site of power, a “surface 
inscribed with culturally and historically specific practices and subject to political and 
economic forces” (King, 2004, p. 30). This body does not exist beyond discourse, but 
is rather shaped by it. Consequently, material or physical effects are themselves 
discursive, which is both the instrument of power and its effect. A textual focus is 
therefore argued to be appropriate in this research.  
FDA’s epistemological stance has also been criticised for theorizing 
subjectivity on discourse alone. While this accounts for the fluidity of subjectivity 
and experience—which this research’s participants demonstrated by shifting between 
a range subject positions in their accounts—critics have argued it is less able to 
explain people’s apparent investment in certain subject positions, and thus 
subjectivity’s stability and unity (Willig, 2000, 2013). Indeed, it is unclear why this 
study’s participants seemed to occupy some subject positions more than others. 
Hollway and Jefferson (2000) have proposed a psychoanalytic framework to account 
for this stability of identity and investment in subjectivities. However, I think this 
approach, too, may be incongruent with FDA’s epistemological relativism, by 
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intimating an extra-discursive realm. Davies and Harré (1999) have suggested that 
individual life histories and experiences, through which people have been located in 
subject positions or related to people in these positions, can account for the stability 
of experience (Willig, 2013). Yet this view seems incompatible with 
poststructuralism’s discontinuous and decentred self. This incapacity to adequately 
account for the continuity of experience therefore seems a limitation of the method: 
like all research approaches, FDA provides a specific lens that is necessarily limiting.  
 In a third area of debate, FDA’s epistemological stance has been criticised for 
“offering only a nihilistic understanding of the subject that claims resistance is 
possible yet fails to offer any understanding of how” (Hanna, 2014, p. 146). As noted 
above (section 3.2), FDA undeniably posits a weaker actor than other discourse 
analysis approaches. Yet charges of nihilism are, I think, misplaced. While Foucault 
effectively mapped out how we are produced and imprisoned by discursive power 
relations in his early and middle work, the final works of his oeuvre concern 
themselves with how we might find a degree of freedom within the power games of 
discourse. The role of critique is central, here (Thompson, 2003). 
 Finally, some contemporary theorists have proposed that FDA is theory-rich 
but data-thin (Dickerson, 2012). I argue, however, that through conducting interviews 
with ten practitioner-participants this study generated sufficient data to substantiate 
its arguments. Nonetheless, as Willig (2013) notes, it is for the reader and not the 
author to decide whether an analysis has enough rhetorical power.  
 
 5.4.2 An evaluation of this research’s data collection methods. 
 This study recruited an opportunity sample of ten psychological practitioners 
who had at least six months’ experience working therapeutically with dual diagnosis 
clients. Recruiting an opportunity sample poses several limitations. First, this study’s 
findings represent only the psychological practitioners who agreed to take part. A 
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different sample would inevitably have produced different results. However, any talk 
can potentially offer an analytic contribution, from a poststructuralist perspective.  
 With research based on a small sample, homogeneity among participants is 
sought. Due to concerns about finding enough CoP participants, I pragmatically 
recruited psychological practitioners more generally. Indeed, my sample included 
only two CoPs. Therefore this research’s sample has more heterogeneity than may be 
desirable. Moreover, this sample was varied in age—mid 20s to mid 70s—and 
experience, which varied from 18 months to four decades. Interestingly, however, no 
influence of experience was noted in the analytic findings: while one participant who 
mobilised the Critical Practitioner subjectivity, Maria, was among the most 
experienced participants in the sample the other, Tony, was among the least. The 
participant sample was also diverse in gender. Seven participants were female, and 
three male. Gender did not seem to influence findings, with male and female 
participants mobilising a variety of subject positions in multiple ways. Participants 
also used a variety of therapeutic approaches in the work with dual diagnosis clients, 
which may be another form of heterogeneity. Again, I found no evidence of influence 
regarding therapeutic approach on this research’s findings. And since CoPs are 
trained in at least two therapeutic approaches and draw on a diverse knowledge in 
their practice, this heterogeneity may be less problematic in the present context.  
 Importantly, I do not argue here that differences in age, gender, experience 
and therapeutic approach were irrelevant, but that the focus of this study did not allow 
such differences to emerge. Following Willig’s (2013) advice, no demographic 
information on participants has been included in this study because such information 
may become a means to construct identities and locate persons in social categories 
that impose realities. 
 As discussed in Chapter Three, participants were individually interviewed 
about their experiences with dual diagnosis clients in this research. While interviews 
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are frequently used in discursive research (see section 3.3), Potter and Hepburn 
(2005) are critical of relying on interview data in such research because “whatever the 
interviewer does and however minimal their contribution is, participants will—to a 
greater or lesser extent—attend to that in their talk” (Dickerson, 2012, p. 259, 
emphasis in original). Consequently, the interviewer may bias the process 
excessively. Moreover, they argue, this bias may be particularly problematic in one-
to-one interviews, such as those used in this study (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). While 
poststructuralist research acknowledges that researchers will inevitably influence 
every aspect of the research process, they should also try to counteract this bias. 
(Harper, 2003; Finlay & Gough, 2003). The use of one-to-one interviews in this 
research may therefore be a limitation.  
 Steffen (2016) has raised ethical questions regarding the use of discourse 
analytic research methods. She notes that participants might not give consent if they 
“realised that the accounts they provided would not be used to gather information 
about a phenomenon but to obtain a sample of the discursive practices they employ” 
(p. 41). This is balanced against concerns that gaining informed consent for such 
research by making the method explicit might lead participants to become self-
conscious, thereby undermining it. These concerns seem rooted in a realist ontology 
that separates phenomena from discursive practices. Moreover, any inductive 
research process necessarily involves uncertainty about the research method to be 
used, until data analysis is underway. 
 While the above limitations are acknowledged, the individual interviews also 
yielded rich data, for the purposes of the analysis. These afforded insight into three 
circulating and sometimes contradictory expert discursive regimes, which 
contextualised and circumscribed participants’ accounts of their therapeutic practice. 
They additionally allowed the identification of five subject positions, which again 
were contradictory and inimical to good therapeutic practice, at times. Alongside the 
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genealogy’s assertion that dual diagnosis currently functions as an exclusionary 
discourse in contemporary health settings (see section 2.4.1), the data therefore 
seemed to shed new light on some of the acknowledged difficulties of dual diagnosis 
practitioner-client relations in the expert literature (see section 1.2). This research 
identified dual diagnosis as a problematic discursive phenomenon, which may partly 
account for these difficulties. This in turn illustrates the capacity of FDA to 
investigate and illuminate problematic areas of practice in novel and unexpected 
ways.  
 
 5.4.3 An evaluation of this study’s relevance to counselling psychology. 
 The limited number of CoP participants in this study impacts its relevance to 
counselling psychology. Had this research attained a more homogeneous sample, its 
relevance would certainly have increased. However, as CoPs resource and deploy a 
range of therapeutic modalities and knowledges in their practice, this limitation’s 
effect may be mitigated. Furthermore, all therapeutic talk is broadly helpful to 
psychological practitioners, including CoPs. 
 As discussed above, Morrow (2005) has argued that qualitative counselling 
psychology research has general criteria of trustworthiness (see section 3.5). I will 
again address the criterion of social validity through further comments on researcher 
reflexivity, below. The analysis (Chapter Four) addressed the criteria of adequacy of 
data and adequacy of interpretation, by using illustrative excerpts to sustain a 
thickness of argument. In relation to the quality criteria for poststructuralist research 
(see section 3.5), the analysis also addressed authenticity by elaborating participants’ 
subject positions and attendant power relations. Through its genealogy (Chapter Two) 
and analysis this research has indeed attempted to locate the discursive phenomenon 
of dual diagnosis historically, and to raise awareness of issues of power in dual 
diagnosis practice. Again, it is for the reader to assess its merits in these areas. 
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 Regarding the criterion of transgressive validity (see section 3.5), this study’s 
ambitions were modest, as noted above. However, I argue that this research has 
demonstrated a capacity to incite discourse in relation to dual diagnosis and dual 
diagnosis practice, and thus contribute to a critical social science, in several ways. 
First, the genealogy offered in this thesis has critiqued medical constructions of 
madness and addiction, and has argued that they may share a core discourse of moral 
failing. Moreover, contemporary constructions still seem unable to conceptualise 
addiction without reference to this moral discourse. This seems in keeping with 
poststructuralist studies by Hodges (2002), which posits that therapy is less a 
psychological interaction than a moral one that gains its power from “relocating 
persons within a therapeutic moral order” (p. 476), and Guilfoyle (2002), which 
locates therapy as a social institution that promotes specific culturally sanctioned 
modes of subjectivity (Avdi & Georgaca, 2007).  
 Further, through the focus on language afforded by its poststructuralist 
perspective, this research has proposed that dual diagnosis is a problematic discursive 
phenomenon, which may account for the current confusion and disquiet that 
characterises the literature in this area. Finally, I argue, the three circulating 
discursive regimes and five subject positions identified in the analysis are of interest 
from a transgressive perspective. The former provided the frames of intelligibility for 
participants’ accounts, and illustrated the diverse and contradictory expert 
knowledges they resourced in their talk about this practice. They may therefore 
provide a critical resource for dual diagnosis practitioners, to raise awareness of these 
expert knowledges and their attendant power games, which they may encounter in 
their own work. In rendering participants’ talk contradictory, they also illustrate the 
apparent paucity of dual diagnosis discourses and the need for new ones in the field.  
The subject positions, too, may incite discourse; not least because of the 
problematic power effects that they engendered or perpetuated. Therefore they are 
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argued to illustrate the dangers of practitioners uncritically resourcing expert 
knowledges, and so being unthinkingly talked by the language they use in their work 
with dual diagnosis clients, in turn instigating problematic practitioner-client 
relations. Moreover, the finding that the ostensibly resistant Advocate subject 
position seemed to perpetuate dominating power relationships it intended to contest is 
of particular interest from a transgressive perspective. It is argued to demonstrate the 
unintended consequences that may accompany attempts at destigmatisation in 
practice. It may therefore exemplify Foucault’s (1991a) maxim that “everything is 
dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we 
always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and 
pessimistic activism.” (p. 343). This research similarly demonstrates that practitioners 
need to bring an activism in the form of reflexivity to their work, to try to avoid 
perpetuating iniquitous power relations in their practice with dual diagnosis clients. 
 
 5.4.4 Revisiting researcher reflexivity. 
 Following on from the consideration of researcher reflexivity (see section 
3.4), I will now comment on reflexivity in the context of data collection, the analytic 
process and the overall research. As noted above, within poststructuralist research it 
is acknowledged that the researcher will influence every aspect of the research 
process, and that bias is unavoidable (Harper, 2003; Finlay & Gough, 2003). This is a 
consequence of the researcher’s own technologies of the self, which are inevitably at 
play throughout the research process. His or her attention will inevitably be drawn 
towards some phenomena, to the exclusion of others. FDA additionally acknowledges 
the interpretive nature of knowledge, and the mutual construction of interviews 
(Randol, 2014; Willig, 2013). This lends greater importance to researcher reflexivity, 
which may offer a critique of the expert knowledges and frames of intelligibility that 
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influence the interpretations of the data. While bias is inevitable, then, one should 
attempt to make it as explicit as possible, thereby trying to counteract it. 
 Furthermore, as counselling psychology moves toward an increasingly 
relational world view that emphasises co-createdness in the therapeutic encounter and 
brings its postmodern assumptions to the fore, it increasingly promotes critical 
reflection as a tool in training and practice, and a required professional competency 
(Milton, Craven & Coye, 2010; Rizq, 2010). This increasing interest in personal and 
professional reflexivity is echoed in counselling and psychotherapy more generally 
(Kuchuck, 2014). Yet I acknowledge here, again, that reflexivity is itself a discourse 
from a Foucauldian perspective, so its prioritisation may enact unintended power 
effects. Indeed, its codification as a professional competency may lead to reflexivity 
becoming a normative and regulatory practice. Therefore it is not regarded as an end 
point in itself, but rather a means to develop professional practice. I again consider 
reflexivity here within Gemignani’s (2017) critical constructionist paradigm, which is 
suited to this research’s epistemological stance (see section 3.4). 
 I approached this study as a doctoral-level student, with the agenda of doing 
doctoral-level research. As discussed above (section 3.4), I was also motivated by my 
experiences of working in a statutory drug service, where I observed the dominating 
and excluding power relations to which dual diagnosis clients were subject. This 
engendered a sense of injustice, which led me to approach this study with an activist-
researcher agenda. It led me to become subject to discourses of injustice and iniquity 
in relation to dual diagnosis practice, unthinkingly. Thus the technologies of the self 
through which I constituted myself as a researcher may initially have led me to 
conceptualise dual diagnosis practice in simplistic binaries of right and wrong. 
 I approached my first interviews with this agenda. I joined in participants’ 
accounts when they conformed to it, and perhaps influenced these participants to 
adopt particular subject positions. As I began to analyse these interviews and 
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interrogate the power-laden discourses and subject positions therein, I realised that I 
seemed endorse particular subjectivities without understanding I was doing so. 
Moreover, I recognised that through my experiences in the drug service I had become 
subject to recovery discourses and had mobilised an Advocate subject position that 
had informed my activist-researcher stance. I had therefore perpetuated the power 
relations I had intended to undertake this research to contest.  
 This was a troubling realisation. However, I began to become more suspect of 
my own expert knowledges, how I deployed them, and how they located me within 
particular power relations. This afforded a more agnostic and critical subjectivity in 
undertaking this research, which seemed to allow a more thoughtful response to 
participants’ talk. It has also enhanced my own development as reflexive CoP, and 
has provided an object lesson in the Foucauldian viewpoint that we are all subject to 
discourse. My own journey in undertaking this research and developing a more 
reflexive stance toward practice, while attempting to be mindful of the power effects 
of such a stance, may thus demonstrate how a poststructuralist reflexivity can 
encourage practitioners to reposition themselves in relation to their knowledge, their 
selves and their clients, and see alternative possibilities that may afford a more 
meaningful practice (Loewenthal & Snell, 2003) 
 
 5.4.5 Suggestions for future research. 
 This research focused on practitioner-participants’ accounts of working with 
dual diagnosis clients, and the discursive constructions and power-laden subject 
positions therein. Some suggestions for future research are noted here, in light of its 
findings. 
 As discussed, this research’s relevance to counselling psychology was 
reduced by recruiting only two CoPs in its opportunity sample. Therefore, a similarly 
designed study using an exclusive CoP sample seems worthwhile. This would afford 
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an investigation of both the power games in CoPs’ accounts of working with dual 
diagnosis clients, and the extent to which qualified CoPs are aware of the discursive 
power games in their talk, and whether they can mitigate these effects to produce a 
practice in keeping with counselling psychology’s egalitarian ethos. Furthermore, this 
might offer some insight into how CoPs negotiate the multiple and contradictory 
expert knowledges that inform their practice, which Rizq (2006) has noted is a source 
of emotional strain to CoP trainees. 
 Another potential study, again using a similar design, might investigate dual 
diagnosis clients’ accounts of clinical practice. This would be of interest in its own 
right, I argue, in affording insight into the discourses to which these clients are 
subject, and the discursive resources they draw upon in mobilising their subjectivities 
as clients within therapy sessions. This might illustrate how dual diagnosis clients 
may be “done” by language, in therapeutic practice. It may also effectively function 
as a critique, in testing the limits of—and perhaps providing alternatives to—the 
expert therapeutic knowledges that inform the accounts presented in this research.  
 As acknowledged above, FDA has been criticised for its potentially limited 
clinical relevance (Avdi & Georgaca, 2007). This research’s use of interviews is also 
a possible limitation, in allowing researcher bias that may be excessive. Therefore, a 
FDA of therapy sessions with dual diagnosis clients might generate more naturalistic 
analyses of the discursive power games at play in working with this client group. 
Hodges’ (2002) study of radio therapy sessions, which demonstrated the normative 
and power-laden transformations of callers’ issues, provides an example of FDA’s 
potential value in this regard. 
 
5.5 Overall Conclusions 
 In this research, the radical approach to and reformulation of language that a 
poststructuralist FDA facilitates, has been applied to ten psychological practitioners’ 
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therapeutic accounts of dual diagnosis practice. As a hermeneutic process, this 
research produced one possible reading of the data, and makes no claims to 
universality or generalisability of its findings. Its contribution and value rests on the 
critical perspective that it offers on dual diagnosis practice, which invites 
practitioners to become aware of the power-laden truth claims in their talk and the 
subject positions that they may unknowingly be located within. Most notably, it is 
argued to demonstrate the importance of practitioners’ awareness of being talked by 
the language they use, which may perpetuate problematic practitioner-client relations. 
It additionally argues that this critical perspective may facilitate reflexivity in practice 
with dual diagnosis clients, and perhaps with clients more generally. In so doing, it is 
argued to demonstrate the capacity of Foucauldian-informed research to shed light on 














Adams, M. W. (2008). Comorbidity of mental health and substance misuse problems: 
A review of workers' reported attitudes and perceptions. Journal of Psychiatric 
and Mental Health Nursing, 15(2), 101-108 ER.  
Akers, R. L. (1985). Deviant behavior: A social learning approach. Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth.  
Alessandrini, A. (2009). The humanism effect: Fanon, Foucault and ethics without 
subjects. Foucault Studies, 7, 64-80.  
All Party Parliamentary Group on Complex Needs and Dual Diagnosis. (June, 2014). 
Factsheet 1: Complex needs and dual diagnosis. Retrieved from http://turning 
point.co.uk/media/636823/appg_factsheet_1_-_june_2014.pdf  
Alexandrescu, L. (2014). Mephedrone, assassin of youth: The rhetoric of fear in 
contemporary drug scares. Crime, Media, Culture, 10(1), 23-37.  
American Psychiatric Association. (1980). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.  
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders (3rd ed., text rev.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association.  
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.  
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.  
 125 
Arney, W. R., & Bergen, B. B. (1984). Medicine and the managagement of living: 
Taming the last great beast. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Arribas-Ayllon, M., & Walkerdine, V. (2008). Foucauldian discourse analysis. In C. 
Willig, & W. Stainton-Rogers (Eds.), The Sage handbook of qualitative research 
in psychology (pp. 91-108). London, England: Sage.  
Askew, R. (2016). Functional fun: Legitimising adult recreational drug use. 
International Journal of Drug Policy, 36, 112-119.  
Avdi, E., & Georgaca, E. (2007). Discourse analysis and psychotherapy: A critical 
review. European Journal of Psychotherapy and Counselling, 9(2), 157-176.  
Avery, J., Dixon, L., Adler, D., Oslin, D., Hackman, A., First, M., . . . Siris, S. 
(2013). Psychiatrists' attitudes toward individuals with substance use disorders 
and serious mental illness. Journal of Dual Diagnosis, 9(4), 322-326.  
Bailey, L. (2005). Control and desire: The issue of identity in popular discourses of 
addiction. Addiction Research & Theory, 13(6), 535-543.  
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
Banerjee, S., Clancy, C., & Crome. I. (2002). Co-existing problems of mental 
disorder and substance misuse (dual diagnosis). The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists' Research Unit: London.  
Benhabib, S. (1992). Situating the self. London, England: Routledge.  
Berridge, V. (1988). Defining the historical context. Addiction, 83(1), 36-39.  
Berridge, V. (1997). Two tales of addiction: Opium and nicotine. Human 
Psychopharmacology, 12, S45-S52.  
 126 
Berridge, V. (2012). The art of medicine: The rise, fall and revival of recovery in 
drug policy. The Lancet, 379(9810), 22-23.  
Berridge, V., Walke, J., & Mold, A. (2014). From inebriety to addiction: 
Terminology and concepts in the UK, 1860-1930. Social History of Alcohol and 
Drugs, 28(1), 88-106.  
Besley, A. C. (2005). Self-denial or self-mastery? Foucault's genealogy of the 
confessional self. British Journal of Guidance & Counselling, 33(3), 365-382.  
Brennan, T. (2004). Craze: Gin and debauchery in an age of reason. By Jessica 
Warner. Journal of Social History, 37(3), 774-777.  
British Psychological Society. (2001). Division of counselling psychology: 
Professional practice guidelines. Leicester, England: British Psychological 
Society.  
British Psychological Society. (February 2008). Generic professional practice 






British Psychological Society. (February 2018). Code of ethics and conduct. 





Broadus, A. D., & Evans, W. P. (2015). Developing the public attitudes about 
addiction instrument. Addiction Research & Theory, 23(2), 115-130.  
Buckland, R. (2016). The decision by approved mental health professionals to use 
compulsory powers under the mental health act 1983: A Foucauldian discourse 
analysis. British Journal of Social Work, 46(1), 46-62.  
Burr, V. (2003). Social constructionism (2nd ed.). Hove, England: Routledge.  
Burr, V., & Butt, T. (2000). Psychological distress and postmodern thought. In D. Fee 
(Ed.), Pathology and the postmodern: Mental illness as discourse and 
experience (pp. 186-206). London, England: Sage.  
Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of ‘sex’. London, 
England: Routledge.  
Butler, J. (2001). What is critique? an essay on Foucault's virtue. In D. Ingram (Ed.), 
The political (pp. 1-10). Oxford, England: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Carter, P. M. (2013). Poststructuralist theory and sociolinguistics: Mapping the 
linguistic turn in social theory. Language and Linguistics Compass, 7(11), 580-
596.  
Chorlton, E., Smith, I., & Jones, S. (2015). Understanding how people who use illicit 
drugs and alcohol experience relationships with psychiatric inpatient staff. Social 
Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology, 50(1), 51-58.  
Coombes, L., & Wratten, A. (2007). The lived experience of community mental 
health nurses working with people who have dual diagnosis: A 
 128 
phenomenological study. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 
14(4), 382-392.  
Cooper, M. (2009). Welcoming the other: Actualising the humanistic ethic at the core 
of counselling psychology practice. Counselling Psychology Review, 41(1), 119-
129.  
Cosci, F., & Fava, G. A. (2011). New clinical strategies of assessment of comorbidity 
associated with substance use disorders. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(3), 418-
427.  
Crick, E. (2012). Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international 
securitization of drugs. International Journal of Drug Policy, 23(5), 407-415.  
Crossley, M. L., & Crossley, N. (2001). ‘Patient’ voices, social movements and the 
habitus; how        p      psychiatric survivors ‘speak out’. Social Science & Medicine, 
52(10), 1477-1489 
Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological 
research. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.  
Davies, B., & Harré, R. (1999). Positioning and personhood. In R. Harré, & L. van 
Langenhove (Eds.), Positioning theory (pp. 35-52). Oxford, England: Blackwell.  
Davies, J. (2013). Cracked: Why psychiatry is doing more harm than good. London, 
England: Icon Books.  
Department of Health. (1996). The task force to review service for drug misusers 
(Report of an independent review of drug treatment services in England). 
London, England: Department of Health.  
 129 
Department of Health. (2002). Dual diagnosis good practice guide (Mental health 
policy implementation guide). London, England: Department of Health.  
Diamond, D. (2010). Psychodynamic contributions to pluralistic practice. In M. 
Milton (Ed.), Therapy and beyond: Counselling psychology contributions to 
therapeutic and social issues (pp. 139-154). Chichester, England: Wiley-
Blackwell.  
Dickerson, P. (2012). Social psychology: Traditional and critical perspectives. 
Harlow, England: Pearson Education.  
Donald, M., Dower, J., & Kavanagh, D. (2005). Integrated versus non-integrated 
management and care for clients with co-occurring mental health and substance 
use disorders: A qualitative systematic review of randomised controlled trials. 
Social Science & Medicine, 60(6), 1371-1383.  
Drake, R. E. (2004). Dual diagnosis. Psychiatry, 3(10), 60-63.  
Drake, R. E., O'Neal, E. L., & Wallach, M. A. (2008). A systematic review of 
psychosocial research on psychosocial interventions for people with co-
occurring severe mental and substance use disorders. Journal of Substance Abuse 
Treatment, 34(1), 123-138.  
Duff Gordon, C. (2017). Ideological dilemmas of Alcoholics Anonymous and 
Narcotics Anonymous recovery (Unpublished doctoral thesis). City University, 
London, England. 
Edley, N. (2001). Unravelling social constructionism. Theory & Psychology, 11(3), 
433-441.  
 130 
Edwards, G. (2012). Thomas Trotter's 'essay on drunkenness" appraised. Addiction, 
107, 1562-1569.  
Edwards, D., Ashmore, M., & Potter, J. (1995). Death and furniture: The rhetoric, 
politics and theology of bottom line arguments against relativism. History of the 
Human Sciences, 8(2), 25-49.  
Elam, M. (2015). How the brain disease paradigm remoralizes addictive behaviour. 
Science as Culture, 24(1), 46-64.  
Fardella, J. A. (2008). The recovery model: Discourse ethics and the retrieval of the 
self. The Journal of Medical Humanities, 29(2), 111-126.  
Finlay, L. (2017). Championing 'reflexivities'. Qualitative Psychology, 4(2), 120-125.  
Finlay, L., & Gough, B. (Eds.). (2003). Reflexivity: A practical guide for researchers 
in health and social sciences. Oxford, England: Blackwell.  
Fomiatti R., Moore, D., & Fraser, S. (2017). Interpellating recovery: The politics of 
'identity' in recovery-focused treatment. International Journal of Drug Policy, 
44, 174-182.  
Ford, J. A., & Ong, J. (2014). Non-medical use of prescription stimulants for 
academic purposes among college students: A test of social learning theory. Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, 144, 279-282. 
Foucault, M. (1974). Prisons et asiles dans le mécanisme du pouvoir. Dits et écrits, II 
(pp. 521-525). Paris, France: Gallimard.  
Foucault, M. (1990). The care of the self: The history of sexuality, volume 3. London, 
England: Penguin. (Orginal work published in 1984) 
 131 
Foucault, M. (1991). Nietzsche, genealogy, history (D. F. Bouchard, S Simon Trans.). 
In P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault reader (pp. 76-100). London, England: 
Penguin. (Reprinted from Homage à Jean Hippolyte, pp.145-172, 1971, Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France) 
Foucault, M. (1991). Truth and power. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault reader (pp. 
51-75). London, England: Penguin. (Reprinted from Power/knowledge: Selected 
interviews and other writings, 1972-1977, pp. 109-133, By M. Foucault, C. 
Gordon, Ed., 1980, London, England, Harvester Wheatsheaf)  
Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and punish (A. Sheridan Trans.). London, England: 
Penguin. (Original work published in 1975) 
Foucault, M. (1991a). On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of work in progress. 
In P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault reader (pp. 340-372). London, England: 
Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (1991b). What is enlightenment? In P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault 
reader (pp. 32-50). London, England: Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (1992). The use of pleasure: The history of sexuality, volume two (R. 
Hurley Trans.). London, England: Penguin. (Original work published 1984) 
Foucault, M. (1998). The will to knowledge: The history of sexuality, volume one (R. 
Hurley Trans.). London, England: Penguin. (Original work published in 1976) 
Foucault, M. (2000). Interview with Michel Foucault. In J. D. Faubion (Ed.), Power: 
Essential works of Foucault 1954 - 1984, volume 3 (pp. 239-297). London, 
England: Penguin. (Reprinted from Il Contributo, IV, I, pp. 23-84, by M. 
Foucault, 1980)  
 132 
Foucault, M. (2000a). The abnormals. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Ethics: Essential works of 
Foucault 1954 – 1984, volume 1 (pp. 51-59). London, England: Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (2000b). The ethics of the concern of the self as a practice of freedom. 
In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Ethics: Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, volume 1 
(pp. 281-302). London, England: Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (2000c). Psychiatric power. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Ethics: Essential 
works of Foucault 1954 – 1984, volume 1. (pp. 39-50). London, England: 
Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (2000d). Subjectivity and truth. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Ethics: Essential 
works of Foucault 1954-1984, volume 1 (pp. 87-92). London, England: Penguin.  
Foucault, M. (2001). Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of 
reason (R. Howard Trans.). London, England: Routledge. (Original work 
published in 1964) 
Foucault, M. (2002). The subject and power. In J. D. Faubion (Ed.), Power: Essential 
works of Foucault 1954-1984, volume 3 (pp. 326-348). London, England: 
Penguin. (Reprinted from Michel Foucault: Beyond hermeneutics and 
structuralism, pp. 208-226  H. L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow, eds., 1983, Chicago, 
ILL: University of Chicago Press)  
Foucault, M. (2016). 22 January 1975. In V. Marchetti, & A. Salomoni (Eds.), 
Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975 (G. Burchell Trans.). 
(pp. 55-79). London, England: Verso.  
Fox, K. J. (2015). Ideological implications of addiction theories and treatment. In C. 
Reinarman, & R. Granfield (Eds.), Expanding addiction: Critical essays (pp. 
159-171). Abingdon, England: Routledge.  
 133 
Foxcroft, L. (2007). The making of addiction: The 'use and abuse' of opium in 
nineteenth-century Britain. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.  
Fraser, S., Moore, D., & Keane, H. (2014). Habits: Remaking addiction. Basingstoke, 
England: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Fraser, S., Pienaar, K., Dilkes-Frayne, E., Moore, D., Kakanovic, R., Treloar, C., & 
Dunlop, A. (2017). Addiction stigma and the biopolitics of liberal modernity: A 
qualitative analysis. International Journal of Drug Policy, 44, 192-201.  
Gemignani, M. (2017). Toward a critical reflexivity in qualitative inquiry: Relational 
and posthumanist reflections on realism, researcher’s centrality, and 
representationalism in reflexivity. Qualitative Psychology, 4(2), 185-199. 
Gent, N. (2017). How are recent changes to primary care mental health provision 
within the NHS affecting psychodynamic counsellors’ construction and 
management of their professional identities? A Foucauldian perspective. 
Psychodynamic Practice: Individuals, Groups and Organisations, 23(1), 45-57.  
Gerevich, J., Bácskai, E., & Meggyes, K. (2005). A group intervention which assists 
patients with dual diagnosis reduce their drug use: A randomized controlled trial. 
comment. Psychological Medicine, 35(2), 299-299.   
Gergen, K. J. (2015). An invitation to social construction (3rd ed.). London, England: 
Sage.  
Gergen, K. J., & Gergen, M. M. (2008). Social construction and psychological 
enquiry. In J. A. Holstein, & J. F. Gubrium (Eds.), Handbook of constructionist 
research (pp. 171-188). New York, NY: Guilford Press.  
 134 
Glover, E. (1932). On the aetiology of drug-addiction. International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 13, 298-328.  
Guest, C., & Holland, M. (2011). Co-existing mental health and substance use and 
alcohol difficulties – why do we persist with the term “dual diagnosis” within 
mental health services? Advances in Dual Diagnosis, 4(4), 162-172.  
Guilfoyle, M. (2001). Problematizing psychotherapy: The discursive production of a 
bulimic. Culture & Psychology, 7(2), 151-179.  
Guilfoyle, M. (2002). Rhetorical processes in therapy: The bias of self-containment. 
Journal of Family Therapy, 24(298), 316.  
Hanley, T., & Amos, I. (2018). The scientist-practitioner and the reflective-
practitioner. In V. Galbraith (Ed.), Counselling psychology (topics in applied 
psychology) (pp. 167-182). Abingdon, England: Routledge.  
Hanna, P. (2014). Foucauldian discourse analysis in psychology: Reflecting on a 
hybrid reading of Foucault when researching “ethical subjects”. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 11, 142-159.  
Harper, D. (2003). Developing a critically reflexive position using discourse analysis. 
In L. Finlay, & B. Gough (Eds.), Reflexivity: A practical guide for researchers in 
health and social sciences. (pp. 78-92). Oxford, England: Blackwell.  
Hawkings, C., & Gilburt, H. (2004). Dual diagnosis toolkit: Mental health and 
substance misuse: A practical guide for patients and practitioners. London, 
England: Rethink and Turning Point.  
Hendrickson, E. L., Schmal, M. S., & Ekleberry, S. C. (2004). Then and now: 
Concepts and treatment of co-occurring disorders. Treating co-occurring 
 135 
disorders: A handbook for mental health and substance misuse (pp. 23-33). New 
York, NY: Psychology Press.  
Hill, D., Penson, W. J., & Charura, D. (2016). Working with dual diagnosis: A 
psychosocial perspective. London, England: Palgrave.  
Home Office. (July 2017). 2017 drug strategy. London, England: UK Government.  
Hodges, I. (2002). Moving beyond words: Therapeutic discourse and ethical 
problematization. Discourse Studies, 4(4), 455-479.  
Hollway, W., & Jefferson, T. (2000). Doing qualitative research Differently: Free 
association, narrative and the interview method. London, England: Sage.  
Hook, D. (2007). Foucault, psychology and the analytics of power. Basingstoke, 
England: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Horsfall, J., Cleary, M., Hunt, G. E., & Walter, G. (2009). Psychosocial treatments 
for people with co-occurring severe mental illnesses and substance use disorders 
(dual diagnosis): A review of empirical evidence. Harv Rev Psychiatry, 17(1), 
24-34.  
Hryb, K., Kirkhart, R., & Talbert, R. (2007). A call for standardized definition of dual 
diagnosis. Psychiatry, 4(9), 15-16.  
Hunt, G. E., Siegfried, N., Morley, K., Sitharthan, T., & Cleary, M. (2013). 
Psychosocial interventions for people with both severe mental illness and 
substance misuse. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, (10), CD001088.  
James, P. E. (2018). What is counselling psychology? In V. Galbraith (Ed.), 
Counselling psychology (topics in applied psychology) (pp. 3-18). Abingdon, 
England: Routledge.  
 136 
Jones, L. (2017). Discursive power games in counselling psychologists’ therapeutic 
accounts of working with male sexual dysfunction: A Foucaudian analysis. 
(Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Roehampton, London, England. 
Joranger, L. (2016). Psychology and the historical power–body conjunction: 
Foucault’s different view of the history and philosophy of psychology. Theory & 
Psychology, 26(3), 304-323.  
Josselson, R. (2017). Editor’s introduction. Qualitative Psychology, 4(2), 119-119.  
Jung, J. (2010). Alcohol, other drugs, and behavior (2nd ed.). London, England: 
Sage.  
Kalivas, P. W., & Volkow, N. D. (2005). The neural basis of addiction: A pathology 
of motivation and choice. Ajp, 162(8), 1403-1413.  
King, A. (2004). The prisoner of gender: Foucault and the disciplining of the female 
body. Journal of International Women's Studies, 5(2), 29-39.  
Koob, G. F., & Volkow, N. D. (2010). Neurocircuitry of addiction. 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 35, 217-238.  
Kuchuck, S. (Ed.). (2014). Clinical implications of the psychoanalyst's life 
experience: When the personal becomes professional. London, England: Taylor 
& Francis.  
Lancaster, K., Duke, K., & Ritter, A. (2015). Producing the ‘problem of drugs’: A 
cross national-comparison of ‘recovery’ discourse in two Australian and British 
reports. International Journal of Drug Policy, 26(7), 617-625.  
 137 
Larsson, P., Brooks, O., & Loewenthal, D. (2012). Counselling psychology and 
diagnostic categories: A critical literature review. Counselling Psychology 
Review, 27(3), 55-67.  
Lawrence-Jones, J. (2010). Dual diagnosis (drug/alcohol and mental health): Service 
user experiences. Practice, 22(2), 115-131.  
Leamy, M., Bird, V., Le Boutillier, C., Williams, J., & Slade, M. (2011). Conceptual 
framework for personal recovery in mental health: Systematic review and 
narrative synthesis. British Journal of Psychiatry, 199(6), 445-453.  
Levine, H. G. (1978). The discovery of addiction: Changing conceptions of habitual 
drunkenness in America. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 39, 143-174.  
Levine, H. G. (2015). Discovering addiction: Enduring conceptions of habitual 
drunkenness in America. In C. Reinarman, & R. Granfield (Eds.), Expanding 
addiction: Critical essays (pp. 25-44). Abingdon, England: Routledge.  
Loewenthal, D., & Snell, R. (2003). Post-modernism for psychotherapists: A critical 
reader. Hove, England: Routledge.  
Madill, A., Jordan, A., & Shirley, C. (2000). Objectivity and reliability in qualitative 
analysis: Realist, contextualist and radical constructionist epistemologies. British 
Journal of Psychology, 91(1), 1-20.  
Malson, H. (1998). The thin woman: Feminism, post-structuralism and the 
socialpsychology of anorexia nervosa. London, England: Routledge.  
Mars, S. G. (2012). The politics of addiction: Medical conflict and drug dependence 
in England since the 1960s. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 138 
Masterson, S., & Owen, S. (2006). Mental health service user's social and individual 
empowerment: Using theories of power to elucidate far-reaching strategies. 
Journal of Mental Health, 15(1), 19-34.  
McAteer, D. (2010). Philosophical pluralism: Navigating the sea of diversity in 
psychotherapeutic and counselling psychology practice. In M. Milton (Ed.), 
Therapy and beyond: Counselling psychology contributions to therapeutic and 
social issues (pp. 5-19). Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.  
McCandless, P. (1984). 'Curses of civilization': Insanity and drunkenness in Victorian 
Britain. British Journal of Addiction, 79, 49-58.  
McKeown, M., Derricott, J., Stowell-Smith, M., & Mercer, D. (1997). Dual 
diagnosis: The need for a collective response. Association of Nurses in Substance 
Abuse Journal, 17(11), 11-14.  
McKeown, M., Stowell-Smith, M., Derricott, J., & Mercer, D. (1998). Dual diagnosis 
as social control. Addiction Research, 6(1), 63-70. 
McKeown, O. (2010). Definition, recognition and assessment. In P. Phillips, O. 
McKeown & T. Sandford (Eds.), Dual diagnosis: Practice in context (pp. 3-12). 
Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.  
McSkimming, J. (2017). Documenting stories of disaffiliation from Christian 
fundamentalism: The challenge of reflexivity and coconstruction. Qualitative 
Psychology, 4(2), 165-185.  
Mental Health Network. (September 2009). Seeing double: Meeting the challenge of 
dual diagnosis. (No. 189). London, England: The NHS Confederation.  
 139 
Mental Health Network. (September 2011). Factsheet: Key facts and trends in mental 
health. London, England: NHS Confederation.  
Miller, L. (2008). Foucauldian constructionism. In J. A. Holstein, & J. F. Gubrium 
(Eds.), Handbook of constructionist research (pp. 251-274). New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press.  
Milton, M., Craven, M., & Coyle, A. (2010). Understanding human distress: Moving 
beyond the concept of 'psychopathology'. In M. Milton (Ed.), Therapy and 
beyond (pp. 57-72). Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Morrow, S. L. (2005). Quality and trustworthiness in qualitative research in 
counseling psychology. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52(2), 250-260.  
Mountian, I. (2013). Cultural ecstasies: Drugs, gender and the social imaginary. 
Hove, England: Routledge.  
Nathan, P. E., Conrad, M., & Skinstad, A. H. (2016). History of the concept of 
addiction. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 12, 29-51.  
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. (2011). Coexisting severe mental 
illness (psychosis) and substance misuse: Assessment and management in health 
care settings. (Clinical Guideline No. cg120). NICE.  
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. (2016). Coexisting severe mental 
illness and substance misuse: Community health and social care services. (NICE 
guideline No. ng 58). NICE.  
Nikander, P. (2008). Constructionism and discourse analysis. In J. A. Holstein, & J. 
F. Gubrium (Eds.), Handbook of constructionist research (pp. 413-428). New 
York, NY: The Guilford Press.  
 140 
O'Brien, C. (2011). Addiction and dependence in DSM-V. Addiction, 106(866), 867.  
O'Callaghan, J. (2017). What do you mean you procrastinate? discursively undoing 
the language of academic procrastination. Manuscript Submitted for 
Publication.  
Olsen, G. W. (1994). "Physician heal thyself": Drink, temperance and the medical 
question in the Victorian and Edwardian church of England, 1830-
1914. Addiction, 89(9), 1167-1177. 
Olssen, M. E. H. (2003). Foucault and critique: Kant, humanism and the human 
sciences. In M. A. Peters, M. E. H. Olssen & C. Lankshear (Eds.), Futures of 
critical theory: Dreams of difference (pp. 73-102). London, England: Rowman & 
Littlefield.  
Orford, J. (2001). Excessive appetites: A psychological view of addictions (2nd ed.). 
Chichester, England: Wiley.  
Orlans, V., & Van Scoyoc, S. (2010). A short introduction to counselling psychology. 
London, England: Sage.  
Orsini, M. M. (2017). Frame analysis of drug narratives in network news coverage. 
Contemporary Drug Problems: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly, 44(3), 189-211. 
Parker, I. (1992). Discourse dynamics: Critical analysis for social and individual 
psychology. Hove, England: Routledge.  
Parker, I. (Ed.). (1999). Deconstructing psychotherapy. London, England: Sage.  
Parker, I. (2013). Discourse analysis: Dimensions of critique in psychology. 
Qualitative Research in Psychology, 10(3), 223-239.  
 141 
Parker, I. (2018). Psy-complex in question: Critical review in psychology, 
psychoanalysis and social theory. Alresford, England: Zero Books.  
Perlman, D. C., & Jordan, A. E. (2017). To neither target, capture, surveille, nor wage 
war: On-going need for attention to metaphor theory in care and prevention for 
people who use drugs. Journal of Addictive Diseases, 36(1), 1-4.  
Ponteretto, J. G. (2005). Qualitative research in counseling psychology: A primer on 
research paradigms and philosophy of science. Journal of Counseling 
Psychology, 52(2), 126-136.  
Porter, R. (1985). The drinking man's disease: The 'pre-history' of alcoholism in 
Georgian Britain. British Journal of Addiction, 80, 385-396.  
Porter, R. (2013). Madness: A brief history. Oxford, England: Oxford University 
Press.  
Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2005). Qualitative interviews in psychology: Problems and 
possibilities. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2, 281-307.  
Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2008). Discursive constructionism. Handbook of 
constructionist research (pp. 275-294). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.  
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1995). Discourse analysis. In J. Smith, R. Harré & R. van 
Langhove (Eds.), Rethinking methods in psychology (pp. 80-92). London, 
England: Sage.  
Prison Reform Trust. (December 2011). Bromley briefings prison factfile. Prison 
Reform Trust.  
Radó, S. (1933). The psychoanalysis of pharmacothymia (drug addiction). The 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 2, 1-23.  
 142 
Ralley, C., Allott, R., Hare, D. J., & Wittkowski, A. (2009). The use of the repertory 
grid technique to examine staff beliefs about clients with dual diagnosis. Clinical 
Psychology & Psychotherapy, 16(2), 148-158.  
Randol, L. T. (2014). Navigating discursive power relations: A Foucauldian 
discourse analysis into counselling psychologists’ accounts of the mind-body 
relationship. (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Roehampton, London, 
England.  
Reinarman, C. (2005). Addiction as accomplishment: The discursive construction of 
disease. Addiction Research and Theory, 13(4), 307-320.  
Reinarman, C., & Granfield, R. (2015). Addiction is not just a brain disease: Critical 
studies of addiction. In C. Reinarman, & R. Granfield (Eds.), Expanding 
addiction: Critical essays (pp. 1-24). Abingdon, England: Routledge.  
Reith, G. (2004). Consumption and its discontents: Addiction, identity and the 
problems of freedom. British Journal of Sociology, 55(2), 283-300.  
Resnick, S. G., & Rosenheck, R. A. (2006). Recovery and positive psychology: 
Parallel themes and potential synergies. Psychiatric Services, 57(1), 120-122.  
Rizq, R. (2006). Training and disillusion in counselling psychology: A 
psychoanalytic perspective. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research 
and Practice, 79(4), 613-627.  
Rizq, R. (2010). Psychodynamic approaches. In R. Woolfe, S. Strawbridge, B. 
Douglas & W. Dryden (Eds.), Handbook of counselling psychology (3rd ed., pp. 
85-104). London, England: Sage.  
 143 
Roberts, M., & Bell, A. (2013). Recovery in mental health and substance misuse 
services: A commentary on recent policy development in the United Kingdom. 
Advances in Dual Diagnosis, 6(2), 76-83.  
Roberts, B., & Jones, R. (2012). Dual diagnosis narratives and their implications for 
the alcohol and other drug sector in Australia. Contemp.Drug Probs., 39, 663.  
Room, R. (2005). Stigma, social inequality and alcohol and drug use. Drug & Alcohol   
        Review, 24(2), 143-156. 
Room, R. (2015). The cultural framing of addiction. In C. Reinarman, & R. Granfield 
(Eds.), Expanding addiction: Critical essays (pp. 43-50). Abingdon, England: 
Routledge.  
Rose, D. (2014). The mainstreaming of recovery. Journal of Mental Health, 23(5), 
217-218. 
Rose, N. (1985). The psychological complex: Psychology, politics and society in 
England, 1869-1939. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
Rose, N. (1998). Inventing our selves: Psychology, power and personhood. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.  
Rosenthal, R. N. (2015). Introduction. In R. N. Rosenthal (Ed.), Dual diagnosis (pp. 
ix-xi). Abingdon: Routledge.  
Rosino, M. L., & Hughey, M. W. (2017). Speaking through silence: Racial discourse 
and identity construction in mass-mediated debates on the “War on drugs”. 




Rush, B. (1812). An inquiry into the effects of the ardent spirits upon the human body 
and mind, with an account of the means of preventing, and of the remedies for 
curing them (7th ed.). Boston, MA: Manning & Loring. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=yPbLPGObSfEC&printsec=frontcover&so
urce=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false 
Rush, B. (1835). Medical inquiries and observations upon the disease of the mind 




Sacco, L. N. (October 2, 2014). Drug enforcement in the United States: History, 
policy and trends. (No. R43749). Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43749.pdf  
Sarup, M. (1993). Post-structuralism and postmodernism. Hemel Hempstead, 
England: Harvester Whatsheaf.  
Schulte, S. J., & Holland, M. (2008). Dual diagnosis in Manchester, UK: 
Practitioners' estimates of prevalence rates in mental health and substance misuse 
services. Mental Health and Substance use, 1(2), 118-124.  
Schulte, S. J., Meier, P. S., Stirling, J., & Berry, M. (2008). Treatment approaches for 
dual diagnosis clients in England. Drug and Alcohol Review, 27(6), 650-658.  
Schulte, S. J., Meier, P. S., Stirling, J., & Berry, M. (2010). Unrecognised dual 
diagnosis – a risk factor for dropout of addiction treatment. Mental Health and 
Substance use, 3(2), 94-109.  
 145 
Scull, A. (2015). Madness in civilization. London, England: Thames & Hudson.  
Seear, K., & Fraser, S. (2014). The addict as victim: Producing the 'problem' of 
addiction in Australian victims of crime compensation laws. International 
Journal of Drug Policy, 25(5), 826-835.  
Shillito-Clarke, C. (2010). Ethical issues in counselling psychology. In R. Woolfe, S. 
Strawbridge, B. Douglas & W. Dryden (Eds.), Handbook of counselling 
psychology (3rd ed., pp. 507-528). London, England: Sage.  
Slade, M., Adams, N., & O'Hagan, M. (2012). Recovery: Past progress and future 
challenges. International Review of Psychiatry, 24(1), 1-4.  
Smith, I. (2010). Essay review: The birth of addiction. History of Psychiatry, 21(3), 
351-355.  
Steffen, E. (2016). Ethical considerations in qualitative research. In E. Lyons, & A. 
Coyle (Eds.), Analysing qualitative data in psychology (2nd ed., pp. 31-44). 
London, England: Sage.  
Strawbridge, S., & Woolfe, R. Counselling psychology: Origins, developments and 
challenges. In R. Woolfe, S. Strawbridge, B. Douglas & W. Dryden (Eds.), 
Handbook of counselling psychology (3rd ed., pp. 3-23). London, England: Sage.  
Thom, B., & Berridge, V. (1995). Special units for common problems: The birth of 
alcohol treatment units in England. Social History of Medicine, 8(1), 75-93.  
Thompson, K. (2003). Forms of resistance: Foucault on tactical reversal and self-
formation. Continental Philosophy Review, 36, 113-138.  
 146 
Trotter, T. (1804). An essay, medical philosophical, and chemical, on drunkenness 
and its effects on the human body. London, England: Longman, Hurst, Rees & 
Orme.  
UK Drug Policy Commission. (July 2008). A vision of recovery: UKDPC Recovery 
Consensus Group. London, England: UKDPC.  
UK Drug Policy Commission. (2012). Dual Diagnosis: A challenge for the reformed 
NHS and for public health england. London, England: Centre for Mental Health, 
DrugScope and UKDPC. 
Valverde, M. (1997). 'Slavery from within': The invention of alcoholism and the 
question of free will. Social History, 22(3), 251-269.  
Van Dijk, T. A. (2008). Discourse and context: A sociocognitive approach. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.  
Velleman, R., & Baker, A. (2008). Moving away from medicalised and partisan 
terminology: A contribution to the debate. Mental Health and Substance use, 
1(1), 2-9.  
Vintges, K. (2012). Muslim women in the western media: Foucault, agency, 
governmentality and ethics. European Journal of Women's Studies, 19(3), 283-
298.  
Vrecko, S. (2010). Birth of a brain disease: Science, the state and addiction                          
neuropolitics. History of the Human Sciences, 23(4), 52-67. 
Vrecko, S. (2016). Risky bodies, drugs and biopolitics. Body & Society, 22(3), 54-77. 
Walker, C. A. (2015). Social constructionism and qualitative research. The Journal of 
Theory Construction and Testing, 19(2), 37-38.  
 147 
Webb, D. (2010). Consumer perspectives. In P. Phillips, O. McKeown & T. Sandford 
(Eds.), Dual diagnosis: Practice in context (pp. 27-36). Chichester, England: 
Wiley-Blackwell.  
Webb, L. (2012). The recovery model and complex health needs: What health 
psychology can learn from mental health and substance misuse service provision. 
Journal of Health Psychology, 17(5), 731-741.  
Weinberg, D. (2008). The philosophical foundations of constructionist research. In J. 
A. Holstein, & J. F. Gubrium (Eds.), Handbook of constructionist research (pp. 
13-40). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.  
Weinberg, D. (2013). Post-humanism, addiction and the loss of self-control: 
Reflections on the missing core in addiction science. International Journal of 
Drug Policy, 24(3), 173-181.  
West, R., & Brown, J. (2013). Theory of addiction (2nd ed.) Chichester, England: 
Wiley-Blackwell.  
Willig, C. (2000). A discourse-dynamic approach to the study of subjectivity in 
health psychology. Theory and Psychology, 10(4), 547-570.  
Willig, C. (2013). Introducing qualitative research in psychology (3rd ed.). 
Maidenhead, England: Open University Press.  
Woolfe, R. (2016). Mapping the world of helping: The place of counselling 
psychology. In B. Douglas, R. Woolfe, S. Strawbridge, E. Kasket & V. Galbraith 
(Eds.), Handbook of counselling psychology (4th ed., pp. 5-19). London, 
England: Sage.  
 148 
Zhao, G. (2012). Human science for human freedom? Piaget's developmental 
research and Foucault's ethical truth games. Educational Studies, 48, 450-464.  
Zinberg, N. (1984). Drug, set and setting: The basis of controlled intoxicant use. New 























The research for this project was submitted for ethics consideration under the reference 
PSYC 16/ 207 in the Department of Psychology and was approved under the 





























CENTRE FOR RESEARCH IN SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION (CREST) 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
DATA STORAGE AND PROTECTION PROCEDURES 
 
SOURCES 
These procedures are informed by, and consistent with, the following sources:  
•  Roehampton University Data Protection Policy, University of Roehampton, 
May 2010 (revised).  
• Ethical Guidelines for Researching Counselling and Psychotherapy, British 
Association of Counselling and Psychotherapy, 2004.  
• Encrypting Confidential Data using Windows XP, Counselling and 
Psychotherapy Research Guidelines, Counselling Unit, University of 
Strathclyde (available via Google Group). 
•  Ethical Principles for Conducting Research with Human Participants, British 
Psychological Society (accessed Sept. 2008). 
  Personal communications with Ralph Weedon, Data Protection Officer, 
University of Strathclyde 
 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
•  The Chief Investigator has overall responsibility to ensure that the 
appropriate data storage and protection guidelines are followed. 
 
NON-ANONYMISED/PERSONAL DATA 
•  Non-anonymised (or ‘personal’) data refers to any form of documentation 
or media – electronic or otherwise – in which an individual is identifiable. 
This includes, but is not limited to:  
  • signed consent forms 
  • client identity forms (including DOB, GP details, gender etc) 
  •  video recordings 
Note: even if no name or other obvious data is involved that would identify 
an individual, data such as date of birth, student matriculation number, 
national insurance number can be ‘triangulated’, perhaps with other data a 
third party has acquired, in such as way as to effectively identify someone. 
Anything that can be used in this way is therefore to be considered personal 
data.  
•  Collection of non-anonymised data will be kept to a minimum, and will only 
be obtained where it is ethically necessary (as in the case of signed consent 
forms), or where it clearly adds to the scientific value of a project (for 
instance, the video recording of counselling sessions). 
•  Non-anonymised data will be kept for ten years.  
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•  All non-anonymised data will be clearly labelled with a date at which it 
should be destroyed.  
• Non-anonymised data will be destroyed in a way which ensures that the 
data cannot be recovered in any way.  
•  Non-anonymised data will be kept physically and/or electronically separate 
from related anonymised data so that links can not be made between the 
two sets of data. 
•  Non-electronic personal data, such as tape recordings and signed consent 
forms, should be kept in a locked and secure location at all times, and, 
wherever possible, at the University of Roehampton.  
•  Electronic personal data will be encrypted and should always be kept on a 
password protected storage device: wherever possible a PC or network 
drive located at the University of Roehampton.  
•  Personal data should not be kept on – or transferred to – laptops, USB 
sticks, CDs or other mobile/portable devices unless absolutely necessary. As 
soon as such data is transferred to a secure University location, it must be 
removed from the portable device such that it cannot be recovered in any 
way.  
  Should it be necessary to transfer personal data from person to person, this 
should be done in a secure manner (i.e., by hand or by recorded delivery), 
always separate from any anonymised data. Any posted materials should be 
marked ‘private and confidential’ and sent recorded delivery. 
•  For the duration of a study, non-anonymised data may, if absolutely 
necessary, be stored (in the manner identified above) by investigators other 
than the Chief Investigator (for instance, where a student is analysing video 
tapes of counselling sessions). However, on completion of the write-up of 
the research, all non-anonymised data will be returned to the Chief 
Investigator for storage, and any copies destroyed. 
 
ANONYMISED DATA 
•  Anonymised data refers to any form of documentation or media – 
electronic or otherwise – in which an individual is in no way identifiable. 
This includes, but is not limited to:  
• SPSS spreadsheets in which identifying characteristics (such 
as age) are not recorded 
•  completed questionnaires: qualitative or quantitative  
•  Anonymised data may be kept for an unlimited period, and may be used for 
subsequent research projects and data analyses at the discretion of the 
Chief Investigator (provided that this is made explicit to participants in 
consent forms).  
•  Non-electronic anonymised data will be kept in a locked and secure location 
at all times, ideally at the University of Roehampton.  
•  Electronic anonymised data may be stored electronically. This should 
always be to the highest possible standard of confidentiality: for instance, 
storage in an encrypted folder.  It may also be kept on a password 
protected storage device, ideally at the University of Roehampton and, 
wherever possible, will be encrypted. Transfer and storage on 
portable/mobile devices (such as USB pens) should be kept to a minimum. 
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  Transfer of anonymised data should be conducted to the highest standards 
of confidentiality, always separate from any non-anonymised data. Any 
posted materials should be marked ‘private and confidential.’ If 
anonymised data is transferred via email, it should be transferred by the 
receiver to an encrypted portion of a hard disk as soon as possible, and 
both sender and receiver should hard delete the email/attachments from 
their email server. 
•  For the duration of a study, anonymised data may be stored (in the manner 
identified above) by investigators other than the Chief Investigator. 
However, on completion of the write-up of the research, all anonymised 
data will be returned to the Chief Investigator for storage, and any copies 
destroyed. 
 
PARTIALLY ANONYMISED DATA (ALSO KNOWN AS PSEUDO-ANONYMISED 
DATA) 
•  This section refers to any form of documentation or media – electronic or 
otherwise – in which it is highly unlikely that research participants can be 
identified, but in which the possibility of triangulation exists. This may 
include, but is not limited to:  
  • audio recordings 
 Note, if such media includes clearly identifying content (for instance, an 
interviewee reveals their name or that of their husband on an audio 
recording), then it will be treated as non-anonymised data until those 
identifying characteristics are removed.  
•  Wherever possible, partially anonymised (and non-anonymised) data 
should be scrutinised and all identifying details should be deleted/erased 
(for instance, identifying features on transcripts, such as names of partners, 
should be deleted or blacked out). 
•  Where all identifying details of partially anonymised data have been 
deleted/erased, this data will be treated as anonymised data, and subjected 
to the same procedures as above. 
•  In instances where partially anonymised data can not be fully anonymised 
(for instance, audio recordings in which the participant may be identifiable 
from their voice), this data will be kept for ten years, and will be stored 
according to the protocols for non-anonymised data. 
•  Within this ten year period, partially anonymised data may be used for 
subsequent research projects and data analyses at the discretion of the 
Chief Investigator (provided that this is made explicit to participants in 
consent forms). 
 
THE EIGHT GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE DATA PROTECTION ACT, 1998 
 Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully (with specific 
requirements regarding sensitive personal data). 
  Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful 
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible 
with that purpose or those purposes. 
  Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to 
the purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
  Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. 
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 Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for 
longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes. 
 Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data 
subjects. 
 Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against 
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against loss or 
destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
  Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the 
European Economic Area, unless that country or territory ensures an 
adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in 
















































PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
 
Title of Research Project: A Qualitative Investigation of Psychological Practitioners’ 
Experiences of Working Therapeutically with Dual Diagnosis Clients. 
 
Thank you for considering participation in this research. Please read carefully the 
information below, and do not hesitate to ask me if you have any further questions. 
 
Brief Description of Research Project, and What Participation Involves:  
 
This research aims to investigate how psychological practitioners understand and 
experience working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients. It also also aims to 
examine how psychological practitioners conceptualise dual diagnosis.  
This research hopes to recruit 10 participants. Participants will be qualified 
psychological practitioners with a minimum self-identified 6-month experience of 
working with dual diagnosis clients. Participants will be accredited by the BACP, 
UKCP, BABCP, BPC or BPS. 
 
In this study, you will take part in a 60- to 90- minute interview with the researcher, 
which will be audio-recorded. Interviews will be conducted at your workplace or the 
University of Roehampton. There will be three main areas of exploration in this 
interview: your understanding or conceptualisation of dual diagnosis, your past 
experiences of working with dual diagnosis clients, and any thoughts you may have 
about working with client group in the future. 
 
This project has been approved under the procedures of the University of 
Roehampton’s Ethics Committee. 
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity: 
 
Your anonymity will be protected at all times. All data will be securely stored in 
encrypted and password-protected computer files and locked filing cabinets. No one 
outside of the research team will have access to your individual data. People within 
the research team will not be aware of any links between your identity and any 
collected data. Signed consent forms will be stored separately from all other data. Your 
identity is not traceable, and will be protected in the publication of any findings. 
 
Confidentiality will be kept at all times unless there is a real concern about your safety 
or other’s safety. 
 
Right to Withdraw: 
 
 155 
You may withdraw from participation from this study at any point during or after this 
interview, without giving a reason. However, if you choose to withdraw after 
submission of the first draft of a thesis based on these research findings, your data 
may still be used in collated form. In order to withdraw, please contact the researcher 
and provide the participant number on the Debrief Form. 
 
Investigator Contact Details: 
 
Matt Treadwell 
Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue 
London, SW15 4JD 
Email: treadwem@roehampton.ac.uk 
Tel: 07796 957014 
 
Consent Statement:  
 
I agree to take part in this research, and am aware that I am free to withdraw at any 
point without giving a reason, although if I do so I understand that my data might still 
be used in a collated form. I understand that the information I provide will be treated 
in confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be protected in the publication 
of any findings, and that data will be collected and processed in accordance with the 








Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any 
other queries please raise this with the investigator (or if the researcher is a student 
you can also contact the Director of Studies.) However, if you would like to contact 
an independent party please contact the Head of Department.  
 
Director of Studies Contact Details:  Head of Department Contact Details: 
 
Dr. Janek Dubowski     Dr. Diane Bray  
Director of Postgraduate Provision              Head of Department 
Department of Psychology                                        Department of Psychology  
University of Roehampton                                         University of Roehampton  
Whitelands College                                                    Whitelands College  
Holybourne Avenue                                                   Holybourne Avenue   
London SW15 4JD                                                    London SW15 4JD 
Email: j.dubowski@roehampton.ac.uk                      Email: d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 






















Title of Research Project: A Qualitative Investigation of Psychological Practitioners’ 
Experiences of Working Therapeutically with Dual Diagnosis Clients. 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study, we appreciate your valuable 
contribution. 
 
This study aimed to examine how psychological practitioners experience working with 
dual diagnosis clients. It used interviews to collect appropriate data, to allow the 
researcher to materialise the research objectives.  
 
• I agree that this interview has been conducted professionally and ethically. 
• A copy of the transcription will be sent to me within a month after the interview. 
• My anonymity is ensured in this project and in all future publications that may 
derive from this thesis. 
 
Participant:………………………………       Researcher: ………………………………..... 
Signature:……………………………….       Signature: ……………………………………. 
Date:……………………………………..       Date: ………………………………………..... 
 
Researcher Contact Details: 
 
Matt Treadwell 
Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue 
London, SW15 4JD 
Email: treadwem@roehampton.ac.uk 
Tel: 07796 957014 
 
 
If the interview caused any emotional distress or discomfort please speak to your 
clinical supervisor. Alternatively, if you would like to access an independent source of 





         BPS                                              UKCP                                           BACP                
 www.bps.org.uk                               www.ukcp.org.uk                        www.bacp.co.uk  
Tel: 0116 254 9568                           Tel: 020 7014 9955                     Tel: 01455 
883300 




Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any 
other queries please raise this with the investigator (or if the researcher is a student 
you can also contact the Director of Studies.) However, if you would like to contact 
an independent party please contact the Head of Department.  
 
Director of Studies Contact Details:  Head of Department Contact Details: 
 
Dr. Janek Dubowski     Dr. Diane Bray  
Director of Postgraduate Provision              Head of Department 
Department of Psychology                                        Department of Psychology  
University of Roehampton                                         University of Roehampton  
Whitelands College                                                    Whitelands College  
Holybourne Avenue                                                   Holybourne Avenue   
London SW15 4JD                                                    London SW15 4JD 
Email: j.dubowski@roehampton.ac.uk                      Email: d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk 
Tel:  020 8392 3214                                                  Tel: 020 8392 3627               







































Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue 





To whom it may concern,  
 
I am a counselling psychologist in training on the Counselling Psychology 
Doctoral programme at the University of Roehampton. I am researching 
psychological practitioners’ experiences of working with dual diagnosis clients.  
This study has been approved under the procedures of the University of 
Roehampton’s Ethics Committee. 
 
I am looking to recruit ten qualified psychological practitioners who have a 
minimum of 6 months’ experience with this client group, to participate in my 
research. I would like to interview these practitioners for 60 to 90 minutes about 
their experience of working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients. 
Interviewees should be accredited by the BACP, UKCP, BABCP, BPC or BPS. 
 
If you are willing to advertise this research in your organisation, please use the 
leaflet attached to post on any noticeboards or give it out in team meetings. If 
you know of any counselling psychologists or psychotherapeutic practitioners 
who may be willing to take part in this research, please contact me or the 
Director of Studies at the address below.  And if you have any further questions 
please do not hesitate to contact me or the Director of Studies.  
 
I believe that the proposed study will meaningfully contribute to the research 
base on dual diagnosis. This may be beneficial for practitioners and the wider 
clinical field in which they practice, and dual diagnosis clients themselves. I 
would be grateful if you would consider helping me recruit for this research.  
 
Thank you in advance for your time and help. 
 












Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue 
London, SW15 4JD 
 
 
Director of Studies:   
Dr Janek Dubowski 
Director of Postgraduate Provision 
Department of Psychology  
University of Roehampton    
Whitelands College     
London SW15 4JD 
Email: j.dubowski@roehampton.ac.uk 




































Are you a psychological practitioner currently 
working with Dual Diagnosis clients? 
 
I am conducting a study on practitioners’ experiences of working 
therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients. 
 
I am a counselling psychologist in training on the Counselling Psychology 
Doctoral programme at the University of Roehampton. I would like to interview 
qualified psychological practitioners who currently work with dual diagnosis 
clients, and have at least 6 months’ experience with this client group. 
Interviewees should be accredited by the BACP, UKCP, BABCP, BPC or BPS. 
Interviews would last no longer than 90 minutes. 
 
While there is increasing research in the dual diagnosis field, practioners’ 
experience of working with dual diagnosis clients remains an under-researched 
area. I believe that a greater understanding of practitioners’ experiences of 
working therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients is valuable and could 
contribute significantly to dual diagnosis research. Developing an 
understanding of practitioners’ experiences of working with dual diagnosis 
clients may benefit not only clinicians and the services in which they practice, 
but also dual diagnosis clients themselves. 
 
If you think you or anyone you know might be interested in participating in this 




Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue 










Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue 




Dear Sir or Madam  
 
I am a counselling psychologist in training on the Counselling Psychology 
Doctoral programme at Roehampton University. I am researching counselling 
psychologists’ or psychotherapeutic practitioners’ experiences of working with 
dual diagnosis clients.  This study has been approved under the procedures of 
the University of Roehampton’s Ethics Committee. 
 
I am looking to recruit ten qualified psychological practitioners who have a 
minimum of 6 months’ experience of working therapeutically with dual 
diagnosis clients, to participate in my research. I would like to interview these 
practitioners for 60 to 90 minutes about their experience of working 
therapeutically with dual diagnosis clients. Interviewees should be accredited 
by the BACP, UKCP, BABCP, BPC or BPS. 
 
I understand that you may currently work with dual diagnosis clients in your 
practice. So I am writing to see if you would be interested in participating in this 
research. If so, please contact me or the Director of Studies at the address 
below. If you know of any other counselling psychologists or psychotherapeutic 
practitioners who may be willing to take part in this research, I would be grateful 
if you would contact me as well.  And if you have any further questions please 
do not hesitate to contact me or the Director of Studies.  
 
I believe that the proposed study will meaningfully contribute to the research 
base on dual diagnosis. This may be beneficial for practitioners and the wider 
clinical field in which they practice, and dual diagnosis clients themselves. I 
would be grateful if you would consider helping me recruit for this research.  
 
Thank you in advance for your time and help. 
 












Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue 
London, SW15 4JD 
 
 
Director of Studies:   
Dr Janek Dubowski 
Director of Postgraduate Provision 
Department of Psychology  
University of Roehampton    
Whitelands College     
London SW15 4JD 
Email: j.dubowski@roehampton.ac.uk 
Tel:  020 8392 3214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
